

# 2016 FIFPRO GLOBAL EMPLOYMENT REPORT

Working Conditions in  
Professional Football

IN COLLABORATION WITH

MANCHESTER  
1824

The University of Manchester

“

WE FOOTBALLERS  
STAND TOGETHER,  
PROUD AND UNITED  
AND THIS SOLIDARITY  
GIVES US OUR  
STRENGTH.

**Didier Drogba**  
Striker, Ivory Coast  
Honorary President, FIFPro Division Africa





# TOP FINDINGS

2016 FIFPro  
GLOBAL  
EMPLOYMENT  
REPORT

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Professional Football

# BEYOND THE FLOODLIGHTS

## The global football employment market is a tale of three worlds


**Published for the first time, the 2016 FIFPro Global Employment Report is the most comprehensive and far-reaching survey of its kind, analysing the labour conditions of professional players in the world's most popular team sport.**

Football is deeply rooted in our societies and generates passion, commitment and a strong sense of

community. As a consequence, it has developed into a global economy and the employment of professional players is at the heart of the game.

The global employment market for professional footballers is as fragmented as the competitiveness and wealth in football overall. The borders of this segmented world map can neither be grouped by geography nor by league – and striking differences sometimes exist even within a single club.

### The global football market is broadly defined in three tiers:



**THE TOP TIER** is formed by a global elite of players with superior talent and skill. They enjoy very good working conditions at the highest level and a very strong market position. These footballers play predominantly in the Big Five European leagues (Premier League, Bundesliga, La Liga, Serie A, Ligue 1). Other wealthy clubs in growing markets around the world offer selected players comparable conditions.

**THE SECOND TIER** includes a large number of professional footballers playing for clubs offering more moderate, but decent employment conditions in well-regulated and relatively sustainably financed markets such as Scandinavia, Australia, the United States, and top clubs in South America, as well as in the second divisions and competitions of major football markets.

**THE THIRD TIER** represents the majority of players, who are under constant pressure to extend their careers in professional football and face precarious employment conditions, including a large degree of personal and contractual abuse. As this report shows, these conditions can be found in large parts of Eastern Europe, Africa and some countries in South and Latin America.

# Why this report?

Public perceptions of professional footballers are largely influenced by the image of players in the top leagues. While these players attract the highest exposure, they also represent the smallest segment within professional football. As a consequence, people often assume that the benefits enjoyed by these players are the norm for most footballers. But the vast majority of players are in the second and third tier where employment conditions are very different.

This report aims to provide a balanced and realistic overview of the conditions and experiences of players throughout the industry, where very little research has been undertaken until now. It looks beyond the bright lights of the top tier and reveals the realities of the working conditions experienced by the large majority of players.

The survey is based on anonymous feedback via questionnaires. However, given the sensitivity of some of the questions and the direct effect which open answers might have on the players, we can assume that in some cases the actual figures might even be higher than portrayed.

The top findings tell a compelling story about the realities of the large majority of professional players who are faced with uncertainty, modest pay and a remarkably short career.

For the first time, this report provides a holistic insight into the different worlds of professional football. It is the joint responsibility of player unions, clubs, leagues, federations and public policy makers to ensure, through effective regulation, that more players benefit from decent employment conditions at sustainably run clubs.

**It looks beyond the bright lights of the top tier and reveals the realities of the working conditions experienced by the large majority of players.**

**The report is the largest data collection about working conditions in football ever produced and the first edition of a research series which will be repeated every few years. It provides a comprehensive and holistic understanding of the global football employment market, from the top leagues to the base of the professional pyramid. Its purpose is to create measurable and comparable evidence in order to:**

## Inform

the industry, public and policy makers with reliable data to better understand the specific nature of a career in professional football via first-hand feedback from the players

## Protect

the rights of players as citizens and employees by raising awareness of their experiences

## Improve

the labour conditions of professional players worldwide by providing a basis for decision making

## Monitor

changes in employment conditions in the global football industry over time

# 9

Overview

# TOP FINDINGS

## 1 GLOBAL ICONS AND MINIMUM WAGE WORKERS

Less than 2% of players earn more than 720.000 USD a year while over 45% earn less than 1.000 USD a month

## 2 (DIS)RESPECT OF CONTRACTS

41% of players experience delayed payments

## 3 A SHORT CAREER AND EVEN SHORTER CONTRACTS

The global average for a player's contract is less than two years

## 4 CAREER PATH INTERFERENCE

29% of transferred players are moved between clubs against their will

## 5 UNREGULATED WORKING CONDITIONS

The majority of players face precarious employment

## 6 ISOLATION FROM THE TEAM

22% of players are aware of forced training alone, used by some clubs to pressure players

## 7 ABUSE OF PLAYERS

9% players suffer from violence, 8% from discrimination, and 16% harassment

## 8 YOUNG PLAYERS NEED PROTECTION

Youngsters are the most vulnerable in the football economy

## 9 INTEGRITY AT RISK

On average, one player per line-up will be approached by match-fixers in his career

# 1 Top finding GLOBAL ICONS AND MINIMUM WAGE WORKERS


**Less than 2% of players earn more than 720.000 USD a year while over 45% earn less than 1.000 USD a month**

FOOTBALL IS MORE THAN JUST A SPORT. IT IS ALSO A SPECTACLE THAT ATTRACTS A WORLDWIDE AUDIENCE IN THE MILLIONS. THE FOOTBALL INDUSTRY IS A PEOPLE BUSINESS, DRIVEN BY THE SAME ECONOMIC FACTORS AS THE ENTERTAINMENT SECTOR. SUPPLY AND DEMAND ALLOW THE MOST TALENTED PLAYERS TO MAXIMISE THEIR REWARDS, WHILE THE MAJORITY OF PLAYERS COMPETE FOR A LIMITED NUMBER OF JOBS. THIS MAKES THEIR MARKET POSITION WEAK AND THEIR EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS OFTEN PRECARIOUS.

In many countries the general economic climate also determines the potential for football's growth and professionalization, as well as the number of decently paying full-time jobs for players. Outside the top markets the financial models for the game are often fragile

and unsustainable. Players are usually the first to see the downside of "jackpot economics" and poor club management. The objective for all stakeholders must be to ensure that as many jobs as possible provide sustainable employment conditions

## OUTSIDE THE GLOBAL ELITE, PLAYER SALARIES ARE MUCH LOWER THAN THE PUBLIC IMAGINES




PERCENTAGE OF PLAYERS RECEIVING MONTHLY SALARY

<b>21%</b>   OF PLAYERS EARNED LESS THAN 300USD NET PER MONTH	<b>74%</b>   MADE LESS THAN 4.000 USD NET PER MONTH
<b>45%</b>   MADE LESS THAN 1.000 USD NET PER MONTH	<b>2%</b>   EARNED ABOVE 720.000 USD NET A YEAR

The analysis of such numbers should obviously be viewed in the context of the general income and economic power of the country that a player plays in – 300 USD in the Congo is worth considerably more than the same amount in the United States. Yet, globally speaking, most players are far removed from an income that provides them with financial security for a lengthy period after professional football – many even struggle to make ends meet during their careers.

### GLOBALLY, 45% OF PLAYERS EARN LESS THAN 1.000 USD A MONTH

This applies to 73% of players in Africa, 47% in South America and 32% in Europe



PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS EARNING UNDER 1.000 USD A MONTH BY REGION

# 2 Top finding (DIS)RESPECT OF CONTRACTS

41% of players experience  
delayed payments


IN ADDITION TO LARGE INCOME DIFFERENCES, MANY PLAYERS ARE EXPOSED TO SIGNIFICANT, DELIBERATE AND ABUSE OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS AND CONTRACT BREACHES.

Football is facing a global epidemic of delayed payments of salaries and other remuneration. This is a global problem, which cannot be left unaddressed in any continent or region. Countries with less developed labour market standards – in football or overall – are more prone to non-payment.

This situation is compounded by weak regulatory standards within the industry, a lack of labour market oversight at national level, as well as the economic unsustainability of many clubs and leagues.

## 41% OF ALL PLAYERS REPORTED EXPERIENCING DELAYED SALARY PAYMENTS OVER THE PAST TWO SEASONS

Some of these delays last for very long periods of more than 3, 6 or even up to 12 months or longer.



PUNCTUALITY OF PAYMENT OVER THE LAST TWO SEASONS


The likelihood of delayed salary payments varies significantly between regions:



## TWO FACTORS THAT INCREASE THE RISK OF DELAYED PAYMENTS ARE LOW INCOME AND POOR CONTRACTUAL STANDARDS

### Low income and delayed payments

In Europe and the Americas in particular, players in lower salary brackets were significantly more likely to experience payment delays, putting them at extra risk of financial hardship.



PAYMENT DELAYS AND WAGE LEVELS PER REGION

**PLAYERS WITH A COPY OF THEIR CONTRACT HAD A 15% BETTER CHANCE OF BEING PAID ON TIME**

Having a written contract (as opposed to only a verbal agreement) improved the chances of timely payment.



51.10% | DELAY IN PAYMENT

40.20% | DELAY IN PAYMENT


48.90% | NO DELAY IN PAYMENT

59.80% | NO DELAY IN PAYMENT

PAYMENT DELAYS AND AVAILABILITY OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT

**EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS WERE 20% MORE LIKELY TO BE HONoured THAN CIVIL- OR SELF-EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS**

Civil law or self-employment contracts are largely an Eastern European phenomenon, a region with generally high rates of non-payment.



5 OF RESPONDENTS WHO EXPERIENCED A DELAY

PAYMENT DELAYS AND TYPE OF CLUB CONTRACT

“

**It's one of the best jobs in the world, but people should also know that it's difficult to reach a high level and only very few make it to the top.**

Defender, Italy



# 3 Top finding A SHORT CAREER AND EVEN SHORTER CONTRACTS

**Labour conditions at risk  
under market pressure**

THE SIGNIFICANT DIFFICULTIES THAT PLAYERS FACE IN ENSURING THEIR EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ARE RESPECTED ARE COMPOUNDED BY THE FACT THAT A PLAYER'S CAREER IS SHORT AND HIS CONTRACT IS SHORTER STILL. THE HIGH PRESSURE ON PLAYERS TO MAXIMIZE THEIR SHORT CAREER FORCES THEM TO ACCEPT NEW CONTRACTS AT THE EXPENSE OF POOR LABOUR CONDITIONS.

Unlike any other industry, the transfer system incentivizes clubs to consider players as both employees and assets. Clubs often seek to earn income by selling their assets before the expiry of the contract to gather a fee. The impact of this market structure strongly affects both the players who are subject to transfers and those who are not.

The majority of players face constant pressure to extend and maximize their careers, which demands a lot of sacrifices – education, personal abuse, delayed payments, etc. At the same time, this majority finds itself in a market position where many have to endure such experiences as alternative employment opportunities are rare and often give little hope for improved conditions.


## THE GLOBAL AVERAGE LENGTH OF A PLAYER'S CONTRACT IS 22.6 MONTHS



## THE LOWER THE SALARY, THE SHORTER THE CONTRACT

The large majority of players at the low end of the income pyramid are under constant pressure to secure future employment. At the other end of the scale, the most

talented players are bound by longer contracts, limiting their opportunities to offer their services to other clubs




### THERE IS A POSITIVE CORRELATION BETWEEN BEING TRANSFERRED FOR A FEE AND RECEIVING A HIGHER WAGE

Players commanding a transfer fee tend to be the most talented – talent for which clubs must pay by offering competitive wages and, at the same time, talent that is protected through longer contracts by current clubs as they seek to maximise their return on investment in a future transfer. However, most economic analysis argues that the current transfer system reduces wages

overall, suggesting that the limited number of potential employers puts negative pressure on salaries.

This finding also shows that the transfer market – with the limited redistributive benefits it provides – excludes those clubs offering lower wages




PERCENTAGE OF PLAYERS RECEIVING MONTHLY WAGE AND HOW THEY ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT

### 63% OF PLAYERS EXPERIENCED A DELAY OF PAYMENT AT THEIR CURRENT CLUB – A SIGNAL OF THEIR WEAK MARKET POSITION

The vast majority of players endure non-payment for long periods and yet stay at the club – even when having a just cause to terminate their contracts. Reasons for this can vary: the weak market position of

the player, which provides him with no other options for employment, and a lack of trust in the judicial process for retrieving his owed remuneration, are only two common factors.



PLACE OF PAYMENT DELAYS

Top finding

# 4 CAREER PATH INTERFERENCE

**29% of players are forced to change their clubs against their will**

THE GENERALLY WEAK MARKET POSITION OF THE MAJORITY OF PLAYERS IS ALSO EXEMPLIFIED BY THE FACT THAT 29% OF PLAYERS ARE FORCED TO CHANGE THEIR CLUB AGAINST THEIR WILL, DESPITE HAVING AN ONGOING CONTRACT.

Freedom of movement is important for footballers and clubs alike. A short career, possibly ending tomorrow with the next injury, means that any player must seek to exploit his talents and physical skills as quickly as possible. At the same time, looking for short-term success, clubs are always out to strengthen their squad and access the talent pool.

While overall there is a lot of mobility, there is strong evidence that such movement is often not free. For many players the market powers are stacked against them – low pay, short career, short contracts, and a high probability of facing abuse and disrespect of contracts.

## ROUGHLY 25% OF PLAYERS MOVE AFTER THE PAYMENT OF A TRANSFER FEE

This confirms other studies' findings that a sizable minority of players are subject to such payments. While a big share of low-income players is moving frequently as free agents, for others – especially young players –

different forms of compensation are usually payable. This includes FIFA's and domestic training compensation systems, as well as fees for agents or third party owners.



HOW DID YOU ENTER INTO YOUR CURRENT CONTRACT?

**29%** | PLAYERS TRANSFERRED FOR A FEE WHO WERE PRESSURED TO JOIN A CLUB AGAINST THEIR WISHES OR NOT OF THEIR CHOICE

This shows that the transfer system not only continues to limit employment opportunities for many players, but that a significant number are being sold to clubs they had no intention to play for.

**Some countries findings were particularly striking:**

- 82% of players in Serbia state that they were pressured into the transfer by agents or other third parties.
- In Kazakhstan, Switzerland, Denmark, Malta and Ecuador, more than 40% of players reported having been transferred against their interest.

**70.8%** | REQUESTED TO JOIN CURRENT CLUB

**19.0%** | REQUESTED TO JOIN DIFFERENT CLUB

**6.6%** | PREVIOUS CLUB PRESSURISED ME TO TRANSFER


**3.6%** | AGENT/3<sup>RD</sup> PARTY PRESSURISED ME TO TRANSFER



REASONS FOR CLUB TRANSFER

**47% OF PLAYERS WHO WERE PRESSURED INTO A TRANSFER BY THEIR FORMER CLUB ALSO REPORTED EXPERIENCES OF DELAYED PAYMENT**


Not only are players made to move against their will, but many end up with clubs that do not respect their contractual obligations.



PAYMENT DELAYS AND CONTRACTING VIA TRANSFER

**62.5% OF PLAYERS WHO WERE FORCED INTO RENEWING THE CONTRACT WITH THEIR CLUB EXPERIENCED DELAYED PAYMENT**

Those who mutually agreed a renewed contract had a lower risk of not receiving due payments (30%).



PAYMENT DELAYS AND CONTRACT RENEWAL

“

**There are a lot of  
lies in football.  
A lot of promises  
about contracts  
and salaries don't  
come true.**

Defender, Ireland



Top finding

# 5 UNREGULATED WORKING CONDITIONS

**Many players face precarious and unregulated employment**

THE WORK OF PLAYER UNIONS AND OVERALL PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE GAME HAVE LED TO SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN CONTRACTUAL STANDARDS IN MANY COUNTRIES. HOWEVER, MANY POOR QUALITY CONTRACTS ARE STILL BEING USED IN LARGE PARTS OF THE INDUSTRY AND FOR MANY PLAYERS THE MOST BASIC CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT ARE NOT FULFILLED. IN PARTICULAR, DEVELOPING FOOTBALLING COUNTRIES IN AFRICA, THE AMERICAS AND EASTERN EUROPE REQUIRE AN URGENT IMPROVEMENT IN BASIC EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS.

In some countries, secondary contracts which usually cover remuneration for the use of image rights are frequently used by clubs and players. Given the market value of domestic competitions and the marketing potential of players, many of these contracts appear to

be misused, for example as a means to decrease social security or tax payments. Such contracts are also significantly harder for a player to enforce in a court in case of a dispute with their club.

**ON AVERAGE, 8% OF PLAYERS DO NOT HAVE A WRITTEN CONTRACT WITH THEIR CLUB**

The data highlights significant regional differences:




Having a written contract and being able to personally access it are the most basic requirements for any employee. Players without such a protection are easily

taken advantage of and will have no chance of enforcing their rights in a dispute.



AVAILABILITY OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT



AVAILABILITY OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT PER REGION

### CIVIL LAW CONTRACTS WERE PROVEN BY THIS STUDY TO BE PRIMARILY AN EASTERN EUROPEAN PHENOMENON WITH THE GLOBAL AVERAGE OF SUCH CONTRACTS STANDING AT 9%

Of the 10 countries around the world with significant shares of civil contracts, seven are in Eastern Europe. Players in these countries are not only deprived of workers' protections under labour laws but also

significantly more likely to face other forms of problems such as breaches of contracts through e.g. delayed payments.

1	CROATIA	94.00%	6	TUNISIA	55.60%
2	CZECH REPUBLIC	93.50%	7	ICELAND	40.20%
3	TURKEY	78.00%	8	POLAND	37.60%
4	SLOVENIA	72.50%	9	UKRAINE	35.10%
5	ROMANIA	59.90%	10	CONGO	18.20%

PREVALENCE OF CIVIL LAW OR SELF-EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS BY COUNTRY

**CLUBS OFTEN USE SECONDARY OR IMAGE RIGHTS' CONTRACTS TO SAVE ON INCOME TAX, NATIONAL INSURANCE AND CIRCUMVENT LABOUR STANDARDS OR MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE FOOTBALL INDUSTRY**


Few players possess an intellectual property value justifying a separate contract for its use by the club. For most players, the use of image rights' payments is a means for clubs to circumvent legal protections and reduce employment costs.

Secondary contracts allow clubs to separate payments to players for playing football under their employment contracts, from payments to a secondary company for the use of the player's image rights. The image rights' payments are not treated as salary, therefore subject to lower tax and exempt the club and player from social security contributions. At the same time such payments

are much more difficult for a player to enforce in an employment dispute or in case of insolvency.

**The proportion of players receiving remuneration via secondary payments is as follows:**

- Africa: nearly 11%,
- Europe: almost 9%
- Americas: 8%.
- Some of the highest shares nationally were in Cyprus (50.5%), Poland (34%), FYROM (26%) and Zimbabwe (30%.)



“

**There is no stability. You have one, two, three-year contracts your whole career so you're always looking over your shoulder thinking, where am I going next?**

Defender, New Zealand

# 6 Top finding ISOLATION FROM THE TEAM

22% of players are aware of forced training alone, used by some clubs to pressure players

ABUSIVE PRACTICES TO PRESSURE PLAYERS TO ACT IN THE INTEREST OF THE CLUB AND AGAINST THEIR OWN WILL ARE RELATIVELY COMMON. FORCED AND PUNITIVE TRAINING IN ISOLATION IS A TACTIC EMPLOYED IN PARTS OF THE FOOTBALL WORLD TO FORCE A PLAYER INTO EITHER ENDING, SIGNING OR CHANGING A CONTRACT OR AGREEING TO A TRANSFER. FORCED TRAINING ALONE IS OF COURSE DIFFERENT TO INDIVIDUAL TRAINING FOR LEGITIMATE MEDICAL OR REHABILITATION REASONS.

One of the main reasons why clubs resort to such tactics is down to the phenomenon of “jackpot economics”, whereby clubs commit to contracts and speculate on future revenue (e.g. through qualification to international competitions); if the income fails to

materialize, they pressure players to try to decrease their expenditure. This explains why, up to a certain extent, that the higher a player’s salary, the more likely he is to find himself training alone if things go wrong for the club.


## OVERALL 22% OF PLAYERS ARE AWARE OF THE PRACTICE OF ISOLATED TRAINING

- 6.2% have personally been a victim of isolated training, with foreign players twice as likely to be victimised compared with the global average
- 63% of those forced to train alone reported that the club wanted them to end their contract
- 22% were pressured to sign a new contract
- The rest reported pressure to agree to a transfer.



HAVE YOU OR YOUR TEAMMATES BEEN FORCED TO TRAIN ALONE FOR REASONS OTHER THAN INJURY?

**69% OF PLAYERS FORCED TO TRAIN ALONE ALSO REPORTED HAVING EXPERIENCED DELAYS OF PAYMENT**




PAYMENT DELAYS AND TRAINING ALONE

**THE LIKELIHOOD OF BEING FORCED TO TRAIN ALONE INCREASES DRASTICALLY WITH HIGHER SALARIES**

Interestingly, players in the higher – but not the highest – wage brackets were significantly more likely to experience being forced to train alone, adding weight

to the anecdotal evidence that clubs employ this tactic to cut contracts and wage costs for economic reasons.



% OF PLAYERS FORCED TO TRAIN ALONE TO REQUEST TRANSFER/END CONTRACT

# 7

Top finding

## ABUSE OF PLAYERS

Large numbers of players suffer from discrimination, violence and harassment


THE STADIUM ATMOSPHERE, PUBLIC ATTENTION AND CULTURAL IMPORTANCE OF FOOTBALL ARE AMONG THE FACTORS WHICH MAKE PLAYING PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL A VERY SPECIAL JOB. BUT THE POSITIVE SIDES OF THE GAME ALSO COME AT A PRICE - THE PRESSURE OF PERFORMING YOUR WORK EVERY WEEK IN A VERY STRESSFUL, OFTEN HOSTILE AND SOMETIMES VIOLENT ENVIRONMENT IS OFTEN OVERLOOKED. THIS STUDY SURVEYED DIFFERENT FORMS OF ABUSE AND THEIR PERPETRATORS, SUGGESTING WIDE-SPREAD PROBLEMS AMONG PLAYERS THEMSELVES, BETWEEN FANS AND PLAYERS, AS WELL AS ABUSE FROM MANAGEMENT TOWARDS PLAYERS.

Stories of physical and psychological abuse of players are commonplace, yet this survey has for the first time gathered global data on the extent to which this takes

place. Comparison to similar surveys in other industries shows that footballers are five times more likely to experience violence at work.

### ALMOST ONE IN TEN PLAYERS REPORTED PERSONALLY HAVING BEEN A VICTIM OF VIOLENCE

- Almost 10% of players experienced physical violence
- Almost 16% have received threats of violence
- 15% were victims of bullying or harassment
- 7.5% faced discrimination based on ethnicity, sexuality or religious beliefs.




EXPERIENCES OF VIOLENCE, HARASSMENT AND DISCRIMINATION

### FANS ARE THE MAIN PERPETRATORS OF VIOLENCE

Fans were responsible for 55% of violent acts against players. In 22% of cases, other players are the perpetrators (normal physical contact during a game was explicitly excluded) and in 23% of cases the club

management, coaching staff or third parties acting allegedly on behalf of the club were responsible for violent acts against the players.



THE PERPETRATORS OF PHYSICAL VIOLENCE

### RACISM, XENOPHOBIA AND OTHER FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION CONTINUE TO BE OF SIGNIFICANT CONCERN

Foreigners were more than twice as likely to experience discrimination (17%) than domestic players and were

also more likely to be victims of physical violence, suggesting continued high levels of racism in the game.



NATIONALS AND NON-NATIONALS: EXPERIENCES OF ABUSE

Top finding

# 8 YOUNG PLAYERS NEED PROTECTION

Youngsters are the most vulnerable in the football economy


THE FINDINGS OF THIS REPORT SUGGEST THAT IN A VARIETY OF WAYS THE YOUNGEST PLAYERS (IDENTIFIED IN THE TWO LOWEST AGE GROUPS MEASURED, UNDER-18 AND 18-23) FACE THE SAME AND, IN SOME AREAS, EVEN WORSE ADVERSE EFFECTS THAN OLDER PLAYERS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE VAST MAJORITY OF YOUNG AND MINOR PLAYERS SACRIFICE THEIR TERTIARY OR EVEN THEIR SECONDARY EDUCATION TO PURSUE THEIR DREAM OF BECOMING A FOOTBALLER.

THE MATCH AND COMPETITION CALENDAR ALSO POSE SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES FOR YOUNG TALENTS. HOWEVER, ONLY A SMALL MINORITY SUCCEED IN THEIR AMBITIONS AND ARE OFTEN ILL-EQUIPPED FOR A CAREER OUTSIDE OF FOOTBALL.

**ALMOST 72% OF THOSE QUESTIONED HAD NOT COMPLETED EDUCATION BEYOND HIGH-SCHOOL, WITH 10% NOT EVEN STAYING IN EDUCATION BEYOND PRIMARY SCHOOL**

Given the severe employment risks described in this report, missing out on their education is an enormous risk for the long-term professional development of players. For many this decision never pays off.

That those surveyed had at least made it into the professional game must also be taken into account; a huge number of aspiring players making similar sacrifices never make the grade in professional football.



EDUCATION DEMOGRAPHICS

## PLAYERS UNDER 24 WERE AT PARTICULAR RISK OF PERSONAL ABUSE SUCH AS VIOLENCE AND DISCRIMINATION

In the first few years of their professional career, young players had already been exposed to the same frequency of such misconduct as other players in the survey. This suggests that young players are either a particular target or that the overall rate of such behaviour has increased in recent years – both being an equal concern.

The survey questioned players about their experiences throughout their career. If a player's risk of being

the victim of violence is constant, then the longer a player's career, the greater the likelihood of them being a victim. If the risk was constant then we would expect younger players to report fewer incidents of violence than players at the end of their career. We consider it probable, therefore, that younger players are significantly more at risk than older players when it comes to violence

44.6% | VIOLENCE BY PLAYERS

43.1% | THREATS OF VIOLENCE BY PLAYERS

43.8% | DISCRIMINATION BY THIRD OTHER PARTIES

42.7% | VIOLENCE (ALL)

41.9% | DISCRIMINATION BY MANAGEMENT, COACHING STAFF

42.1% | HARASSMENT BY PLAYERS

41.9% | DISCRIMINATION BY PLAYERS

### INCREASED RISKS FOR YOUNGER PLAYERS

In addition, the report confirms the anecdotal evidence that young players often 'run' harder than older players. Players promoted from youth academies lacked access

to higher levels of paid annual leave, compared to players who joined their club via a transfer or had their contracts renewed.

# 9 | Top finding INTEGRITY AT RISK

**On average one player per line-up will be approached by match-fixers in his career**


INTEGRITY REMAINS A KEY ISSUE IN PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL. DESPITE ATTRACTING LESS PUBLIC ATTENTION IN RECENT YEARS COMPARED WITH OTHER FORMS OF FOOTBALL CORRUPTION, MATCH-FIXING CONTINUES TO BE AN IMMINENT THREAT TO THE GAME AND TO PLAYERS. THE STUDY PRESENTS A FIRST GLOBAL STUDY INTO THE EXTENT TO WHICH PLAYERS ARE BEING APPROACHED BY MATCH-FIXERS AND IS BACKED UP BY PREVIOUS FINDINGS IN FIFPRO'S 2012 BLACK BOOK EASTERN EUROPE.

For years, expert opinions and whistle-blowers have shown how criminal match-fixers strategically target players, referees and other officials who are more easily corrupted for personal reasons. The

key incentive is financial desperation. This report confirms that match-fixing is still happening and that to prevent it, football must do more to protect the key protagonists in the game.

**BY THE END OF HIS PLAYING CAREER, A FOOTBALLER ABOVE THE AGE OF 33 HAS AN ALMOST 11% CHANCE OF HAVING BEEN APPROACHED AT LEAST ONCE BY MATCH-FIXERS**

**11%** | THE LIKELIHOOD OF BEING APPROACHED AT LEAST ONCE DURING THE COURSE OF YOUR CAREER TO FIX A MATCH



PERCENTAGE OF MATCH FIXING APPROACHES BY AGE OF RESPONDENT

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN APPROACHED TO CONSIDER FIXING A MATCH?




ARE YOU AWARE OF ANY MATCH FIXING THAT TOOK PLACE IN THEIR LEAGUE?



MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES AND AWARENESS: OVERALL AND BY REGION

**PLAYERS IN LOWER INCOME BRACKETS WERE TWICE OR THREE TIMES MORE LIKELY TO BE APPROACHED BY MATCH FIXERS.**



PERCENTAGE OF PLAYERS REPORTING MATCH FIXING APPROACH BY SALARY

**PLAYERS WHO HAD BEEN SUFFERING FROM DELAYED SALARY PAYMENTS WERE SIGNIFICANTLY MORE LIKELY TO BE TARGETED AS WELL**

This correlation grew even further the longer the delay in payment endured.

DELAYED PAYMENTS AND PLAYERS APPROACHED TO FIX A MATCH



MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES AND DELAY IN SALARY PAYMENT

Top findings

# CONCLUSIONS/ RECOMMENDATIONS

**Decent employment conditions for players fuel the overall positive development of both club and national team football. It must be a core objective of the industry to improve the working conditions of the large majority of footballers. It must also be a core objective to create as many quality jobs as possible for players and move them from the third into the second tier.**

Factors to improve employment conditions in football include:

- Stronger minimum employment and arbitration standards
- Better and greatly reformed international regulation of transfer and transfer-related activities
- Strengthening of collective bargaining as a core component of football governance
- Increased economic sustainability, innovation and better management standards
- Tackling the social and criminal risks faced by football and its players.

All professional football stakeholders, FIFA under its new leadership, the confederations, FAs as well as public policy makers and legislators must act together and with decisiveness in the interest of the world's game and its players.

## 1 | STRONGER MINIMUM EMPLOYMENT AND LEGAL STANDARDS

This study leaves no doubts about the need for stronger and more ambitious regulatory frameworks for better employment conditions and stronger protection for players (and clubs).

While new approaches responding to industry developments are required, some mechanisms are already in place and simply require more vigorous efforts to implement and enforce them.

These include:

- Global implementation of minimum requirements for standard player contracts as agreed by European social partners, UEFA and FIFA
- Improved arbitration at national (NDRCs) and international level, which ensures swift recourse to justice
- Club licensing systems, which must properly address employment standards on many levels
- Labour laws at national and supranational level, which must be more consistently applied to professional football

## 2 | BETTER INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS

The regulations and operation of the transfer system and related activities such as agents must also be thoroughly reviewed and fundamentally reformed.

This survey confirms the failure of market regulations in football to achieve their core stated objectives of ensuring respect of contracts and fairly balancing the interests of clubs and players.

A reform of the regulations on transfers of players must, at the very least, provide stronger protections of players against material breaches of contracts by clubs such as: shorter and proportionate periods of overdue payment justifying a termination, prohibitions of abusive practices such as forced training alone and stronger deterrents for actions in bad faith. The overall impact of transfers on the employment market and interference with the career path of a player must be addressed.

Via a new industry agreement, the global reach and enforceability of such regulations must be put to better use to ensure that players are paid and employment conditions performed with mutual respect.

# 31 IS AN A GAME AGGRESSIVE REFORMS

## 3 | DEMOCRATIC INDUSTRY GOVERNANCE

There is no denying that football today is an industry. The challenge of adapting all levels of governance at club, league, FA and overall industry levels, while protecting and strengthening the essence of the game, is football's supreme challenge.

Collective bargaining between employers and players as a requirement of decent governance must be universally accepted and integrated into all relevant decision making structures. Shared responsibility and the democratic checks and balances of institutionalised collective bargaining helps redefine the governance of football. In many cases it has served as vehicle for stability, growth and innovation.

## 4 | SOLUTIONS FOR IMPROVED ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Football has enjoyed continuous economic growth, even throughout the financial crisis and still provides the biggest employer in sport. Yet, the financial growth is clustered around a select few markets and clubs. Therefore, employment conditions have substantially improved only for few players – mostly at the top of the game.

At the same time football is continuously driven by "jackpot economics" as the incentives for growth are speculative and therefore management and investment not sustainable.

- Professional football needs to address its financial redistribution structures to ensure a greater share of countries, clubs and players benefit from its growth
- In parallel, more responsibility needs to be established in club management, more decency ensured in ownership and less speculative investment incentivised
- The perceived financial dependency on the volatile transfer market, as a source of revenue for clubs, has to be addressed as it is harmful to employment and unsustainable

- New opportunities of growth for different countries and conditions need to be explored to allow a broader growth and more even pyramid of professional football.

## 5 | TACKLING CRIMINAL AND SOCIAL RISKS

This report also uncovered and reconfirmed various prevailing social and criminal risks effecting football – match-fixing, violence, discrimination, protection of minors and career support for players transitioning in and out of the game.

All parties need to embark on new efforts to tackle these issues in cooperation with governments and civil society.

A football club and stadium remain the work place of players and their safety in this environment must be guaranteed.

- The threat of match-fixing is current and continuous efforts are needed to combat it. Preventing match-fixing starts with players enjoying decent employment conditions
- More advanced international and national standards for protection of the personal, educational and professional development of minors and young players, which complement current existing regulations, must be established
- The findings on violence, discrimination and harassment are severe and show that an urgent response is required from club managements, fans and players.

Based on these findings FIFPro will approach and work with all relevant institutions and stakeholders in and around football to find solutions to all the problems unearthed by this study. We will continue to bring evidence to the forefront of decision making to ensure that step by step, more and more footballers can enjoy decent, just and fair conditions of work when pursuing their profession and bringing life to the beautiful game.

Top findings

# ABOUT THE SURVEY

The 2016 FIFPro Football Employment Report is the world's most comprehensive survey of its kind. It builds on the success of the FIFPro Black Book Eastern Europe and a similar survey conducted by FIFPro Division Asia in 2015. The 2016 FIFPro Football Employment Report is based on a 23-question survey jointly developed by FIFPro and the University of Manchester. The survey was conducted during the first half of 2016 by the FIFPro unions with their member players around the world. The responses were analysed by the University of Manchester.

THE SURVEY COVERS SIX KEY AREAS:

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Key personal information – age, education and citizenship

## MATCH-FIXING

Approaches and awareness of match-fixing and its relation to employment conditions of players.

## HEALTH AND WELL-BEING

Medical standards, rest periods and more

## CONTRACTS

Key facts about contract standards between clubs and players

## THE MARKET

Details on the economic and legal position of players on the employment market

## ABUSE

Personal and contractual abuse faced by players

54 | PARTICIPATED UNIONS

87 | LEAGUES

13.876 | QUESTIONNAIRES

## UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER

The analysis of the responses by the University of Manchester sought to identify global trends, regional and national phenomena, as well as particularities in the employment market for professional footballers, vis-à-vis workers in other sectors.

Cross tabulations, comparing results of two or more questions, can lead to a deeper understanding of the prevalence of certain phenomena as regards, for example, certain age groups, national or international players, or, more broadly, how results relate to each other. As this survey is intended to be the first of a series, its findings will provide a baseline for future comparison and measurement of specific areas.

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## MARKETS COVERED BY THE REPORT

The report covers the member markets of player unions in Africa, the Americas and Europe: Austria, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, FYROM (Macedonia), Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malta, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Scotland, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.

As FIFPro Asia conducted a similar regional report in 2015, the results were used for global comparisons in some areas of this report but are not integrated in their entirety due to methodological differences. The full data is available in a separate section of the report.

The report does not cover England, Spain and Germany. While data from these markets would have certainly been interesting, it would have had only a minimum impact on the report's focus, in revealing the working conditions of the large majority of professional players represented by the second and third tier of the global employment market.

The women's game continues to make great strides in terms of participation, attracting crowds and revenues in some countries. Yet the economic and development gap between male and female football is still a reality of today's game, which makes it difficult to compare these two markets. FIFPro will be conducting a separate survey on professional women's football.







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FIFPro is the worldwide representative organisation for all professional footballers; more than 65,000 players in total, male and female. The world players' union has 58 national players' associations as its members

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## **ABOUT**

The University of Manchester, a member of the prestigious Russell Group of British universities, is the largest and most popular university in the UK. It has 20 academic schools and hundreds of specialist research groups undertaking pioneering multi-disciplinary teaching and research of worldwide significance. The University is one of the country's major research institutions, rated fifth in the UK in terms of 'research power' (REF 2014), has had no fewer than 25 Nobel laureates either work or study there, and had an annual income of just over £1 billion in 2014/15. [www.manchester.ac.uk](http://www.manchester.ac.uk)

# 2016 FOOTBALL EMPLOYMENT REPORT

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# WELCOME

**THEO VAN SEGGELEN**

FIFPro Secretary General

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**We are proud to present the first ever global study of working conditions in men's professional football. With nearly 14,000 players surveyed across Europe, Africa and the Americas, these findings are a reference point on the current state of the game and highlight the realities that professional players face in their daily lives.**



---

Our objective was to learn as much as possible about a wide range of leagues and divisions through the eyes of the players themselves, from the world's elite to those further down the pyramid.

What we discovered was a silent majority, afraid to speak openly for fear of being blacklisted by clubs. We are grateful to them for confiding in FIFPro and telling us their stories.

Flick through these pages and you will find a variety of interviews, mostly given on condition of anonymity. They are just the tip of the iceberg. We have spoken to many more.

Until now, we could only speculate about the extent of the issues players are forced to deal with, such as not receiving what is contractually owed to them.



**As a former player myself, I know what it means to be treated like a commodity. At the same time, I enjoyed every moment of the short and fragile career I had to experience the wonders of this great game.**

That players are often pressured to join a club not of their choosing is now a hard fact, an undeniable reality which is at the heart of a dysfunctional transfer system in urgent need of reform. The findings show that players are too often at the mercy of clubs who exploit the system to bully them into submission.

Like most of us, players should be able to feel secure in their workplace. They should be given adequate rest, be well cared for by medical staff, and expect protection against violence from fans and club management. Sadly, we found this is not always the case.

One popular misconception is that all players are wealthy individuals, leading privileged lives. The data we have uncovered destroys that myth once and for all.

Our goal at FIFPro is to ensure players are guaranteed decent, stable jobs that allow them to pursue their chosen profession with dignity.

As a former player myself, I know what it means to be treated like a commodity. At the same time, I enjoyed every moment of the short and fragile career I had to experience the wonders of this great game.

I truly believe this data can be a turning point for football and a platform for FIFPro to pursue future negotiations with football's leading authorities.

The critical findings contained in this report confirm that much work still needs to be done to ensure players are afforded the same rights as other workers.

# CASE STUDY

## THE AVERAGE GLOBAL PLAYER

Public perceptions of professional footballers are largely influenced by the image of players in the top leagues. For the first time this report provides an insight into the labour conditions of professional football, telling a compelling story about the realities of the large majority of professional players.

## AVERAGE AGE

**74%** OF PLAYERS ARE BETWEEN 18 AND 28 YEARS OLD

17% BETWEEN 29 AND 33

5% ARE ABOVE 33

3% UNDER 18

## EDUCATION LEVEL

**72%** OF PLAYERS DID NOT COMPLETE EDUCATION BEYOND HIGH-SCHOOL

9% ONLY FINISHED PRIMARY SCHOOL

14% COMPLETED VOCATIONAL TRAINING

12% COMPLETED A UNIVERSITY DEGREE

## AVERAGE CONTRACT

**22-23 MONTHS**

WAS THE AVERAGE LENGTH OF A PLAYER CONTRACT

25 MTHS FOR PLAYERS WHO JOINED VIA A TRANSFER FEE

30 MTHS FOR PLAYERS WHO JOINED VIA THE ACADEMY

20 MTHS FOR PLAYERS WHO JOINED AS FREE AGENT

AS A GENERAL RULE THE CONTRACT LENGTH WILL DECREASE THE LOWER THE SALARY IS.

## HOW PLAYERS JOIN THEIR CLUB

**45%** OF PLAYERS JOIN THEIR CLUB AS FREE AGENT

16% OF PLAYERS ARE PROMOTED VIA THE ACADEMY

25% OF PLAYERS ARE TRANSFERRED FOR A FEE

14% OF PLAYERS RENEWED THEIR CONTRACT

## MONTHLY SALARY

**74%** OF PLAYERS EARN LESS THAN 4000 USD NET PER MONTH

45% OF PLAYERS MAKE LESS THAN 1000 USD NET PER MONTH

21% OF PLAYERS MAKE LESS THAN 300 USD NET PER MONTH

2% OF PLAYERS MAKE MORE THAN 720.000 USD A YEAR

## DELAYED PAYMENTS

**59%** OF PLAYERS WERE PAID ON TIME

41% OF PLAYERS EXPERIENCED DELAY OF PAYMENTS

14% OF PLAYERS EXPERIENCED UP TO 1 MONTH DELAY

19% OF PLAYERS EXPERIENCED 3 TO 6 MONTH DELAY

6% EXPERIENCED 6 TO 12 MONTH DELAY

THE REST EXPERIENCED OVER 12 MONTH DELAY

# CASE STUDY

## COUNTRY LINE-UP

The 2016 FIFPro Global Employment Report is the world's largest most comprehensive survey on the working conditions in professional football. The survey is based on 13.876 player questionnaires and provides for the first time a country-by-country analysis to better understand the working conditions of players by region and country.



# 67,8%

## CAMEROON



67,8% DOES NOT HAVE A COPY OF THEIR CONTRACT



# 4,5/5

## SWEDEN



HIGHEST GLOBAL FEELING OF JOB SECURITY AT CURRENT CLUB (4.5 OUT OF 5)



# 74%

## ROMANIA



74% OF PLAYERS EXPERIENCED PAYMENT DELAYS



# 81,5%

## SERBIA



81,5% PRESSURED INTO TRANSFER BY AGENT OR OTHER PERSON



# 95,6%

## GABON



95,6% OF PLAYERS EXPERIENCED PAYMENT DELAYS



95%

**BOLIVIA** 

95% DOES EXPERIENCE LATE PAY



43%

**DENMARK** 

43% OF PLAYERS TRANSFERRED AGAINST THEIR WILL



11,6 MONTHS

**ISRAEL** 

AVERAGE CONTRACT LENGTH 11.6 MONTHS



52,5%

**BRAZIL** 

ONLY 52.5 HAS A DAY OFF A WEEK (VS. SCOTLAND AT 100%)



48,9%

**CYPRUS** 

48,9% OF PLAYERS HAS A 2ND CONTRACT



94%

**CROATIA** 

94% OF PLAYERS DO NOT HAVE AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT

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# ACADEMIC REPORT

## THE AUTHORS

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## Academic Survey

**INTRODUCTION**

**The objective of the FIFPro Global Professional Football Players Survey is to present the most comprehensive and far-reaching study to date of the labour conditions and experiences of professional footballers throughout the world.**

This report analyses and provides academic commentary from researchers at the University of Manchester on nearly 14,000 questionnaires completed by professional (and in some cases semi-professional) footballers in 54 different nations, in Africa, the Americas, and Europe. The FIFPro Global Survey provides a snapshot of a professional footballer's life in 2016, covering issues such as age, education and salary, to the topics of contract renewal and transfers. It also gathers data about longer-term experiences of footballers throughout their careers on issues such as abuse, violence, and match-fixing. The Global Survey is designed to assist FIFPro, national player unions, and also clubs, leagues, federations, event organisers, fans, and public authorities to understand some of the challenges and problems facing professional footballers and, where appropriate, to develop strategies to manage or counteract problems.

FIFPro's Task Force Group highlighted five different areas where, potentially, the problems and challenges affecting professional footballers across different countries could be detected. Those fields of interest, which form the main body of this report, are: Contracts, the Market, the Abuse of Contracts and Players, Health and Wellbeing, and Match-Fixing. The second chapter of the report presents the main comparative findings concerning demographics. This is then followed by an analysis of the findings in respect of contracts at global, regional and national level (chapter 3) and an analysis of the findings in respect of the market and transfer system (chapter 4). Chapter 5 then presents the main findings regarding the abuse of contracts and players and chapter 6 deals with questions related to health, safety, and well-being. The final chapter of the analysis discusses the findings on match-fixing.

In order to better understand the relationship between different issues, and highlight potential causes, cross-tabulation analyses were made. This kind of statistical analysis shows a distribution between two variables, revealing how respondents answered on two or more questions at the same time. In other words this means that cross-tabulations bring together two variables and display possible relationships between them in a table. Cross-tabulation analyses are included in all chapters for many of the previously defined fields of interests.

This is FIFPro's third major survey into the labour conditions of Professional Football Players and is by far the most comprehensive. In 2012 FIFPro's 'Black Book' on football players in Eastern Europe was published, surveying players across the region. In 2014, the FIFPro Asia Survey surveyed 1,078 players affiliated to the Asian and Oceanian Football Confederations. The results of this latter survey are included in this report where possible to allow comparisons between the continents. The 2016 Global Survey has been conducted on a much larger scale. FIFPro sent the invitation to participate in the above-mentioned project to players unions in 66 countries around the world.

The survey did not include player unions from Asia, due to the just recently conducted research mentioned above. 56 Unions responded and agreed to cooperate and assist in distributing and collecting the anonymous questionnaires to all the professional football players in their leagues, asking them about their working conditions and experiences. The survey was conducted at clubs across professional divisions to ensure that the experiences of both the elite players and those playing further down the pyramid were represented.

**This is FIFPro's third major survey into the labour conditions of Professional Football Players and is by far the most comprehensive.**

This report contains data from 54 Unions (one provided too small a sample to be included, another provided completed surveys too late to be included) and in total gives voice to 13,876 footballers. This accounts for 21% of FIFPro-affiliated players. When the Asia survey is added (1,078 respondents), 23% of FIFPro affiliated players were surveyed. In research terms this is a very large global sample. It is also by far the largest survey of professional sportspersons utilising direct participant data ever conducted.

The Methodology chapter towards the end of this report provides greater detail about how the survey was developed and the data collected, collated, and analysed. It is important to note four limitations here though. First, this survey is only of male

## FIFPRO IN NUMBERS

professional footballers; FIFPro is currently preparing a targeted survey for female professional footballers. Secondly, a number of key football markets did not return surveys, including Argentina, England, and the Netherlands. Germany and Mexico - who are not FIFPro members - were also not included. Thirdly, we did not look to collect a specific sample from each country but instead looked to include all players who had completed a questionnaire provided there were sufficient responses to make a meaningful contribution and to guarantee anonymity of players (this led to Spain's exclusion).

Finally, because this is the first global survey, a comparison over time is not possible (although in some areas we were able to compare the situation globally to data from the Eastern Europe Black Book and the Asia Survey). It is foreseen that the data in this report will be the starting point for longer term analysis of the issues in the future that will allow meaningful comparison.

**The Global Survey is designed to assist FIFPro, national player unions, and also clubs, leagues, federations, event organisers, fans, and public authorities to understand some of the challenges and problems facing professional footballers and, where appropriate, to develop strategies to manage or counteract problems.**



# 54

COUNTRIES  
REPRESENTED



# 87

LEAGUES  
REPRESENTED



# 13.870


PLAYERS  
REPRESENTED

# DEMOGRAPHICS

This chapter analyses the findings of the questionnaire relating to the demographic information of the respondents. It identifies that 14% of players were playing in a foreign country, and highlights which countries had the highest and lowest number of non-national players. It looks at the distribution of age across respondents, identifying how players over 28 find it more difficult to retain employment in professional football. Finally, it looks at the highest education achieved by players, noting how football players are relatively under-educated when compared to workforce groups in other economic sectors.

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## Demographics

# OVERVIEW

**THIS CHAPTER ANALYSES THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE PLAYERS THAT RESPONDED TO THE SURVEY. ON THE BASIS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NATURE OF THE DATA, OUR ANALYSIS CONFIRMS A NUMBER OF TAKEN-FOR-GRANTED TRUTHS ABOUT THE CONTEMPORARY FOOTBALL INDUSTRY.**

FIRST, THERE IS A HIGH DEGREE OF MOBILITY OF PLAYERS ACROSS ALL REGIONS AND A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PLAYERS ARE EMPLOYED BY CLUBS OUTSIDE THEIR HOME COUNTRY. WHETHER THERE ARE ANY DIFFERENCES IN HOW THESE PLAYERS ARE TREATED IS THE FOCUS OF MUCH OF THE SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS IN THIS REPORT (E.G. CHAPTER 5 ON ABUSE OF CONTRACTS/PLAYERS). SECONDLY, THE MAJORITY OF PLAYERS BELONG TO THE 18-28 AGE RANGE. IN LIGHT OF THIS, ACCESS INTO THE SPORT AND THE TREATMENT OF MORE SENIOR PLAYERS WARRANTS GREATER ATTENTION. THIRDLY, THE FINDINGS INDICATE THAT PLAYERS ONCE IN THE FOOTBALL INDUSTRY TYPICALLY DO NOT CONTINUE TO PURSUE EDUCATION. ONLY 28% OF PLAYERS ARE LIKELY TO HAVE ATTAINED VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING OR HIGHER EDUCATION. THEREFORE THE MAJORITY OF PLAYERS MAY NOT BE EQUIPPED WITH ADEQUATE SKILLS AND EXPERTISE TO ENTER THE ORDINARY LABOUR MARKET, ONCE THEIR SHORT FOOTBALL CAREER HAS ENDED.

“

**If you speak to people who know nothing about football and tell them footballers should receive a pension, they look at us as though we're thieves.**

Defender, Italy



## Demographics


# NATIONALS AND NON-NATIONALS<sup>1</sup>

**The survey asked the respondents to indicate whether they were citizens of the country in which they were playing professional football.**

The global average for non-nationals stood at 14%. In terms of regional variation, the highest percentage of non-nationals (as proportion of the population by region) was found in Europe (16%). The second largest was in Americas (14%) and in Africa, this stood at 8% (figure 2.1)

**14%** — THE PROPORTION OF FOOTBALL PLAYERS PLAYING IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY

**FIGURE 2.1: PERCENTAGE OF NON-NATIONALS AS PROPORTION OF POPULATION BY REGION**




The variation between countries was notably higher (figure 2.2). The country with the greatest percentage of non-nationals was Cyprus (50%), followed by the USA (41%), and Greece (33%). At the other end, low percentages of non-national players were reported in a number of countries in Africa, including Cameroon (2%), Zimbabwe (3%), and Ghana (4%). As we will see in chapter 4.2, these three countries were all in the bottom four of respondent countries when it came to average salary. In Europe, Serbia and Ireland but also Italy were among the countries with low percentages of non-nationals with 4% of non-nationals in the cases of Serbia and Italy and 5% in the case of Ireland. Very low rates of non-nationals were also reported in parts of the Americas, with Uruguay at 5% and Brazil at 6%.

**These most obvious differences included Russia and France, where the rate of non-national football players was much lower than the total migration rates for these countries.**

The findings overlap to some extent with the latest UN data on the total number and share of international migrants: countries such as the USA and Switzerland seem to attract non-nationals in both football and other sectors.<sup>2</sup> However, significant variation was found in migration rates for the majority of the other countries. The most obvious differences included Russia and France, where the rate of non-national football players was much lower than the total migration rates for these countries. These discrepancies between the total number of migrants and number of non-national footballers indicate that sector specificity is a very important determinant. While it was not possible in the survey to uncover the reasons for moving across countries, the sector specificity may include factors such as the extent of the migrant network, wage levels in the sport, and the regulatory and institutional framework governing the football sector in the country (e.g. competition quotas for "foreign players").

## FIGURE 2.2: PERCENTAGE OF NON-NATIONALS AS PROPORTION OF POPULATION BY COUNTRY

% OF RESPONDENTS WHO ARE NON-NATIONAL IN EACH COUNTRY



## Demographics

# AGE


### Respondents were asked in the survey to identify their age group.

First, there is a high degree of mobility of players across all regions. The findings suggest that the majority of the respondents belonged to two age groups: 18-23 (39%) and 24-28 (35%). Only 5% were above 33 years old and 3% were under 18 years' old. The limited number of very young and older players is significant. On the one hand, it points to the existence of barriers for young players in accessing the professional football market; on the other hand, it seems to confirm the considerable challenges that older players may face for staying in the game. In the case of older players, the findings also demonstrate a very early retirement age for players when compared with the retirement age of those in other professions (more detail on the average duration of a player's professional career can be found in chapter 4.3).

In light of the fact that most players will not have attained sufficient levels of educational achievement (see below section 2.3) and that only a small minority will have earned enough to be financially stable for their entire lives (see chapter 4 on remuneration), it is highly likely that most players will be faced with a significant and daunting career transition challenge. This may include seeking new employment in a related area, e.g. sports' broadcasting or coaching - where only limited employment opportunities exist - or even developing an entirely new career in an unrelated area.

**Only 5% were above 33 years old and 3% were under 18 years' old. The limited number of very young and older players is significant.**

**FIGURE 2.3: AGE DEMOGRAPHICS**




**77%** — OF PLAYERS ARE UNDER 28 YEARS OLD

A breakdown of age groups by region points to considerable differences in terms of the distribution of respondents per age group (figure 2.4). Broadly speaking, the rates of younger players (under-18 and 18-23) were higher in Africa than in Europe and America. However, the trend was reversed in the older age groups, where there was a greater proportion of players 29-33 and above-33 in Europe and the Americas: 18% and 19% of respondents belonged to the 29-33 age group in the Americas and Europe respectively. The figure for above-33 stood at 6.5% and 5% respectively for these regions. These findings suggest that either football clubs in Europe and the Americas have embraced age diversity to a greater extent than

those in Africa when it comes to offering contracts, or that players in these regions are on average physically more able to perform at an older age. Various reasons may be in operation here, including changes in cultural and societal expectations regarding older players, indirectly influenced sometimes by anti-discrimination legislation. They may also reflect differences in the provision of medical support and treatment of players in the older age groups, either at club level or at the level of the country (see chapter 6 on medical support). Finally, a lack of sustainable and decent remuneration employment conditions in a given country may deter players from pursuing longer careers.

**FIGURE 2.4: AGE GROUPS BY REGION**



## Demographics

# EDUCATION

**As a general principle, highly-educated individuals are more likely to be protected from unemployment, simply because educational attainment makes an individual more attractive in the workforce.**

Higher educational achievement can also be translated to greater lifetime earnings, including – importantly – during the period following the end of a football career. Research evidence supports this: the third (2012) European quality of life survey, for instance, reported that having completed tertiary education is associated with higher life satisfaction compared with only having completed secondary education.<sup>3</sup>

Unfortunately in football, the effort to become a top-level player means that it is difficult, sometimes impossible, to

commit to the achievement of educational qualifications. In some countries (e.g. England), clubs who take on younger players on school-release programs are now obliged to provide them with an adequate level of education. However, this is far from the picture elsewhere in the world. As such, >>

**Higher educational achievement can also be translated to greater lifetime earnings, including – importantly – during the period following the end of a football career.**

former players may face significant challenges, including in many cases unemployment and substandard quality of life. Our results demonstrate that professional footballer players compare very unfavourably to male workers across other industries when it comes to the level of education achieved.

Respondents to the survey were asked to describe the highest level of education or training they had successfully completed. As illustrated in figure 2.5, the majority of respondents had finished high school (62%). This was followed by respondents that had completed vocational education and training (15%) and those that had a university degree (12%). In Europe, nearly one fifth of respondents possessed a university degree (although we are aware those with a higher level of education may have been more inclined to complete the survey). The figures here do, however, demonstrate that combining education with a professional football career is achievable for some; further research could

identify the circumstances under which such educational achievements are more likely to be fulfilled.


At the other end of the scale, 1% of the respondents had not finished primary school education and 9% had only completed primary school education. In total, only 28% of respondents were likely to have achieved such a level of education that would enable them to enter into the ordinary labour market at the end of their football career.

**Our results demonstrate that professional footballer players compare very unfavourably to male workers across other industries when it comes to the level of education achieved.**

**28%** — OF RESPONDENTS ACHIEVED A LEVEL OF EDUCATION THAT WOULD ENABLE THEM TO ENTER THE LABOUR MARKET

**72,9%** — HAVE NO TERTIARY EDUCATION


**FIGURE 2.5: EDUCATION DEMOGRAPHICS<sup>4</sup>**



Finally, a regional breakdown of the groups of respondents by educational level does not suggest the existence of a clear pattern across the different regions (figure 2.6). Players in Europe were somewhat more likely to have completed successfully high school education or have a university-level qualification than players in Africa and the Americas; however, the percentage of those with only primary level qualification was higher than in Africa and the Americas. Conversely, a greater proportion of players in Africa had finished high school while a considerable

percentage of players in the Americas had completed vocational training courses. Countries with particularly high ratios of educational achievement (i.e. university-level education) included France and the USA. In a number of countries, a significant percentage of players had high-school qualification. This included a number of European countries (e.g. Austria, Cyprus, Croatia and Montenegro) but also Uruguay (74%), South Africa (80%) and the Ivory Coast (80.5%).

**FIGURE 2.6: EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT PER REGION**



These findings have to be read taking into account the fact that different educational standards exist in different countries.<sup>5</sup> Bearing in mind this, a comparison with the OECD data suggests that footballers are far less likely to graduate from tertiary education: the average for footballers is 13% while the average rate of completion in the OECD countries stands at 41%.<sup>6</sup> Comparison with global data from the World Bank reveals that the rates of completion of secondary education by footballers and the general male population are broadly similar (the completion rate of lower secondary education for males is 74% according to World Bank data).<sup>7</sup>

There is no global data on the rate of vocational education and training for the general population. Data from EU countries

reveals that close to half (48%) of all upper secondary school pupils in the EU-28 followed vocational programmes in 2013, with the share for males standing at 53%.<sup>8</sup> The respective rate for footballers was much lower and stood at 15%.<sup>9</sup>

**A comparison with the OECD data suggests that footballers are far less likely to graduate from tertiary education: the average for footballers is 13% while the average rate of completion in the OECD countries stands at 41%.**

# CONTRACTS

The football player's relationship with his club should be governed by his employment contract. However the protections supposedly provided by the contract are much harder to access if there is no employment contract, or if the player and/or his agent do not have a copy. The survey found that a sizable minority of players reported not having an employment contract, or if they did, they did not possess a copy which they could refer to. The chapter also considers the number of players who possess a secondary image rights contract and the geographical distribution of this type of contracts.



## Contracts

# OVERVIEW

**THE CHAPTER DEALS WITH THE WAY PLAYERS ENTER INTO THEIR CONTRACTS AND DRAWS ATTENTION TO THE CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH THE LEGAL EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF FOOTBALL PLAYERS AND THE GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE LABOUR MARKET.**

A SINGLE AND CLEAN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT IS KEY TO ENSURING THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES, INCLUDING SALARY AND OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT. UNDER THE FIFA REGULATIONS ON THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS (RSTP), THE EXISTENCE OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT IS A NECESSARY (BUT NOT SUFFICIENT) CONDITION TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN A PROFESSIONAL AND AN AMATEUR FOOTBALL PLAYER.

At regional level, policy initiatives in the European Union culminated in 2012 to the conclusion of the first social partners agreement in the sector regarding minimum contract requirements.

The agreement includes a number of commitments to ensure that player employment contracts throughout Europe meet certain minimum standards, including among others that contracts must be in writing, that they must define the rights and duties of club and player, and that they must address matters such as salary, health insurance, social security, or paid leave.

**The use of non-employment contracts in the sector (with a severe regional cluster in parts of Eastern Europe) may have significant implications, including lacking access to basic labour standards, such as working-time entitlements and dismissal protection, lack of coverage by collective agreements or representation by trade union channels, and a limited degree of entitlement to social protection.**

Our findings suggest that regional specificity is an important factor in respect of whether players had written contracts and copies of these. The prevalence of labour market informality meant that written contracts and copies of contracts were less available in Africa than in the Americas and Europe. Regional differences were still important in respect of the employment status of footballers, and considerable variation was found between regions in the use of non-employment contracts. There were also considerable variations on a country-by-country basis. The use of non-employment contracts in the sector (with a severe regional cluster in parts of Eastern Europe) may have significant implications, including lacking access to basic labour standards, such as working-time entitlements and dismissal protection, lack of coverage by collective agreements or representation by trade union channels, and a limited degree of entitlement to social protection.

“

**There are a lot of lies in football. A lot of promises about contracts and salaries don't come true.**

Defender, New Zealand



## Contracts

# PLAYERS WITHOUT CONTRACTS

**The existence of a written contract is an essential prerequisite for limiting labour market informality, especially in transition economies.**

In our survey, football players were asked whether they had a written contract with their club. The findings suggest that 8% of respondents did not have a written contract.


**FIGURE 3.1: AVAILABILITY OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT**



A regional breakdown reveals that the largest percentage of footballers without a written contract were in Africa (15%), followed by footballers in Americas (8%) and Europe (3%) (figure 3.2). The difference in the availability of a written contract may be attributed to the different degree of professional management combined with the very low income-employment of football in some of the regions included in the survey. Regulatory standards within football such as club licensing programs and labour market oversight differs greatly and might also be causes for the large variations.

**Informal employment is widespread in developing countries but is also increasingly common in advanced economies, including, among others, transition economies in Eastern Europe.**

At the same time, the findings may be consistent with the regional differences in respect of the rates of informal employment.<sup>10</sup> Many of those counted as being informally employed are either without a proper labour contract or social security coverage, or are self-employed in precarious conditions. According to the 2014 World at Work report by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), informal employment is widespread in developing countries but is also increasingly common in advanced economies, including, among others, transition economies in Eastern Europe. The latest estimates show that informal employment accounts for a large share of total non-agricultural employment, ranging from 33% in South Africa to 82% in Mali; in Latin American countries it ranges from 40% in Uruguay to 75% in Bolivia.


**FIGURE 3.2: AVAILABILITY OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT PER REGION**

In terms of country distribution (figure 3.3), the greatest percentage of footballers without written contracts was found in African countries: in Congo, 89% of players did not have a written contract, in Botswana the rate stood at 36% and in Ivory Coast at 21%. The findings seem to confirm the evidence on labour market informality in Africa generally. In countries such as Congo, it is only top clubs that conclude written contracts with their players and oral agreements tend to be the norm in lower leagues. However, high rates of footballers without written contracts were also reported in some European countries, including Montenegro (46%) and Slovenia (albeit at a much lower rate, i.e. 8%).<sup>11</sup> Interestingly, little difference

was found here between EU and non-EU Member States within UEFA: 95% of respondents in UEFA countries had a written contract with their club and the respective rate in EU Member States stood at 98%. In the Americas, the highest rate was found in Peru (20%), followed by Costa Rica (16%). At the other end, countries where the majority of respondents confirmed that they had written contracts in place included a large number of European countries: in Sweden, Kazakhstan and Georgia, all respondents had written contracts with their clubs. High rates of written contracts were also found outside Europe, including Brazil.

**High rates of footballers without written contracts were also reported in some European countries, including Montenegro (46%) and Slovenia (albeit at a much lower rate, i.e. 8%).**


**FIGURE 3.3: LACK OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT PER COUNTRY**



The availability of a written contract may be more prevalent where certain factors are in operation, including higher educational qualifications. The findings indicate that within the group of players that had a written contract, the proportion of respondents with primary school or university degree education was much higher compared to those that had not completed primary education (figure 3.4). But no notable difference was found in respect of other educational levels, including high school and vocational education and training. The greater

exposure of players with very limited levels of education to abuse through the lack of a written contract, may result to a 'double penalty': first during their football career, this category of players may be deprived of better working conditions as a result of the lack of a written contract; and secondly, in their post-football career, they may be penalised further as their limited educational attainment will most probably be a hindrance for their transition into the ordinary labour market.


**FIGURE 3.4: AVAILABILITY OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT AND LEVEL OF EDUCATION**



Further cross-tabulations concerning the availability of a written contract and different age groups point to an equally significant problem in football, i.e. the discrepancy in treatment between different age groups and especially the problems associated with the working conditions of very young or older players. As shown in figure 3.5, the proportion of younger players, especially under-18 years' old, that did not have a written contract with the club, was much higher than other age groups (77% of under-18s had written contracts in comparison to 96% in the case of those in the 29-33 age range). The findings indicate that young players may experience significant problems when transitioning to a professional career, even in cases where this transition may take place through youth academies, and as such may be more exposed to precarious working conditions.

**The findings indicate that young players may experience significant problems when transitioning to a professional career, even in cases where this transition may take place through youth academies, and as such may be more exposed to precarious working conditions.**

**FIGURE 3.5: AVAILABILITY OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT AND AGE GROUP**




In our analysis, we also explored the extent to which there was a relationship between the existence of a written contract and whether the respondents were citizens or not of the country in which they were playing. Overall, the findings do not suggest any significant difference at global level regarding the availability of a written contract between nationals and non-nationals. However, the picture was very different at regional level (figure 3.6). In both Africa and the Americas, it was disproportionately more likely that non-nationals had written contracts with their clubs. In contrast, the difference between

the two groups, i.e. nationals and non-nationals, was negligible in Europe. What explains this regional variation? A common sense explanation would be that non-national players would be more inclined to relocate only when they had secured a written contract with a club (which may also be encouraged by having to conform to FIFA regulations on international transfers). Another explanation, which may complement the explanation offered just above, would relate to the higher rates of informal work and requirements concerning working-permissions for foreign players.

### FIGURE 3.6: AVAILABILITY OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT AND CITIZENSHIP

NO WRITTEN CONTRACT



**In both Africa and the Americas, it was disproportionately more likely that non-nationals had written contracts with their clubs. In contrast, the difference between the two groups, i.e. nationals and non-nationals, was negligible in Europe.**

## Contracts

# DO PLAYERS HAVE A COPY OF THEIR CONTRACT?

**Aside from the issue of having a written contract in place, awareness of the terms and conditions of employment is significant.**


Also, in case of legal dispute with a club, having access to the employment contract is a critical requirement to enforce one's rights. In this respect, having a copy of the contract personally (or at least through the agent) is crucial. In our survey, respondents were asked whether they had a copy of the contract personally, whether their agent had one, or whether they had no access to a copy at all. The findings indicate that a considerable proportion of players personally had a copy of their club contract (78%) and

in a further 7% of the cases, a copy was kept by the agent (figure 3.7). However, a high rate of respondents, i.e. 16%, did not have a copy at all. When interpreting these results, it is important to remember that in some cases (especially in African countries) there was a problem of lack of written contracts (see discussion above); respondents who answered that they did not have a written contract were excluded from the analysis here. Our findings are broadly similar to the findings of the 2014 FIFPro Asian Survey: 77% of the respondents in Asian countries had a copy of their contract with the club, in 8% of the cases there were two contracts, the so-called 'double contract' and in 15% of the cases there was only one contract but the player did not have a copy.

**FIGURE 3.7 AVAILABILITY OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT**



**FIGURE. 3.8 AVAILABILITY OF A CONTRACT COPY PER REGION**




The regional distribution in terms of availability of a copy of contract indicates some interesting trends (figure 3.8). Of the respondents who personally had a copy of their contract, the proportion of players in Europe was much higher than the players in Africa (89% of players in Europe had personally a copy in comparison to 60% in Africa). Significant difference was found between EU and non-EU Member States within UEFA: 14% of respondents in non-EU Member States did not have a copy at all in comparison with only 6% of respondents in EU Member States: the difference can be probably attributed to the regulatory framework applicable in the regions.<sup>12</sup>


**Significant difference was found between EU and non-EU Member States within UEFA: 14% of respondents in non-EU Member States did not have a copy at all in comparison with only 6% of respondents in EU Member States: the difference can be probably attributed to the regulatory framework applicable in the regions.**

Further analysis at national level reveals significant variation (figure 3.9), suggesting that country specificities are equally important. The greatest percentage of respondents with no copy at all was found in Cameroon, where the percentage stood very high (65%). This was followed by other African countries, including Gabon (60%), the Ivory Coast (60%) and

Namibia (56%). However, high rates of players without a contract copy were found in countries in the Americas and Europe. In Europe, this included a number of countries such as Turkey (37%), FYROM (29%) and Ukraine (20%). In the Americas, it included Peru (39%), Guatemala (58%) and, importantly, Brazil, where the rate of players with no copy of contract stood at a worrying 47%.

**10 WORSE COUNTRIES PER REGION**



**FIGURE 3.9: AVAILABILITY OF A CONTRACT COPY PER REGION**

## Contracts

# THE LEGAL EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF PROFESSIONAL PLAYERS

The availability of an employment contract vis-à-vis other forms of contracting, including as self-employed or through so-called 'civil law contract' is significant in terms of the nature and range of rights that professional footballers may enjoy.

FIGURE 3.10: TYPE OF CONTRACT



Lacking an employment contract is an indicator for precariousness, as non-employment contracts are often associated with worse employment protection and working conditions. The survey findings suggest that the majority of respondents (84%) had an employment contract in place (figure 3.10). However, 9% had a civil law contract or were self-employed and a further 7% of respondents did not know about the type of contract they had. The existence of a civil law contracts or the lack of awareness may become crucial data in cases of abuse of contracts and players (see analysis below in chapter 5).<sup>13</sup>

A breakdown of the empirical findings at regional level suggests that the greatest proportion of civil law/self-employment contracts was found in European countries (14% in comparison to 2% in the Americas and 6% in Africa). Country-level analysis on the type of club contracts reveals that in the vast majority of countries over 95% of players said they had an employment

**Lacking an employment contract is an indicator for precariousness, as non-employment contracts are often associated with worse employment protection and working conditions.**

contract. At the top end, this included western European countries, such as Sweden, Italy and Norway, where none of the players reported being self-employed or having a civil law contract. High rates of employment contract also included countries in other regions, including South Africa (99.5%), Paraguay (99.5%) and the important market of Brazil (99%).

However, ten countries reported significantly lower rates of employment contracts. The data in table 3.1 presents the countries with the lowest rates of employment contracts. It becomes obvious that there is a cluster of Central and Eastern European countries, including the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Romania, Poland, and Ukraine, which are characterised by low rates of employment contracts. Our findings are broadly consistent with patterns of contracting in other economic sectors in these countries. While the problem of bogus self-employment is particularly prevalent in the 'old' EU Member States, Central and Eastern European states are characterised by disguised civil law relationships. Existing evidence suggests the prevalence of special 'non-employment' labour relationships (civil law contracts, occasional employment) in these countries.<sup>14</sup> The proliferation of such contracts, including in the football sector, may be attributed to the regulatory deficiencies in respect of employment status but also to the poor enforcement of existing legislation to prevent abuse of non-standard contracts.

**It becomes obvious that there is a cluster of Central and Eastern European countries, including the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Romania, Poland, and Ukraine, which are characterised by low rates of employment contracts.**

**This has significant implications for workers, including lacking access to basic labour standards, such as working time entitlements and dismissal protection, lack of coverage by collective agreements or representation by trade union channels, and a limited degree of entitlement to social protection.**

This has significant implications for workers, including lacking access to basic labour standards, such as working time entitlements and dismissal protection, lack of coverage by collective agreements or representation by trade union channels, and a limited degree of entitlement to social protection. In this context, the case of Iceland should be best treated as symptomatic of the prevalence of part-time contracts in the sector, as the latter does not provide for sufficient levels of pay to allow full-time employment. Recent evidence on the rates of part-time workers as a proportion of overall self-employment suggests indeed that across Europe the likelihood of part-time work for the self-employed is greater.<sup>15</sup> Yet this should not be a reason for non-employment contracts and may actually disguise genuine employment.


**FIGURE 3.11; LOWEST RANKING COUNTRIES FOR POSSESSION OF AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT**

1	CROATIA	94.00%	6	TUNISIA	55.60%
2	CZECH REPUBLIC	93.50%	7	ICELAND	40.20%
3	TURKEY	78.00%	8	POLAND	37.60%
4	SLOVENIA	72.50%	9	UKRAINE	35.10%
5	ROMANIA	59.90%	10	CONGO	18.20%

Further, our survey evidence indicates that there was no relationship between the existence of an employment contract and whether the players were nationals or not of the country where their club was located. However, when looking at the relationship between age and type of contract, the findings

indicated some interesting trends. 4% of under 18 years' old had non-employment contracts (figure 3.12). In contrast, the highest percentages of non-employment contracts were found in the 24-28 and 29-33 age groups (10% respectively).

**FIGURE 3.12: AGE AND TYPE OF CLUB CONTRACT**



Further analysis on the relationship between the type of contract and level of education indicates that within the group of respondents that had a civil law or self-employment contract, a large percentage of players had either not finished primary school (figure 3.13). More specifically, 17% of respondents who had not finished primary school had non-employment contracts. The distribution across different levels

of educational attainment was more widespread in the case of respondents with employment contracts. At regional level, the majority of respondents that had an employment contract in place in Africa had completed high school qualifications. The figure was similar in the Americas but in Europe a considerable proportion of respondents with employment contracts had completed vocational education programmes.

**FIGURE 3.13: EDUCATION AND TYPE OF CONTRACT**

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT



89,70%	VOCATIONAL TRAINING
84,50%	UNIVERSITY DEGREE
83,10%	HIGH SCHOOL
85,70%	PRIMARY SCHOOL
72,10%	DID NOT FINISH PRIMARY SCHOOL

CIVIL LAW CONTRACT / SELF-EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT



5,60%	VOCATIONAL TRAINING
10,60%	UNIVERSITY DEGREE
8,60%	HIGH SCHOOL
5,20%	PRIMARY SCHOOL
17,20%	DID NOT FINISH PRIMARY SCHOOL

## Contracts

# SECONDARY CONTRACTS AND IMAGE RIGHTS

**Football is part of the sports entertainment industry and for the elite players (or good players in small markets), the ability to endorse products and services can bring in a significant secondary income. In a number of countries, especially these that attract foreign players, image-rights contracts have become increasingly popular.**


This type of contracts has provided scope for football clubs to isolate the payment of players for playing football under their employment agreements, from payments to a secondary company for the use of the player's image when they are not part of a team group. These image rights payments are not treated as salary but payments to the (player's) company for services provided, therefore saving income tax and national insurance for both the player

**In a number of countries, especially these that attract foreign players, image-rights contracts have become increasingly popular.**

and the club, creating a potential loophole for the abusive use of such contracts.<sup>16</sup> The survey sought to find out the percentage of players that have such secondary contracts in place. The findings at global level regarding remuneration on the basis of a second contract indicate that the large majority of respondents (91%) did not receive such remuneration, suggesting that the practice of secondary contracts involving image rights was not widespread. Once again, it is clear that the benefits of being an elite and/or highly marketable player are not shared by the vast majority of players.

However, further analysis at regional and national levels reveals a pattern of possible strategic use of secondary contracts in certain cases. First of all, at regional level, the findings indicate that a considerable proportion of players in Africa received remuneration from second contracts (figure 3.14): 11% of players in Africa had such contracts in place. The respective rate in the case of players in Europe was lower (9%) and that of players in the Americas stood at 8%. Just as in the case of the use of non-employment contracts (see above), the use of secondary contracts in African and European countries could be related to governance deficiencies in the labour market of football players.


**FIGURE 3.14 REMUNERATION FROM SECOND CONTRACT PER REGION**



Analysis at national level identified a number of countries significantly above the global average. Surprisingly, the highest percentages were found in Cyprus (50.5%), Gabon (32%), Poland (34%), Zimbabwe (30%), and FYROM (26%). Less surprisingly, 21.5% of players in Brazil had a secondary image rights contract (figure 3.15). A significant number of other countries, including Bulgaria, South Africa, and Costa Rica had lower (albeit still above the average) rates of secondary contracts. The evidence seems to corroborate anecdotal and practical evidence gathered by FIFPro and its national representatives concerning the use of such practices in certain countries in order to circumvent taxes, protective labour legislation, club licensing regulations, and other provisions safeguarding the interests of football players. The high percentages in some countries in which at the same time the image rights value of the players are comparably low may constitute wages in disguise.

From a regulatory perspective, the seeming reliance on secondary contracts in these countries, as a means to evade existing tax or other duties, points to poor governance, undermining the sport's ability to safeguard the interests of players, and reducing tax revenues and other income for the state authorities. These deficiencies are set against the agreement regarding the minimum requirements for standard player contracts in the professional football sector in the European Union and the rest of the UEFA territory, which regulates, among others, the use of image rights and stipulates that all matters concerning the employment relationship must be addressed in the employment contract.<sup>17</sup>

**FIGURE 3.14 REMUNERATION FROM SECONDARY CONTRACTS PER COUNTRY**



**From a regulatory perspective, the seeming reliance on secondary contracts in these countries, as a means to evade existing tax or other duties, points to poor governance, undermining the sport's ability to safeguard the interests of players, and reducing tax revenues and other income for the state authorities.**

# THE MARKET

The market for professional football players is unique in global employment relations. Similar to other professional sports industries, footballers have a very short playing career, but in no other industry do employers have so much power over the future movement of their employees. The survey shows that while the payment of transfer fees is limited to a minority of players, for those affected fees are often used to restrict the player's movement. Further, while the focus of much of the world's media is on the elite players, the vast majority of respondents earned relatively modest salaries and were on short-term contracts providing little employment security.

MANCHESTER  
1824

The University of Manchester



## The Market

**OVERVIEW**

**THE MARKET FOR FOOTBALL PLAYERS IS UNIQUE. IN 2015, A COLOSSAL \$4.1BN WAS SPENT IN TRANSFER FEES FOR FOOTBALL PLAYERS GLOBALLY, AND THE AMOUNTS BEING PAID ARE INCREASING.<sup>18</sup>**

IN NO OTHER INDUSTRY DO EMPLOYEES MOVE FOR THE PAYMENT OF SUCH LARGE 'RELEASE' FEES, OR CAN CURRENT EMPLOYERS HAVE SUCH AN INFLUENCE OVER THE FUTURE MOVEMENTS OF THEIR EMPLOYEES. THE ELITE FOOTBALL PLAYERS ARE ALSO EXCEPTIONALLY WELL-REMUNERATED, LEADING TO CRITICISM FROM FANS FACING INCREASED TICKET AND TV SUBSCRIPTION PRICES WHO MAY BE STRUGGLING TO MAKE ENDS MEET. IT IS UNDERSTANDABLY DIFFICULT FOR FANS TO HAVE MUCH SYMPATHY FOR THE PLIGHT OF FOOTBALLERS IN THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CLIMATE.

However, the data in this chapter sets out in stark terms that the elite players are far from the norm when it comes to player salaries. Further, it provides evidence that rather than being able to bully their way to better contracts or clubs, many players have struggled to leave clubs they no longer wish to play for, or join the club they think will best support their career development. The majority of respondents were modestly paid, especially for an uncertain career that even without the risks of injury or loss-of-form remains remarkably short in duration.

Our findings support the analysis in the 2013 KEA/CDES European Commission Report into the Transfer System, that the player labour market is segmented, and that the (vast majority) of players exist in a secondary market which has the characteristics of an oligopsony. In other words there are far more suppliers (players) than there is demand (from the clubs). This has the effect of driving down wages for those operating in the secondary market. Meanwhile in the primary market

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for "good"<sup>19</sup> and elite players, demand outstrips supply in turn driving up both wages and especially transfer fees. Overall, recent data from FIFA TMS suggests that wages in the top leagues in Europe are in a decline, while acquisition expenses in agent and transfer fees continue to climb steeply.<sup>20</sup>

“

**There is no stability.  
You have one, two,  
three-year contracts  
your whole career so  
you're always looking  
over your shoulder  
thinking, 'where am I  
going next?**

Defender, New Zealand



## The Market SALARIES


**Due to anticipated sensitivities about revealing exact salaries, players were asked to identify which salary band they fell into.**

The response rate was excellent but the drawback was that the wording of the question meant that we could not calculate a global or national mean which we could be compared with similar data from ILO and OECD data on average monthly wages.

Figure 4.1 shows the percentage of players globally receiving

different monthly remuneration. Salaries of over \$15,000 a month were rare, with only 8.2% of respondents being paid this amount or more. 20% of respondents received a wage of less than \$300 a month and roughly 60% of the respondents received less than \$2,000 a month.

**FIGURE. 4.1 PERCENTAGE OF PLAYERS RECEIVING MONTHLY SALARY**




The picture painted here is far less healthy than the \$47,000 average monthly wage for 26-29 year olds identified in the 2015 FIFA Global Transfer Market Report.<sup>21</sup> Our survey suggested that less than 4.5% of professional footballers received this salary or higher (although we did not survey specifically for the 26-29 year old age bracket where wages are at their highest). When we come to look at the findings set out in below (chapter 4.5.1), it is clear that players for whom a transfer fee is paid are on

**The picture painted here is far less healthy than the \$47,000 average monthly wage for 26-29 year olds identified in the 2015 FIFA Global Transfer Market Report.**

average paid higher than those moving on a free transfer. This is intuitive and supports the 2013 KEA/CDES European Commission Report into the Transfer Market; clubs are only willing to pay a transfer fee for the good and elite-level players who will also command the higher wages. Operating at the lower end of the player market are a larger number of players for whom a transfer fee may never be paid and whose average monthly wage even at the peak of the wage-earning power in their mid-late 20s will be many times lower than was reported in the FIFA Report.

**Clubs are only willing to pay a transfer fee for the good and elite-level players who will also command the higher wages.**

**FIGURE. 4.2 PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS EARNING UNDER \$1000 A MONTH BY REGION**



Broadly the payment of the lower wages fitted in with the data from organisations like the ILO, OECD and European Union identifying average wages in across all industries. Countries whose workers were paid the best generally tended to see their footballers also receive comparably higher wages. This meant that footballers in relatively small football markets but high-performing economies were typically well rewarded (e.g. Switzerland and the USA). Conversely, footballers in West Africa in particular were more likely to receive comparatively low wages; 100% of respondents from Ghana received less than \$1,000 per month.<sup>22</sup> However the prevalence of lower pay bands for footballers was not limited to economically-developing nations, particularly where the football market was dependent on part-time players.<sup>23</sup>

In the biggest football markets that returned, Italy and France, the percentage of players earning under \$1,000 was very low (2.3% and 2.7% respectively), although the survey was careful to include data from all professional


**However the prevalence of lower pay bands for footballers was not limited to economically-developing nations, particularly where the football market was dependent on part-time players**

**One other notable figure was that in the football powerhouse of Brazil, 83.3% of professional footballers were earning under \$1,000.**

leagues. One other notable figure was that in the football powerhouse of Brazil, 83.3% of professional footballers were earning under \$1,000.

There is an important caveat to these figures. We did not receive data from two of the 'big five' European leagues (England/Wales and Germany) and a third (Spain) provided too little data to be included in the analysis. This will invariably have the effect of bringing the salary level slightly down, but given the vast number of less developed nations that also did not provide data, this effect should not be over-emphasised. We also needed to be mindful of the breakdown responses by different leagues when commenting on the headline figure. For example the reported wage for players in Turkey was very low, but this can be explained by the lack of First and Second League responses.

**FIGURE. 4.3 PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS EARNING UNDER \$1,000 A MONTH BY COUNTRY**



## The Market

# CONTRACT LENGTH

A football player's professional career is short. Most players will sign their first contract in their late teens and retire from professional football – if they are lucky - in their early 30s. However a professional career of 15 years would be the exception, not the rule, and in most – if not all – countries, the average career length will be well below 10 years.<sup>24</sup> This is supported in the age distribution of respondents set out earlier which shows a dramatic drop-off of respondents from the 29-or-above age groups. Injury, general physical “wear and tear”, and a loss of “pace” or cardiovascular fitness can all play a role in the extremely short career of the professional footballer.

As we saw in chapter 2.3, many players have little in the way of education to fall back on when they retire and look to re-enter the employment market. However while the media reports on elite players being given lucrative 5-year deals, this is unusual for the typical football player. Globally, the average footballer can expect a contract of just 22.6 months – less than two years. This is supported by other data suggesting that in 2015 alone, 13,558 professional players made an international transfer from one club to another,<sup>25</sup> which does not take into account the tens of thousands of domestic transfers that take place each year. Players in some countries reported an average of considerably lower than this. The average contract length of players in Brazil, Ireland and Israel was lower than 12-months, suggesting a reliance on standard one-year contracts with little job security.

**However while the media reports on elite players being given lucrative 5-year deals, this is unusual for the typical football player**

There is a more general problem here, in that the football industry continues to rely almost exclusively upon fixed-term contracts. While many states, and the European Union, are looking to outlaw fixed-term contracts in all but the most unusual circumstances, footballers even early in their career will never enjoy a “permanent” contract (which would still leave the club the opportunity to dismiss a player who became incapable of playing at the required level). Towards the end of their career even the elite players may find themselves on repeated one-year contracts offering little employment security in the event of injury or illness.<sup>26</sup>

**We found that older players were more likely to renew their contract or enter new employment as free agents than younger players. Unsurprisingly, older players were more likely to receive a shorter contract.**

## 22-23 MONTHS


AVERAGE LENGTH OF A FOOTBALL PLAYER'S CONTRACT

There are a couple of important caveats to these findings. First, there were a number of responses which reported contract lengths of over 6-years. The FIFA maximum contract length is 5-years and while we know in some countries longer contracts are signed, we had concerns that some players were adding together a number of shorter term contracts at the same club and reporting their total employment duration rather than their contract length. We were particularly concerned with the response from players in Congo, given that 89% of their players reported not possessing an employment contract (see 3.2). Once we removed players reporting over 6-year contract lengths, the average global contract dropped further, to 22.1 months.

How a player enters into their contract also has an impact upon the length that this new contract will be. Players who entered into their contract as a free agent reported a lower average contract length of 19.5 months, and those who renewed their contract 19.7 months. In contrast, players who entered into their contract following the payment of a transfer fee had a higher average (25.4 months) and those who signed following promotion from the academy higher still (30.1 months).

**Good and elite younger and mid-career players on the other hand were likely to receive longer contracts which in turn would restrict their ability to move as a free agent “on a Bosman”**


What this appears to show is a combination of the effect of the transfer system (clubs trying to secure the players of the highest quality for longer periods, to maximise their value as assets) and the short duration of a player's career. More analysis of the transfer market is carried out below, but we found that older players were more likely to renew their contract or enter new employment as free agents than younger players. Unsurprisingly, older players were more likely to receive a shorter contract. This is most likely because clubs do not want to risk a longer contract on a player more prone to injury and general physical deterioration, but also because older players are less likely to enable the club to recoup a transfer fee. Good and elite younger and mid-career players on the other hand were likely to receive longer contracts which in turn would restrict their ability to move as a free agent “on a Bosman”.<sup>28</sup>

**FIGURE. 4.4 AVERAGE CONTRACT LENGTH BY COUNTRY<sup>27</sup>**

\*As the questionnaire was administered by hand, respondents were able to pass over questions they did not wish to answer for or have information for. Some questions went unanswered on a national basis and in these instances the data does not appear in the comparative graphs. In Fig 4.4 data from Romania and Russia is excluded.

**FIGURE. 4.5 CONTRACT LENGTH BY AGE**


That players received shorter contracts as their career progressed was supported by the data, whether contracts of 6-years and over were excluded from the analysis or not:



Given the short length of time of a player’s career, our data suggests that the average player would sign around four to five contracts in the course of their employment as a professional footballer. From what we have already seen in relation to the relative low pay of most professional players, this is nowhere near sufficient to provide financial security following retirement for the vast majority of players. When coupled with the data demonstrating the relative lack of (non-football) training education of the average professional footballer, this promises a future of severe financial insecurity for many players nearing the end of their playing career.

The problem of the prevalence of short-term contracts is exacerbated by the fact that there is also a strong positive relationship between average contract length and the salary a player is on; the lower the salary, the shorter the contract. Figure 4.6 shows an accelerating increase in the average length of a player’s contract up to the \$30,001-\$50,000 bracket when it levels out. Players on the lowest wages reported average contract lengths that were around a third shorter than those earning above \$30,000 per month. This once again supports the argument of the segmentation of the player market. While a small number of good and elite players are paid very high wages coupled with longer contracts, players on more modest salaries are usually on shorter contracts, providing limited employment security

**FIGURE. 4.6 CONTRACT LENGTH AND MONTHLY SALARY**



**+10 MONTHS** — BETWEEN \$30,000 TO \$60,000 IS THE MAJOR AUGMENTATION OF CONTRACT LENGTH

**37 MONTHS** — IS THE LONGEST CONTRACT

## The Market

## EMPLOYMENT SECURITY

**The survey also focussed on the level of security players felt within their football career, both in terms of their current employment and longer-term playing career.**

The survey asked players "How secure do you currently feel about your employment at your current club and as a professional football player in general?" Respondents were asked to answer on the basis of a scale from 1 (feeling very insecure) to 5 (feeling very secure). The average across all countries in terms of security in employment at the current club stood at 3.58, indicating that overall the football player feels more secure than insecure in their employment. In this respect, significant country variations can be found. Countries where respondents felt very secure included Austria, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Israel, Norway,

**The average across all countries in terms of security in employment at the current club stood at 3.58, indicating that overall the football player feels more secure than insecure in their employment.**


**There was a strong relationship between countries whose players rated their employment security as low and those countries whose players had a higher likelihood of being subject to payment delays.**

Paraguay and Switzerland. At the other end of the spectrum, countries where respondents felt very insecure included Morocco, Gabon, Tunisia and Cameroon.


Interestingly, while there were some country-wide differences, the global mean for how secure players felt in football more generally was not notably higher, standing at 3.60.


There was a strong relationship between countries whose players rated their employment security as low and those countries whose players had a higher likelihood of being subject to payment delays. The four countries ranked lowest for employment security were all ranked in the top-5 for risk of payment delays (see chapter 5.2). Interestingly there did not seem to be a notable change in feelings of security as a professional footballer, or at the player's current club, depending on age.

## 5 WORSE COUNTRIES



## 5 BEST COUNTRIES



**FIGURE. 4.7 HOW SECURE DO YOU FEEL IN YOUR EMPLOYMENT AT YOUR CURRENT CLUB?**

## The Market

# PLAYER MOVEMENT AND TRANSFER ISSUES


**Players were asked how they entered into their current contract in order to gain a better understanding of the operation of the market for professional football talent.**

We are aware that this situation may be confused when we take into account player loans, but we were solely interested here in the contract with a player's parent club. The picture shows a large number of players moving as free agents between clubs and low levels of players renewing contracts with clubs. Given the short

nature of player contracts seen in 4.3, this means that there is constant migration of players within the football industry, with the vast majority of players moving clubs once every 2 years or less.

**Given the short nature of player contracts seen in 4.3, this means that there is constant migration of players within the football industry, with the vast majority of players moving clubs once every 2 years or less.**

**FIGURE. 4.8 HOW DID YOU ENTER INTO YOUR CURRENT CONTRACT?**




A comparison of regions on the whole demonstrated remarkable similarities in terms of how players entered into their current contract with only Africa showing significant differences. Here, the number of players entering a contract following the payment of a transfer fee was significantly higher (34.6%) than other regions, and the number of contract renewals less than a third of those in Europe or the Americas (a mere 5.5%). The data for Africa suggests a large amount of internal transfers where some kind of release fee is being paid (this is not reflected in the 2016 FIFA TMS Transfer Market data on international transfers). Player Union representatives also indicated that in many African states, “pre-Bosman” transfer systems are still in place, meaning

that player registrations remained at their club even after the expiry of the contract. Combined with the short-term nature of the average contract in many African states this is particularly problematic for footballers in this region.

**Player Union representatives also indicated that in many African states, “pre-Bosman” transfer systems are still in place, meaning that player registrations remained at their club even after the expiry of the contract.**

**FIGURE. 4.9 HOW DID YOU ENTER YOUR CURRENT CONTRACT (BY REGION AS A %)?**



## The Market

# PLAYER MOVEMENT AND CAREER DEVELOPMENT

## How players moved between clubs changes as they (hopefully) progress through a full career.

While players over-18 were more likely to move as a free agent than any other reason, for those under-18, promotion from the club's youth academy was the main route into the current contract, accounting for 54% of players in this age range. This was still an important route for players in the 18-23 age range (32% of cases). Club transfers for a fee were most likely for players in the 24-28 age range (29%). Players over-33 were almost twice as likely to remain at a club and sign a new contract than any other age range (30%).<sup>29</sup>

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**FIGURE 4.10 HOW PLAYERS ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT BY AGE GROUP**

	Under-18	18-23	24-28	29-33	Over 33
Free Agent	25,90%	33,40%	51,30%	55,50%	53,10%
Youth Academy	54,50%	32,00%	5,60%	2,10%	1,00%
Transferred for fee	15,00%	24,20%	29,20%	24,10%	16,70%
Renewed Contract	4,50%	10,50%	13,90%	18,30%	29,20%

**54.5%** — OF PLAYERS UNDER 18 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH YOUTH ACADEMY

**55.5%** — OF PLAYERS BETWEEN 29 AND 33 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH A FREE AGENT

**51.3%** — OF PLAYERS BETWEEN 24 AND 28 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH A FREE AGENT

**53.1%** — OF PLAYERS OVER 31 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH A FREE AGENT

How a player enters into their contract also correlates with their wage. Fig 4.11 looks at the relationship between salaries and how the player entered into their contract. As might be expected, those promoted from the youth academy typically received lower wages. In contrast, those renewing contracts

were more likely to receive higher wages. However both contract renewers (more likely to be the older players) and academy graduates were both well represented across all wage categories (except the lowest for contract renewers).


Most interesting for us was the performance in terms of salary of free agents and those who were transferred for a fee. Over 50% of those receiving \$600 or under a month were free agents whereas this dropped by half for those receiving above \$30,001. The opposite was observed for those transferring for a fee. Here there was a positive relation.

between being transferred for a fee and receiving a higher wage (although there was a slight drop off in the highest wage bands). It is not the case that the payment of transfer fees leads to higher wages (indeed most economic analysis

argues the system deflates wages overall),<sup>29</sup> but rather that those players commanding a transfer fee tend to be the most talented: talent for which clubs must pay by offering competitive wages

**Over 50% of those receiving \$600 or under a month were free agents whereas this dropped by half for those receiving above \$30,001.**

**FIGURE 4.11 PERCENTAGE OF PLAYERS RECEIVING MONTHLY WAGE AND HOW THEY ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT**



When we focussed only on the younger players, the situation was slightly different but as we expected. For players under-23, those who renewed contracts with the same club performed better in terms of income (only 31% received under \$601 a month). Players in this age range who were transferred for a fee also performed reasonably well in terms of income (38% were in the sub-\$601 a month bracket). In contrast 47% of those who entered into their contract having been promoted from the academy received less than \$601 and when we looked at free agents this rose to 55%. As might be expected, with the exception of those high-fliers who were already onto a second (or third) contract, younger players earned less than their senior colleagues (as we saw in 4.2, 34% of players overall received a monthly wage of

**FREE OF AGENT PLAYERS HAVE LOWER WAGES THAN TRANSFERRED FEE PLAYERS THAT HAVE HIGHER WAGES**

under \$601). At the other end of the scale, those moving for a fee performed the best in terms of income: 9.1% of under-23 players who moved for a fee earned over \$15,001 compared with 6.2% of contract renewers and only 2.4% of promoted players and 2% of free agents.

## The Market

# CLUB TRANSFER REASONS AND ABUSE

## The 25% of players who were transferred for a fee were then asked the reasons for the transfer to their current club.

The vast majority (70.8%) reported that they had requested to join their current club and that a fee had been agreed with their former club. This suggests that for most players, the current transfer system is not directly harming a player's choice of employer. However we must remember that the operation of the transfer system may well be indirectly operating in a restrictive way, as players are more likely to request moves to clubs they think can meet the likely transfer fee.

For a significant minority of our respondents the transfer system worked against their wishes to move to the employer of their choice. 594 players (29%) reported to us that they had been transferred to their current club because either they had been pressured into it by their previous club or by a third party (often their agent), or following a request to move to a different club. The data shows that the abuse of the

transfer system against a sizable minority of football players is continuing despite the changes to the international transfer system brought in by FIFA in 2001 and 2005 to allay European Commission concerns to this effect.

FIFPro is currently challenging the legality under EU Competition Law of the payment of transfer fees. It is important to note that this survey does not provide data either supporting or challenging the economic hypothesis of the negative effects of the system upon player wages overall, or on competition amongst clubs for employing sporting talent. A far more sophisticated but narrower survey comparing similar players moving in different ways would have been required to achieve this.

However the Global Survey does provide some food for thought for those who believe the system is both necessary and fair. First, the data shows that only a quarter of new contracts were the result of the payment of a fee, indicating that the use of fees to compensate clubs for investment in

**FIG. 4.12 CLUB TRANSFER REASONS AND ABUSE**



training young players is - at best - inconsistent. This supports the conclusions of the 2013 KEA/CDES Report into the workings of the transfer system which found that the system is not working to redistribute wealth back down to those clubs developing young players. The payment of transfer fees largely at the top end of the market will also restrict the ability of the system to redistribute wealth back down the football "pyramid". Secondly, our analysis shows that where players are transferred for a fee, the system is placing unfair restrictions upon players, restricting free movement which is supposedly guaranteed under the Art.45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (and many domestic labour laws). As we will see in chapter 5, the system can also lead to abuse of players in the form of being forced to train alone by clubs wishing to pressurise them into a transfer.

A closer analysis of the responses revealed some startling geographical differences. When we analysed the responses of those players who had been transferred for a fee, there

**29%** — PLAYERS TRANSFERRED FOR A FEE WHO WERE PRESSURED TO JOIN A CLUB AGAINST THEIR WISHES OR NOT OF THEIR CHOICE

were a number of countries where the system was clearly restricting the right of a player to move to the club of their choice. Over 40% of players moving for a fee in Ecuador, Kazakhstan, Slovenia, and Switzerland reported they had been forced into it or had moved to a club not of their choice. In Serbia, 96% of players who were transferred for a fee reported that they did not move to the club of their choice, with an astonishing 82% saying they had been pressurised into the move by an agent or 3rd party.<sup>30</sup>

Players based in the European Union did not receive any more protection. In fact of the 13 nations where over 40% of players transferred for a fee did not move to the club of their choice, nine were EU member states (or territories within the EU). These were: Croatia (44%), Czech Republic (75%), Denmark (43%), Malta (47%), Romania (44%), Scotland (67%), Slovenia (45%), and Sweden (60%).

## The Market

# REASONS FOR CONTRACT RENEWAL

**The same problems of pressure were not seen as frequently where players renewed contracts with their current club rather than moving on for a fee.**

Of those renewing, the overwhelming majority (94%) reported this to have been a mutual agreement with no pressure to renew coming from either club or agent. This slightly surprising figure is supported by our data on training alone and other forms of abuse set out below (chapter 5.3).

However players in Africa were more likely to be pressurised into renewing a contract; 8.6% of African players reported being pressurised by their club or a third party into renewing a contract. 16.7% of players renewing contracts in Botswana, and 21.1% in the Congo, reported being pressurised into

doing this. These players are also earning considerably less than their counterparts elsewhere in the world; 83% and 90% respectively of players in these countries are earning a monthly wage of less than \$1,000. While pressure to renew contracts was much less of a problem across Europe, there were notable hotspots in Romania (15.4%) and Cyprus (12.5%) although players were much better remunerated. As can be seen from chapter 5.2, being pressurised into contract renewal may drastically increase the risk that a player will suffer delays in the payment of his wages.

# ABUSE

The survey uncovered that a significant proportion of players were the victims of contractual and personal abuse during the course of their employment. 41% of players reported delays in the payment of their wages, in extreme cases lasting for more than 12-months. A smaller number reported being forced to train alone, often in order to pressurise them into cancelling their contract. There was also evidence of psychological and physical abuse of players, including discrimination, harassment, threats, and physical violence, from a number of sources. Here it was clear that non-nationals and younger players were more likely to be the victims of either contractual or personal abuse.

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Abuse

# OVERVIEW

**THROUGHOUT THEIR CAREER, FOOTBALLERS ARE LIKELY TO BE EXPOSED TO CHALLENGING WORKING CONDITIONS. THEY MAY EXPERIENCE ABUSE IN RESPECT OF THEIR CONTRACTS AND ALSO IN RESPECT OF HOW THEY ARE TREATED PHYSICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY.**

IN THE CONTEXT OF CONTRACT ABUSE, PREVIOUS RESEARCH<sup>32</sup> HAS SUGGESTED THAT NON-PAYMENT OF FOOTBALLERS' SALARIES MAY BE A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN INCREASING THE RISK OF MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES. OUR FINDINGS CONFIRM THAT A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF PLAYERS WERE EXPOSED TO PAYMENT DELAYS. IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT PLAYERS AFFECTED BY DELAYS WERE MOSTLY LOWER PAID, THE ANALYSIS SERVES TO ILLUSTRATE THE SIGNIFICANT SCOPE OF CONTRACTUAL ABUSE IN THE SECTOR. ADDITIONALLY, VERBAL AND PHYSICAL ABUSE CONTINUES TO BE REPORTED BY FOOTBALL PLAYERS. MOST NOTABLY, OUR SURVEY DEMONSTRATED THAT RACIAL AND NATIONALITY DISCRIMINATION IS A MAJOR PROBLEM. 16.1% OF FOREIGN PLAYERS REPORTED EXPERIENCING SOME FORM OF DISCRIMINATION, AND FOREIGN PLAYERS WERE ALSO TWICE AS LIKELY TO BE FORCED TO TRAIN ALONE

“

**Why should I be  
excluded from  
the first team?**

**My wife is a nurse.  
When they don't  
want her anymore,  
they don't put her  
on a floor without  
any patients.**



## Abuse

# THE ABUSE OF CONTRACTS: DELAYS IN PAYMENT

**Recent developments in the football, including increased transfer spending and the global financial crisis, have increasingly exposed players to the risk of unpaid wages.**

Signing players in hope of success but beyond the financial means of a club together with financial disparity and uncompetitive championships may explain the phenomenon of payment delays. As discussed elsewhere in the report (chapter 4.2), not all professional players are especially highly paid and this means that any delay in payment of wages can have a significant impact on their personal life. As we will see below (chapter 7.2.4), payment delays may also increase the likelihood of corrupt practices such as match-fixing. Respondents were asked whether they had experienced any delays in payment over the last two seasons and, if so, where this delay occurred (i.e.

**In light of this evidence, it seems that country specificities are more important than regional ones.**

at their current club, at a former club in the same country, or at a former club in a different country).


Alarming, 41% of players had experienced delays in wage payments (figure 5.1). While in some cases these problems may be related to the difficult economic environment following the recent (and still ongoing in some countries) financial crisis, in others it could point to issues related to poor management of clubs, and problems in the regulatory governance of the sport.

**41%** — PLAYERS HAVE EXPERIENCED  
PAYMENT DELAYS OVER  
THE LAST TWO SEASONS



A breakdown of the findings in terms of the duration of payment delays suggests that the most common period of payment delays was between one and three months (19% of respondents). The second highest percentage was in respect of payment delays of up to a month (14%). Lower percentages were reported in the cases of 3-6 months, 6-12 and over 12 months payment delays (figure 5.1).

**FIGURE 5.1: PUNCTUALITY OF PAYMENT OVER THE LAST TWO SEASONS**




At regional level, the findings suggest that the highest rate of payment delays was concentrated in Africa. Indeed, the majority of respondents (55%) in Africa had experienced payment delays. In the Americas and Europe, the rate of payment delays stood at 40% and 35% respectively. Although UEFA-zone countries performed better, the fact that over a third of players here had


experienced recent payment delays suggests that the licensing systems of many national competitions, and UEFA's own system<sup>3</sup>, have had only a modest success in ensuring clubs are able to honour their contractual obligations to their players across the continent.<sup>4</sup>

**FIGURE 5.2: PAYMENT DELAYS PER COUNTRY**

**MOST PAYMENT DELAYS**



**LESS PAYMENT DELAYS**



A more detailed breakdown per country indicates high percentages of payment delays across a number of countries (figure 5.2). In Gabon, almost all respondents (96%) reported payment delays. Bolivia was the second worst case (95%), followed by Tunisia (94%) and Cameroon (85%). In Europe, the countries with the highest percentage of payment delays were Malta (79%), Turkey (75%) and Romania (74%). At the other end, respondents in some European countries (France, Norway and Scotland) but also the USA and Paraguay reported very low percentages of payment delays.

In light of this evidence, it seems that country specificities are more important than regional ones. Factors influencing this could include the extent to which employment relationships are regulated by collective agreements or statutory law and the scope for actually enforcing collectively-bargained standards or statutory labour standards. This was somewhat confirmed in respect of the countries in Europe. Romania, Malta, Slovenia and Cyprus, which reported the highest rates of payment delays in Europe, were also characterised by an absence of collectively agreed standards and lack of compliance with the National Dispute Resolution Chamber Standard Regulations.

An analysis of the relationship between payment delays and citizenship reveals only minor differences between nationals and non-nationals: 40% of players in clubs in their country of origin had experienced delays in comparison to 38% in the case of non-nationals.<sup>35</sup>


This relationship held true in respect also of payment delays of more than 6 months: 25% of non-nationals had experienced such payment delays in comparison to 27% of nationals. No significant differences were found at regional level, with the biggest difference found in the Americas, where a greater percentage of

nationals (42%) experienced delays than non-nationals (32%). However, evidence of variation was found at country level. In some countries, e.g. Brazil, Cameroon, Congo, Costa Rica and Israel, it was predominantly nationals who had experienced payment delays. In contrast, in a number of European countries (e.g. Cyprus, Greece, Switzerland, Slovenia, Norway, Malta, France, Finland and Denmark), the distribution of payment delays was more even between nationals and non-nationals. This was most evident in the case of Cyprus, where 49% of players experiencing delays were non-nationals.

The survey findings also reveal an interesting pattern in respect of the relationship between payment delays and education levels. The relationship between higher education qualification and payment on time was positive; further, a lower percentage of players with such qualifications experienced payment delays of less than 6-months than respondents with lower educational qualifications. Interestingly, no significant difference between players with different levels of educational attainment was reported in respect of payment delays lasting longer than 6-months, suggesting that the advantage of higher educational attainment becomes neutralised once the extent of payment delays becomes extreme (figure 5.3).

**The survey findings also reveal an interesting pattern in respect of the relationship between payment delays and education levels. The relationship between higher education qualification and payment on time was positive**

**FIGURE. 5.3 PAYMENT DELAYS AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL**



As discussed in chapter 3, the absence of a written club contract may be an indicator of labour market informality and as such be accompanied by an increased risk of abuse. Supporting the hypothesis that football players without written contracts may be more susceptible to adverse treatment, the findings suggest that there was a positive relationship between respondents without a written contract and payment delays (figure 5.4).

**The findings suggest that there was a positive relationship between respondents without a written contract and payment delays.**


**FIGURE. 5.4 PAYMENT DELAYS AND AVAILABILITY OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT**



In a similar manner, there is a positive relationship in respect of payment delays and lack of a contract copy (figure 5.5). 54% of respondents with a written contract but without possessing an actual copy, either personally or through their agent, had experienced payment delays. The rate of those experiencing payment delays where the agent had a copy of their contract was much lower and stood at 33% and the rate for those that had personally a copy was 38%.

**Evidence at a global level seems to suggest that the renewal of a club contract resulted in the least delays in payment under the new contract.**


**FIGURE. 5.5 PAYMENT DELAYS AND AVAILABILITY OF A CONTRACT COPY**



When examining the relationship between payment delays and means of entering into contract, the analysis of the survey findings points to some very interesting patterns. Evidence at a global level seems to suggest that the renewal of a club contract resulted in the least delays in payment under the new contract. A positive relationship was also found in respect of players who had been promoted from youth academies. However, the relationship was not so strong in the case of respondents contracting as free agents, suggesting that they were at a greater risk of contractual abuse in the form of payment delays.

**The findings therefore indicate an additional negative impact of the transfer system; many players were being forced to move to a club which was then unable to pay their wages.**

**FIGURE. 5.6 PAYMENT DELAYS AND CONTRACTING VIA TRANSFER**




Further analysis shows differences in payment delays depending on whether the players were pressured into transferring or into renewing their existing club contracts (figure 5.6). In the case of players who were transferred, the proportion of respondents who experienced payment delays and who had been pressured into transferring from their previous club was much higher when compared to those that requested the transfer. The findings therefore indicate an additional negative impact of the transfer

system; many players were being forced to move to a club which was then unable to pay their wages.

Similar findings were reported in respect of players who had been pressured into contract renewal by their club or their agent. Less than a third of players who mutually agreed to renew a contract suffered payment delays. But payment delays nearly doubled in comparison for players pressurised by the club to sign a new deal (figure 5.7).

**FIGURE. 5.7 PAYMENT DELAYS AND CONTRACT RENEWAL**




It is not only the way players have entered into their club contracts but also the type of contract they have that may be relevant in the case of payment delays. The survey findings suggest that within the group of players that had civil law contracts or were self-employed, the proportion of respondents who experienced payment delays (57%) was much higher when compared to respondents with employment contracts (38%) (figure 5.8). The findings confirm the risks associated with non-employment contracts. Importantly, the greatest difference between respondents with employment contracts and those without was found in respect of over 6-months' payment delays: 41% of those with civil-law/self-employment contracts had experienced such delays in contrast to 26% of respondents with

employment contracts, suggesting that the scope of contractual abuse is indeed substantial in the case of players without employment contracts.

**The survey findings suggest that within the group of players that had civil law contracts or were self-employed, the proportion of respondents who experienced payment delays (57%) was much higher [ . . . ]**


**FIG. 5.8 PAYMENT DELAYS AND TYPE OF CLUB CONTRACT**



However, probing further into the relationship between payment delays and type of contract, our findings suggest that the correlation between non-employment contracts and payment delays does not indicate clear patterns. On the one hand, payment delays were particularly pronounced in some countries characterised by a prevalence of non-employment contracts. This included, for instance, Congo, where 50% of players in non-employment contracts experienced payment delays in

comparison to 12.5% of players on employment contracts. Similar issues were identified in Croatia, where 55% of players on non-employment contracts had been subjected to payment delays vis-à-vis 25% of players on employment contracts. In Ukraine, the percentages stood at 50% and 36% respectively. This was not the case though in Turkey and Romania, where the rates of payment delays were similar across the two groups of players.


**FIGURE. 5.9 PAYMENT DELAYS IN COUNTRIES WITH HIGH PREVALENCE OF NON-EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS**




As noted above, our data suggests that payment delays were more often experienced by players at the lower end of wage levels: the difference was more pronounced in respect of delays below 6-months (figure 5.10).

**FIGURE 5.10 PAYMENT DELAYS AND LEVEL OF PAYMENT**



PAID ON TIME



1-6 MONTHS DELAY




MORE THAN 6 MONTHS DELAY



Further analysis on at regional levels reveals some interesting dynamics. In Africa, there was evidence of an increase in payment delays from low to high wages. In contrary, payment delays were more prevalent in low-wage groups in both the Americas and Europe (figure 5.11). Among others, 53% of respondents earning \$1,001-\$8,000 per month in Croatia had experienced payment delays in comparison to 31% of

respondents earning more than \$8001 per month. The opposite was true in Kenya, where 62% of respondents earning over \$8,001 per month had experienced payment delays in comparison to 44% of respondents earning less than \$1,000 per month.


**FIGURE. 5.11 PAYMENT DELAYS AND WAGE LEVELS PER REGION**



Finally, in cases where respondents had experienced payment delays, they were also asked to report where the delay had taken place, i.e. at their current club, at a different club in the same country or at a former club in a different country. Survey evidence suggests that in the majority of cases (63%), payment delays

took place at the club where the respondents were at that time playing, followed by 29.5% of cases where the delays had taken place in a different club but in the same country (figure 5.12). Only 7.5% of payment delays were reported in respect of delays in different clubs in different countries.

**FIGURE 5.12 PLACE OF PAYMENT DELAYS**



Importantly, there was hardly any difference in respect of players leaving their club when experiencing a payment delay of less than 3 months versus a delay of more than 3-months. This finding is particularly interesting if considered in the light of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber case law<sup>36</sup>, and the Commentary on the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players<sup>37</sup>, which generally assumes that a delay of 3-months constitutes a just cause for termination of the contract by the players. The RSTP commentary points out that: 'The fact that the player has not received his salary for such a long period of time entitles him to terminate the contract, particularly because persistent noncompliance with the financial terms of the contract could severely endanger the position and existence of the player concerned.'

The survey did not ask the respondents to identify the reasons for staying in the club despite experiencing payment delays. However, it is possible to hypothesize that one explanation for this could include concerns about the low likelihood and/or duration for receiving the wage arrears due to low trust in the procedures of arbitration courts (NDRC, DRC and CAS) or the ordinary courts. A complementary or alternative explanation could be that players in such circumstances would feel insecure finding new employment at a different club; in many national environments employment opportunities are very limited in

number. In the secondary market described in chapter 4.1, players are competing with many others for a limited number of positions, making finding a new club difficult. Moreover, in countries with very high prevalence of delayed payment across various clubs, this in itself may be a discouragement for players as hopes to find a more secure employment environment are limited. Either way it is further evidence that players are choosing not to terminate their contracts with clubs and move as free agents even when they have the legal means to do so. It highlights once again that the post-2001 FIFA Transfer Regulations on unilateral contract termination may provide insufficient protections to ensure the respect of contracts by club, while continuing to deter players from resigning for 'just cause'.

**Either way it is further evidence that players are choosing not to terminate their contracts with clubs and move as free agents even when they have the legal means to do so.**

## Abuse

# THE ABUSE OF PLAYERS

**In this section we turn to the personal abuse of players rather than their contracts. This abuse may take psychological or physical forms.**

We will focus on situations where players have been forced to train alone, and instances of discrimination, bullying, threats, and violence. One of the on-going themes in this section is that players who are non-nationals were more likely to be subjected to abuse than those who were nationals. Furthermore it can be assumed that the actual prevalence of the forms of abuse described in this section is higher than the reported results of the survey, as victims of such forms of abuse are often afraid of speaking openly about their experiences due to embarrassment, or fear of ridicule or repercussions.

## TRAINING ALONE

The issue of training alone falls under the category of abuse of players for a number of reasons. The inability to practice in a team setting reduces the opportunity for that player to play in first-team matches (they will, for example, not be participating in tactical

**33%** | OF THOSE REPORTING BEING FORCED TO TRAIN ALONE WERE FOREIGN PLAYERS

exercises) which will in turn have a potential longer-term impact on their ability to find high-level future employment and also (for the elite players) reduce opportunities for personal endorsements. Training alone can also have a negative psychological impact on a player who is excluded from the camaraderie of the team setting in what, after all, is a team game.

It will, of course, sometimes be necessary or expedient for a player to train alone rather than with their colleagues; a player recovering from injury may have special requirements or need to spend more time working on regaining fitness levels, and of course goalkeepers will regularly train on technique away from outfield players. However training alone is also used as a sanction to punish or stigmatise players, or to make their working conditions so poor that they feel pressurised to leave a club or acquiesce to a club request (e.g. to sign a new contract, ask for a transfer, or agree to a decrease in salary).

**FIGURE. 5.13: HAVE YOU OR YOUR TEAMMATES BEEN FORCED TO TRAIN ALONE FOR REASONS OTHER THAN INJURY?**



**78,20%** | NOT AWARE OF PRACTICE

**15,60%** | NOT PERSONALLY BUT TEAMMATES

**3,90%** | YES (CLUB WANTED TO END CONTRACT)

**1,40%** | YES (CLUB WANTED ME TO SIGN NEW CONTRACT)

**0,90%** | YES (CLUB WANTED ME TO AGREE TO TRANSFER)

It is clear that training alone as a sanction for players is common. Over 22% of respondents were aware of it occurring, although only 6.2% reported having personally been victims. Of those who had personally been affected, the vast majority reported that it was because the club either wanted to end their contract or because they wanted them to transfer to another club.

Non-nationals were particularly at risk of being forced to train alone. Overall in our survey, 15% of all respondents were of a different nationality to the country in which they were playing football. However 32.5% of those reporting they had been forced to train alone were non-nationals, suggesting that being a foreigner doubled your chance of this type of abuse occurring.


Players in Africa were the most likely to be ordered to train alone; 7.6% of players in Africa reported being forced to train alone in order to end their contract which was more than double the percentage of their colleagues in Europe or the Americas. Players employed in the Americas were least affected by the phenomenon, with 87% reporting that they had never been

forced to train alone and had never seen this happen to a teammate.


The relationship between being forced to train alone and the monthly salary of the player provided some evidence that clubs were using the tactic of forcing players to train alone to reduce wage bills (although not necessarily for the best-paid players). Figure 5.14 shows that players in the lower wage brackets were less likely to be forced to train alone and that players in the higher (but not the highest) wage brackets were more likely to be forced to train alone because the club either wanted them to transfer or because the club wanted them to terminate their contract.<sup>38</sup>

**The relationship between being forced to train alone and the monthly salary of the player provided some evidence that clubs were using the tactic of forcing players to train alone to reduce wage bills [ . . . ]**

**FIGURE 5.14: A: % OF PLAYERS REPORTING TRAINING ALONE AND MONTHLY SALARY**



**FIGURE 5.14B: % OF PLAYERS FORCED TO TRAIN ALONE TO REQUEST TRANSFER / END CONTRACT BY SALARY**




One cause for this might be clubs that sign contracts speculating on revenue which ultimately does not materialize, and who then use pressure on players to decrease their wage bill.

Given that one symptom of a club struggling to service its wage bill is a failure to pay its players on time, this is potentially supported by a positive relation between those forced to train

alone and those who suffer delays in payment. While overall, 59.7% of respondents said they were fully paid on time, this dropped to only 31.1% of those who had personally been forced to train alone. While overall 24.3% of respondents said they had suffered payment delays of 1-6 months, for those who had experienced training alone, this rocketed to 51%.

**FIGURE. 5.15 PAYMENT DELAYS AND TRAINING ALONE**




### Comparison with FIFPro Asia Survey and Eastern European Black Book

There were significant regional variations, with players in Africa (9.8%) being nearly twice as likely as those in the Americas (5.4%) or Europe (5.2%) to be forced to train alone. These compared favourably to the response of players in Asia responding to the 2014 FIFPro Asia survey. Here it was reported that 14.5% of players had personally been forced to train alone. It is impossible to tell from the two data sets whether the difference is mainly a geographical one or whether the situation is improving with time, although the latter seems less likely as there was only sporting season between the Asian and Global surveys. The FIFPro Asia survey, however, produced similar results in terms of the reason for being forced to train alone; 48.7% reported it was because the club wanted to terminate the player's contract.

The numbers of players being forced to train alone according to the Global Survey were also significantly lower than reported in the 2013 Black Book Report into Eastern Europe. The Black Book found that 15.6% of players had been forced to train alone and a country-by-country comparison found that in all but two countries, reports of being forced to train alone had dramatically reduced, usually by more than a half. Whether the increasing awareness of this problem following the Black Book's publication is a reason for this decline is unknown, but the relatively consistent levels reported in this region make us confident about the veracity of the Global Report findings in this respect. As with both the FIFPro Asian survey and the Global Report, the Black Book reported that the club wishing to end the player's contract was the main reason for forcing them to train alone.

**FIGURE 5.16 TRAINING ALONE: BLACK BOOK AND GLOBAL SURVEY COMPARISON**



## VIOLENCE, THREATS, BULLYING AND DISCRIMINATION

Personal abuse of players can also be more direct, ranging from harassment and bullying, to discrimination, threats of violence, and even physical violence. This can come from other players (tackles, challenges, and injuries falling within normal 'playing culture' were excluded), coaches, club management, and fans (either on a match-day or at other times).

The data pointed to a working environment where bullying and harassment and threats of violence were not uncommon, but did not affect the majority of players. 16% reported being victims of threats of violence and 15% being the victims of bullying and harassment. 7.3% of respondents had been the victims of recognised<sup>39</sup> discrimination (this could include discrimination on the grounds of race/nationality, religion, or sexuality).


The 15% of players who said they had experienced bullying or harassment was a notable increase from the 10.8% reporting the same in the 2014 FIFPro Asia Survey and the 10.2% from the 2013 Eastern European Black Book. For what is commonly seen as a 'macho' environment, this figure might seem low. It can be considered however that the thresholds of players of which experiences they considered worthwhile reporting is fairly high in comparison with the general population; football players are, after all, used to a working environment where verbal abuse is very common.<sup>40</sup>

**The data pointed to a working environment where bullying and harassment and threats of violence were not uncommon, but did not affect the majority of players.**

It may be that players are either not willing to admit they have been affected by mere 'psychological' violence or do not interpret it in this way. Astonishingly, more players reported having been victims of threats of violence (15.8%) but it was impossible to establish the extent to which players viewed these as separate or overlapping.

**For what is commonly seen as a 'macho' environment, this figure might seem low. It can be considered however that the thresholds of players of which experiences they considered worthwhile reporting is fairly high in comparison with the general population.**

**FIG. 5.17 EXPERIENCES OF VIOLENCE, HARASSMENT AND DISCRIMINATION**



### Physical Violence against Players

9.6% of respondents reported being the victims of physical violence. This is marginally lower than the 11.7% reporting physical violence in the 2013 Eastern European Black Book and marginally higher than the 8% who reported the same in the 2014 FIFPro Asia report. Taken together it looks safe to say that around 10% of players worldwide are the victims of violence. This figure is high when compared with the data from the Fifth Eurofound Working Conditions Survey of 2010 which reported that 1.9% of respondents had experienced violence in the workplace across the EU and a further 5% had experienced threats of physical violence.<sup>41</sup>

This data would still suggest that footballers are nearly twice as likely to experience deliberate physical violence (outside of the playing culture) than the average worker across other sectors. When we look at the perpetrators of the violence, we can see that 50.9% was reported to be the result of attacks by football fans (whether they were fans of the same club or rival clubs was not specified). A similar breakdown was noted by the 2014 FIFPro Asian Report (58.1%) and the 2013 Eastern European Black Book (55.8%). To put the threat of match-day 'hooliganism' against players (34.6% of total violence) into context, the Global Survey indicates that 3.3% of players have been physically attacked by fans on a match-day.


Other sources of violence were players (25%), members of the management/coaching staff (12%), and other third parties (17%).

The Asian Survey identified 20.9% of violence being committed by management/coaching staff and the Black Book 21.6%. However, violence by players was not included in either the Asian or Black Book reports, making comparison impossible and meaning that the percentage for violence by other groups was almost certainly artificially high.

layers were also asked whether they were aware of violence being perpetrated against a team-mate. Surprisingly, the numbers did not increase significantly. 12% of players were aware of violence against teammates. Players were less likely to be aware of violence by players or management/coaching staff on their teammates but interestingly more likely to be aware of violence committed by fans on a non-matchday. It is of course possible that some victims of violence by other players/club officials would also feel intimidated and fearful of admitting this in the survey: although the survey was designed to be anonymous, there is a risk that players influenced each other over certain questions when completing the questionnaire in a group setting (e.g. a changing room)

**This data would still suggest that footballers are nearly twice as likely to experience deliberate physical violence (outside of the playing culture) than the average worker across other sectors.**

**FIG. 5.18: THE PERPETRATORS OF PHYSICAL VIOLENCE**



## The Victims of Abuse: Younger Players

The survey questioned players about their experiences throughout their career rather than over a specific number of recent seasons which made it difficult to identify whether younger players were more likely to be the victims. Players under-24 made up 42% of respondents and 42.8% of those who reported violence but notably less for the other categories of abuse (figure 4.19). On the face of it this suggests that young players were no more likely to be the victims of violence than more senior teammates. However the data here should be cumulative; if a player's risk of being the victim of violence


is constant, then the longer a player's career, the greater the likelihood of them being a victim. If the risk was constant then we would expect younger players to report fewer incidents of violence than players at the end of their career. We consider it

probable, therefore, that younger players are significantly more at risk than older players when it comes to violence. The other

possibility, which we consider less likely, is that the football playing environment has changed so that players are more likely to experience abuse now than they were 10-15 years ago. When we break down the data from harassment, threats of violence and discrimination we also see increases in risk for younger players when it comes to many of the sub-categories.

**We consider it probable, therefore, that younger players are significantly more at risk than older players when it comes to violence.**

**FIG. 5.19: INCREASED RISKS FOR YOUNGER PLAYERS**




### The Victims of Abuse: Non-Nationals

The data showed that being a non-national of the league in which the player was employed had a discernible impact on whether a player faced abuse. However, it was not the case that all forms of abuse increased for non-nationals. Non-nationals were far more likely to be the victims of discrimination (17.2%) and slightly more likely to be the victims of physical violence. Surprisingly, they were less likely to be the victims of either harassment/bullying or threats of violence.

The data showed that being a non-national of the league in which the player was employed had a discernible impact on whether a player faced abuse.

**FIGURE. 5.20 NATIONALS AND NON-NATIONALS: EXPERIENCES OF ABUSE**




## Abuse Hotspots

There were a number of countries where players reported levels of abuse which were significantly above the global average. The outliers when it came to physical violence experienced by players were almost exclusively in Africa. For example players in Ghana reported more than ten-times more physical attacks by


management/coaching staff than the global average. In South Africa and the Congo, violent attacks by other players were three-times the global average. Africa also featured heavily when it came to physical attacks by fans on a matchday.

**FIGURE. 5.21 PHYSICAL VIOLENCE BY FANS ON A MATCHDAY**



When it came to threats of violence, the geographic distribution of the 'hotspots' was more diverse with some developed European nations featuring highly.


**FIGURE. 5.22 THREATS OF VIOLENCE BY FANS ON A MATCHDAY**



When it came to threats of violence on a non-matchday, players from Bolivia, Brazil, Congo and Poland reported three times the global average (5.9%) of incidents. But Italy was by far the highest, with almost a quarter of players having been threatened by fans away from the match (24.1%).

Players in the Congo and Scotland were five-times more likely to be threatened by another player than the global average of 4.2%, and players in the Congo and Kazakhstan were five-times more likely to be threatened by management or coaching staff, or third parties, than the global average (2.7%).

**FIGURE. 5.23 BULLYING / HARASSMENT BY FANS ON A MATCHDAY**



Egypt and Brazil were also more than three-times over the global average when it came to bullying and harassment by fans on a non-matchday, although Ecuador reported this problem as the highest at 22%. Other hotspots for bullying and harassment were Congo (21% by other players, 19% by management/coaching staff) and Georgia (25% for the same categories). Players in Kazakhstan also reported bullying and harassment by management/coaching staff and third parties many times above the global average.

Finally, when it came to reports of discrimination the two hotspots were Ghana and Scotland. Players in Ghana reported significantly elevated levels of discrimination by fans, other players, coaching staff, and third parties. In Scotland, where we speculate that the issue of sectarianism may have played a major role, nearly a quarter of players reported experiencing discrimination by fans on a matchday (23% against the global average of 5%) and 10% on a non-matchday (against a global average of 2%).

# HEALTH AND WELL-BEING

Professional football players are exposed to constant risk of injury, and the high pressure in the working environment can have important implications for their health and well-being. In this light, rest and annual leave periods as well as medical support are crucial in ensuring the physical and mental well-being of players. The survey found that a significant proportion of players lacked access to appropriate rest and annual leave periods, highlighting problems regarding the match calendar and enforcement of labour rights. The chapter also considers player satisfaction with medical support and the geographical distribution of this.



## Health and Well-being

# OVERVIEW

**DIFFERENT FORMS OF REST AND ANNUAL LEAVE ARE RECOGNISED AS BEING IMPORTANT FOR A WORKER'S PHYSICAL AND MENTAL WELL-BEING, AND LEGISLATION AT EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL LEVELS PROVIDES LABOUR ENTITLEMENTS TO DAILY AND WEEKLY REST PERIODS AS WELL AS A RIGHT TO ANNUAL LEAVE. THE SAME PRINCIPLES APPLY TO PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALLERS, PERHAPS TO AN EVEN GREATER EXTENT. BEING A PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALLER BRINGS WITH IT A CONSTANT RISK OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY, AND THE HIGHLY PRESSURED AND SCRUTINISED ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH PLAYERS OPERATE CAN LEAD TO OTHER NEGATIVE IMPACTS UPON THEIR PHYSICAL AND MENTAL WELL-BEING. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE NEED OF PLAYERS TO REST SHOULD BE GIVEN INCREASED ATTENTION AT BOTH POLICY AND PRACTICE LEVELS.**

IF STRUCTURED PROPERLY, ADEQUATE REST AND RECUPERATION PERIODS CAN HAVE A POSITIVE IMPACT ON OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY FOR PLAYERS AS WELL AS IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR CLUB. RECENT RESEARCH FOUND THAT A RECUPERATION PERIOD OF TWO-DAYS BETWEEN MATCHES IS INSUFFICIENT AND THAT THE CHANCE OF A POSITIVE RESULT IN THE SECOND MATCH IS CONSIDERABLY REDUCED.<sup>42</sup> A REST PERIOD OF THREE-DAYS, HOWEVER, DID NOT GIVE RISE TO ANY NOTICEABLE CHANGE IN THE TEAM'S CHANCES DURING THE SECOND MATCH.

As the legal and institutional framework in most countries, including in Africa, provides for weekly rest periods of at least one-day, the differences in the actual provision of weekly rest periods to football players possibly reflects the limited scope for enforcing these rights. Problems of enforcement may be compounded in cases where there is absence of trade union representation and/or where resources for the effective operation of enforcement authorities, such as Labour Inspectorates, have been reduced, the latter being particularly prominent in a number of countries following the recent economic crisis. We should also bear in mind that the survey was of FIFPro-affiliated players: players not represented by a union may be suffering even worse enforcement of their labour rights. Further analysis at national level confirms that the great majority of countries where respondents reported the lack of a full day without club obligations were in Africa. Countries where players did not have at least one full-day without club obligations included Congo (57%), Cameroon (48%), Gabon (45%) and

Botswana (44%) (figure 6.2). However, a considerable percentage of players in Brazil (48%), Bolivia (33%) and Croatia (24,5%) were also deprived of at least one-day of weekly rest without club obligations. Besides reflecting problems of effective enforcement of labour entitlements, the higher rates of respondents with no access to weekly rest periods in certain, especially African, countries may also reflect the prevalence of labour market informality (see the findings in chapter 3 concerning the existence of a written contract of employment). At the other end, players in a number of European countries were less likely to report such problems (e.g. Scotland, FYROM, Georgia and Greece). In the same category, we found Tunisia (0.5%) and the USA (2%).

Aside from the fact that the availability of weekly rest periods may reflect regional and country specificities, it may also be dependent on the league where the footballers play. The analysis of the survey findings suggests that the proportion of players in higher leagues who were deprived of weekly rest periods was higher than those in lower leagues. 86% of players in first leagues received one full day without obligations to the club (figure 6.3). This can be contrasted with 90% and 93% of respondents in the second and third leagues respectively. The findings are a case for concern, as players in higher leagues may not recover completely and as such face higher risks in terms of both performance and player injury rates.

**The risk of injuries in conjunction with the lack of appropriate medical support may have even further long-term implications for the players themselves, as these injuries may result in psychosocial and mental disorders, such as distress, depression, and anxiety.**

“

**If you are injured,  
then you are out.  
Nobody will ask  
how you are,  
nobody will call  
you. You only  
come back to  
the club when  
you are healthy.**

Midfielder, Ghana



## Health and Well-being

# WEEKLY REST PERIOD<sup>45</sup>

**A one-day weekly rest is the minimum standard in the EU and in national legislation in many countries. At international level, the ILO Weekly Rest Convention of 1921 (No. 14) also provides for a consecutive 24-hour weekly rest period.**


In order to assess the state of well-being of footballers, respondents were asked whether they received weekly rest periods of at least one day without club obligations. A significant percentage of respondents (12.5%) reported that they did not receive one-full-day per week without obligations to club.


A regional breakdown suggests considerable differences in respect of the provision of weekly rest periods (figure 6.1). The lowest percentage of players with one full day without obligations to their club was in Africa: almost a third of respondents (29%) lacked access to weekly rest periods. This was followed by respondents in the Americas, where the percentage of players with no weekly rest period stood at 12%. In Europe, however, the rate was much lower at 6%.

**12,5%** OF PLAYERS DO NOT RECEIVE AT LEAST ONE FULL DAY OF REST PER WEEK

**As the legal and institutional framework in most countries, including in Africa, provides for weekly rest periods of at least one-day, the differences in the actual provision of weekly rest periods to football players possibly reflects the limited scope for enforcing these rights.**

**FIGURE. 6.1 AVAILABILITY OF WEEKLY REST PERIODS PER REGION**



**FIGURE. 6.2 LACK OF AVAILABILITY OF WEEKLY REST PERIODS PER COUNTRY**


As the legal and institutional framework in most countries, including in Africa, provides for weekly rest periods of at least one-day, the differences in the actual provision of weekly rest periods to football players possibly reflects the limited scope for enforcing these rights. Problems of enforcement may be compounded in cases where there is absence of trade union representation and/or where resources for the effective operation of enforcement authorities, such as Labour Inspectorates, have been reduced, the latter being particularly prominent in a number of countries following the recent economic crisis. We should also bear in mind that the survey was of FIFPro-affiliated players: players not represented by a union may be suffering even worse enforcement of their labour rights. Further analysis at national level confirms that the great majority of countries where respondents reported the lack of a full day without club obligations were in Africa. Countries where players did not have at least one full-day without club obligations included Congo (57%), Cameroon (48%), Gabon (45%) and Botswana (44%) (figure 6.2). However, a considerable percentage of players in Brazil (48%), Bolivia (33%) and Croatia (24,5%) were also deprived of at least one-day of weekly rest without club obligations. Besides reflecting problems of effective enforcement of labour entitlements, the higher rates of respondents with no access to weekly rest periods in certain, especially African, countries may also reflect the prevalence of labour market informality (see the findings in chapter 3 concerning the existence of a written contract of employment). At the other

**We should also bear in mind that the survey was of FIFPro-affiliated players: players not represented by a union may be suffering even worse enforcement of their labour rights.**


**The analysis of the survey findings suggests that the proportion of players in higher leagues who were deprived of weekly rest periods was higher than those in lower leagues.**

end, players in a number of European countries were less likely to report such problems (e.g. Scotland, FYROM, Georgia and Greece). In the same category, we found Tunisia (0.5%) and the USA (2%).

Aside from the fact that the availability of weekly rest periods may reflect regional and country specificities, it may also be dependent on the league where the footballers play. The analysis of the survey findings suggests that the proportion of players in higher leagues who were deprived of weekly rest periods was higher than those in lower leagues. 86% of players in first leagues received one full day without obligations to the club (figure 6.3). This can be contrasted with 90% and 93% of respondents in the second and third leagues respectively. The findings are a case for concern, as players in higher leagues may not recover completely and as such face higher risks in terms of both performance and player injury rates.

14% OF PLAYERS HAVE LESS THAN A DAY OFF

**FIGURE. 6.3 AVAILABILITY OF WEEKLY REST PERIODS BY LEAGUE**



## Health and Well-being

# ANNUAL LEAVE

### A second recognised fundamental requirement in contemporary labour law is the right to paid annual leave.


The ILO Holidays with Pay Convention<sup>46</sup> entitles workers to take three weeks' paid leave each year. Legislation in many countries provides for a longer period of paid annual leave than this and the 1993 EU Directive on Working Time provides for four weeks of paid leave per year as a minimum European-wide standard. In the EU and Norway, workers are on average entitled to 25.3 days of paid leave per year, of which 21.9 days are guaranteed by law. In the rest of the world, there is significant divergence, with workers, for instance, in Chile being entitled to only 12 days of paid annual leave.<sup>47</sup> The regulations on paid annual leave laid down in collective agreements in countries with a tradition of collective bargaining are more beneficial than statutory entitlements (e.g. in Portugal and Finland).

Given the recognised importance of annual leave for promoting well-being and also for assisting the recovery of football players following the end of the season, the survey asked respondents how many days of paid annual leave they were given during the


last year.<sup>48</sup> A regional breakdown confirms that the proportion of respondents in Europe who had access to longer periods of annual leave was significantly higher than that in other regions (figure 6.4). 27% of respondents in Europe reported that they received between 26 and 30 days of annual leave. In contrast, half of respondents in Americas and 48% of respondents in Africa received between 0-9 days of annual leave. While the findings are consistent with the differences in the annual leave entitlements provided by the legislation in different countries, they may also point in some cases to the problematic enforcement of the leave provisions.

### A regional breakdown confirms that the proportion of respondents in Europe who had access to longer periods of annual leave was significantly higher than that in other regions

**FIG. 6.4 ANNUAL LEAVE PER REGION**



**FIGURE. 6.5 PERCENTAGE OF PLAYERS MEETING THE NATIONAL MINIMUM REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL LEAVE<sup>50</sup>**





A country breakdown of the results suggests significant variations. Figure 6.5 is based on a tabulation of the percentage of players, which meet the national (legal) minimum requirements for annual leave. Annual leave ranging between 26 and 30 days was provided in some European countries, including Austria and Finland. However, there was also evidence to suggest that compliance with the four-week annual leave rule set out by the 1993 EU Working Time Directive was not ensured in a number of EU Member States.

This included Bulgaria, where most respondents received between 10 and 15-days of annual leave but also Ireland where 85% of respondents reported that they received between 0 and 9 days of annual leave. It may be that the result in Ireland reflects the part-time nature of football in the country; in turn, part-time professionals are likely to be part-timers because their markets fail to provide sufficient financial support for full-time employment. In some EU countries (e.g. Czech Republic, France and Italy), the two most popular options were annual leave provisions of 21-25 and 26-30 days. Only in a small number of countries were players provided with leave of more than 30-days per year: Denmark and Malta<sup>49</sup> were examples of this but also the Ivory Coast, Namibia, Russia and Slovenia. Interestingly, no significant differences were found between UEFA and EU countries.

On the other hand, players in countries in America such as Bolivia, Costa Rica and also Brazil were more likely to receive between 0 and 9 days of paid leave. Similar trends were observed in a number of countries in Africa. Once again, players in Cameroon reported

particularly poor working conditions, with 64% of respondents there receiving between 0 and 9 days of annual leave. In Egypt the respective rate was even higher and stood at 93%. The overall message of the analysis is that national laws seem to be different and to be poorly applied. National football associations should pay particular attention to these findings, as the latter seem to suggest that despite recent improvements in the international match calendar, players can still be exposed to disadvantages, especially in Africa. The overall findings suggest that on all levels of professional football, harmonized standards of rest and recreation periods should help significantly to ensure the health and wellbeing of players. In this context, legal/institutional support for collective bargaining in the sector would contribute to ensuring better application of leave provisions.

**The overall findings suggest that on all levels of professional football, harmonized standards of rest and recreation periods should help significantly to ensure the health and wellbeing of players. In this context, legal/institutional support for collective bargaining in the sector would contribute to ensuring better application of leave provisions.**




A final issue to consider here concerns the extent to which the provision of annual leave is contingent on the way the player entered into a club contract. The findings suggests that the proportion of players who had entered into their contracts as free agents had benefited from fewer days of annual leave than the rest of the players' groups (figure 6.6). This is consistent with the fact that it is generally players with poor employment opportunities that become free agents, increasing thus the risk of worse employment standards. The relative poor bargaining position of the average free agent can also be seen elsewhere in this report in terms of monthly salary (chapter 4.2).

Aside from the evidence of the weaker position of free agents, the findings also indicate that a greater proportion of players promoted from youth academies lacked access to higher levels

of paid annual leave, albeit not at the levels of free agents. This confirms the anecdotal evidence that young players often 'run' harder than older players. The distribution of leave periods was more even in respect of respondents who had been transferred from a previous club for a fee or had their contracts renewed.

**The findings suggests that the proportion of players who had entered into their contracts as free agents had benefited from fewer days of annual leave than the rest of the players' groups**

**FIGURE 6.6: ANNUAL PAID LEAVE AND MEANS OF ENTERING INTO A CONTRACT**



## Health and Well-being

# MEDICAL SUPPORT

**Empirical evidence has confirmed that appropriate medical testing and the mandatory employment of medical physicians and physiotherapists at a club can lead to improved medical care and support of professional players and can empower the potential prevention of time-loss injuries.<sup>51</sup> In this light, respondents were asked to rate how satisfied they were with the medical support (i.e. professionals and facilities) provided by their club (from 1 not satisfied to 5 very satisfied).<sup>52</sup>**


The findings suggest that football players were generally quite satisfied with the provision of medical support (figure 6.7). 74% rated their medical support from “moderately satisfied” to “very satisfied”. However, a sizable minority (26%) of players were unsatisfied, of which 12% stated they were not satisfied at all.

The findings show that the majority of clubs are providing support which players deem to be appropriate to their needs but that at around a quarter of clubs much better attention needs to be paid to providing adequate preventive and supportive measures to protect and empower the health and well-being of players. The provision of such support is crucial not only

for the well-being and performance of players during their career, but also for their life post-football. Physically, there is a proven link between repeated short-term injury treatments (e.g. the once-prevalent knee cortisone injections) and long term disability. Psychologically, research on mental disorder in retired male professional footballers found a high prevalence of symptoms related to mental disorders among retired professional footballers. Importantly, the study established a relationship between symptoms of mental disorders and severe injuries, recent life events, and career dissatisfaction.<sup>53</sup>


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
**FIGURE. 6.7 PLAYER SATISFACTION WITH MEDICAL SUPPORT**



**FIGURE. 6.8 PLAYERS' SATISFACTION WITH MEDICAL SUPPORT**

MEAN RESPONSE TO HEALTH SATISFACTION






Looking more closely at the findings regarding medical support, the average global figure on players' satisfaction stood at 3.39 (figure 6.8). Greater levels of satisfaction with medical support were found mostly in European countries. These included, among others, Israel, Ireland, Russia and Finland, all of which had a mean of above 4. However, high rates of satisfaction were also reported by respondents in Paraguay (mean 4.88) and the USA (4.19). In Africa, the highest mean was reported in Zimbabwe (3.74). At the other end, countries where players reported lower rates of satisfaction included a number of African countries, including Morocco (mean 1.87), Gabon (2.18) and Ivory Coast (2.49). In respect of other regions, Bolivia had the lowest mean (2.34) among countries in the Americas and Malta (2.66) in Europe. An important qualification when interpreting these results is that individuals often adapt their expectations about

what will happen in the future based on what has happened in the past. In the particular instance, it may mean that players may adjust their assessment on the basis of what they have experienced in the past, in terms of quality and adequacy of medical support. This is an issue that should be taken always into account when interpreting the results of such surveys.

**Looking more closely at the findings regarding medical support, the average global figure on players' satisfaction stood at 3.39 (figure 6.8). Greater levels of satisfaction with medical support were found mostly in European countries.**



# MATCH FIXING

Players were asked if they had been approached to fix a match and if they were aware of match-fixing in their league. 6.7% of players reported being approached, but the data showed the likelihood of an approach increased as a player's career progressed, and in the course of a 15-year career 11% of players would be approached. Due to the sensitivity of the question, it is likely that the actual figure is higher than this. Lower-paid players and those who experienced payment delays were more likely to be approached and there were hotspots in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Central America.

MANCHESTER  
1824

The University of Manchester



## Match-Fixing OVERVIEW

**IT IS CLEAR THAT THE NUMBER OF PLAYERS WHO ARE BEING APPROACHED TO FIX MATCHES, AS A PROPORTION OF THE PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALLER POPULATION, IS RELATIVELY LOW.**

FIRST, IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT OUR FIGURES ARE FOR OVERALL APPROACHES THROUGHOUT A PLAYER'S CAREER RATHER THAN FOR A SINGLE SEASON. SECONDLY, WE MUST REMEMBER THAT THESE FIGURES RELATE TO APPROACHES TO FIX MATCHES, RATHER THAN MATCHES THAT WERE FIXED. THERE IS NOTHING FROM OUR DATA TO SUGGEST THAT MATCH-FIXING IS AN ENDEMIC PROBLEM IN WORLD FOOTBALL.

However, there are a number of caveats to this. First, it is likely that many players who were approached would not want to admit this even in an anonymous survey. This is also true in terms of being aware of match-fixing given the current regulations placing players under a duty to report such activity. We can also assume that any players who agreed to fix a match are very unlikely to admit this in a survey. Secondly, players who admitted being approached may have been

approached regularly – the data shows us number of players, not number of approaches. Thirdly, the 6.7% figure is an average across all respondents of all age-ranges. The longer a player's career lasts, the more exposed he will become to an approach. The chance of a player being approached to fix a match in the course of their career was reported to be much higher by respondents over 33 years of age, at 10.7%.

### FIGURE 7.1 MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES AND AWARENESS: OVERALL AND BY REGION

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN APPROACHED TO CONSIDER FIXING A MATCH?



ARE YOU AWARE OF ANY MATCH FIXING THAT TOOK PLACE IN YOUR LEAGUE?



**“  
My teammate  
received  
messages  
from the same  
woman as me on  
Facebook. I think  
it was the mafia.  
They want to  
control you.**

Goalkeeper, Greece

## Match-Fixing

## FACTORS INFLUENCING APPROACHES

The major factors relating to whether a player reported being approached to fix a match were age, income, delay in payment of wages, and where the respondent played their football.

### MATCH FIXING APPROACHES BY REGION AND COUNTRY

There was a discrepancy between the answers given by respondents depending on where they played their football. Players in Africa were more likely to have been approached (8.3%), compared with 7.2% in the Americas and 6.1% in Europe. However, the country-by-country breakdown illustrated that the differences between countries was greater than those between regions. A number of African countries

reported relatively low numbers of approaches, whereas three of the five countries reporting the biggest problems were in the UEFA zone. Further, as we will see later, there is a positive relation between low salaries and approaches, which may explain why players in Africa reported a higher number of approaches.

The hotspots for match-fixing attempts, where over 15% of players reported approaches, are noted in Figure 7.2:

### FIGURE 7.2 MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES AND AWARENESS: OVERALL AND BY REGION

#### I HAVE BEEN APPROACHED TO FIX A MATCH

1	GEORGIA	34,20%	5	CYPRUS	18,60%
2	CONGO	31,30%	6	BOLIVIA	17,20%
3	KAZAKHSTAN	25,30%	7	ECUADOR	16,90%
4	ZIMBABWE	19,00%	8	MALTA	15,50%

#### I AM AWARE OF MATCH-FIXING IN MY LEAGUE


1	CONGO	56,00%	5	BOLIVIA	15,40%
2	CYPRUS	40,50%	6	ECUADORE	14,60%
3	MALTA	18,20%	7	KAZAKHSTAN	4,10%
4	ZIMBABWE	17,20%	8	GEORGIA	0,90%

At the other end of the scale no players from Romania reported being approached, from a large sample of 511 respondents. Given the recent reports of match-fixing in this country, we do not consider this data to be reliable and reiterate again that the survey's findings relating to personal match-fixing approaches are likely to be significantly lower than the reality (although they may be much higher than the number of matches actually fixed of course).

We had even greater concerns about the reliability of the "awareness of match-fixing" figures, as they refer to actual

fixed matches (rather than approaches) and may be based on media or changing-room gossip and rumour. In some cases the figures on awareness of match-fixing were much higher than the number of reported approaches. Notably Austria (38%), FYROM (20.3%) Namibia (20.4%), and Sweden (20%) all reported high awareness of matches being fixed but rated low in terms of actual approaches. For other countries, the figures for awareness were much lower, possibly indicating the low likelihood of a match-fixing approach actually leading to a match being manipulated.

**FIGURE 7.3 MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES BY COUNTRY**




## MATCH FIXING APPROACHES BY AGE

There was no age when footballers were particularly at risk of being approached to fix a match. The data supported this assumption and, despite our fears of under-reporting, made us confident that our findings here are valuable. 10.7% of players over 33 years of age reported that they had been approached compared to just 5.4% of those in the 18-23 age group. 4.8% of under-18s reported approaches which could indicate that match-fixers are also interested in targeting youth tournaments but this amounted to only 16 responses so it is impossible to make a strong case for this argument based on our data.

As expected, the longer a player is employed in professional football, the greater the chance that he will receive an approach to fix a match.


### FIGURE 7.4 & 7.5 MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES BY AGE RANGE



11%

THE LIKELIHOOD OF BEING APPROACHED AT LEAST ONE DURING THE COURSE OF YOUR CAREER TO FIX A MATCH

## FIGURES 7.6A AND 7.6B PERCENTAGE OF PLAYERS REPORTING MATCH FIXING APPROACH BY SALARY



### MATCH FIXING APPROACHES BY SALARY

Earners of sub-\$300 per month bucked this trend slightly, which could be explained by their relative lack of ability to influence matches or the relatively low value in terms of betting of the matches they participate in. A match-fixer will be looking for players who are at least likely to be in the starting XI of the team on the betting markets. Data from players earning \$30,000 and above is less explicable but it should be noted that the number of respondents in this category was significantly lower than in the sub-\$30,000 salary categories and so may not be representative of the wider picture.

**As might be expected, the lesser the salary a player is earning, the more likely it is that they will be approached to fix matches (because match-fixers will be expecting a less well-off player to be more inclined to accept their offer)**

## MATCH FIXING APPROACHES AND DELAY IN SALARY PAYMENT

The 2013 Black Book report on player conditions in Eastern Europe identified a relationship between those experiencing delays in the payment of their wages and reporting being approached to fix a match; if you received a delay in payment, you were more likely to also be approached to fix a match. This supported FIFPro's hypothesis that players who received delayed payment were more likely to be targeted by match-fixers (who would assume they were more likely to be tempted by financial rewards from elsewhere). Our Global Survey showed a similar trend.

So, while 40% of respondents overall had received a delay in payment, this rose to 51.5% of those respondents who had

been approached to fix a match. The results also suggested that the longer the delay in payment, the more likely it was that an approach would be made. While only 2.5% of respondents overall claimed they had been the victims of a delayed payment of over 6-months, this increased to 3.9% for those who had been approached to fix a match.

It is impossible to be certain about the cause-and-effect relationship here, but the survey provides supporting evidence for the argument that those players who receive delayed payments are more likely to be approached to fix matches, and that those players who are the victims of long payment delays are even more likely to be targeted

### FIGURE 7.7 MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES AND DELAY IN SALARY PAYMENT

HAVE YOU BEEN APPROACHED TO FIX A MATCH?

**51,50%**

YES, WITH DELAY  
IN PAYMENT



**48,50%**

YES, WITH NO  
DELAY IN PAYMENT

### COMPARISON WITH THE 2013 BLACK BOOK REPORT AND 2014 FIFPRO ASIA SURVEY

Conducting a comparison of the threat of match-fixing over time is difficult. This is the first Global Player Survey and so a global comparison is not possible. The 2014 FIFPro Asian survey found that 6.8% of players admitted to having been approached to fix matches, and 17.5% said they were aware of match-fixing occurring in their league. The approach figure is remarkably similar to that from the Global Survey (6.7%) although the Global Survey awareness figure was significantly lower (9.3%). It should, however, be noted that being "aware"

**"I HAVE BEEN APPROACHED TO FIX A MATCH."**

**11,90%** — 2012 EASTERN EUROPEAN  
BLACK BOOK


**6,80%** — 2014 FIFPRO  
ASIAN SURVEY

**6,70%** — GLOBAL SURVEY

of match-fixing in your league could be little more than media reports, rumours, or changing room gossip.

The 2012 FIFPro Black Book survey of players in Eastern Europe found that 11.9% of respondents admitted to having been approached to fix a match and 23.6% stated that they were aware match-fixing has taken place in their league. This compared to 6.7% (approaches) and 8.9% (awareness) in the Global Survey for the same region. This suggests a significant drop in match-fixing approaches in Eastern Europe since 2012 or a lower share of players being ready to report such approaches for the reasons discussed above.

However when the figures were broken down on a country-by-country basis the situation looks more confused with three countries reporting increases and some discrepancies and outlying results which lead us to be suspicious of the veracity of some of the data.<sup>55</sup> The comparison should also be viewed with the data on approach by age set out in Section 6.2.2. This data appears to show that levels of match-fixing approaches globally have remained relatively stable throughout the past 15-20 years. Given the discrepancies and methodological concerns, conclusions at this stage must be tentative; at best we can conclude that despite the attempts of regulators and law-enforcement bodies, match-fixing approaches remain an entrenched problem in both Eastern Europe and globally, albeit one affecting only a small minority of players.

**FIGURE 7.8 MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES: BLACK BOOK AND GLOBAL SURVEY COMPARISON****I HAVE BEEN APPROACHED TO FIX A MATCH: 2013 BLACK BOOK V 2016 GLOBAL SURVEY**

# METHODOLOGY

Duis aliquam convallis nibh, eu tincidunt turpis elementum vel. Morbi a mattis sem. Sed a elementum sapien. Vivamus efficitur sodales nisi eget sollicitudin. Maecenas scelerisque nisl at neque vehicula mollis. Cras sagittis tempus risus, at vulputate orci congue id. Fusce massa nulla, aliquam quis metus ut, feugiat iaculis risus. Fusce interdum sollicitudin nunc in interdum. Suspendisse potenti. Mauris rutrum ut velit sed commodo.

MANCHESTER  
1824

The University of Manchester



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## RESEARCH PURPOSE

The 2013 Black Book report on player conditions in Eastern Europe identified a relationship between those experiencing delays in the payment of their wages and reporting being approached to fix a match; if you received a delay in payment, you were more likely to also be approached to fix a match. This supported FIFPro's hypothesis that players who received delayed payment were more likely to be targeted by match-fixers (who would assume they were more likely to be tempted by financial rewards from elsewhere). Our Global Survey showed a similar trend.

So, while 40% of respondents overall had received a delay in payment, this rose to 51.5% of those respondents who had been approached to fix a match. The results also suggested that the longer the delay in payment, the more likely it was that an approach would be made. While only 2.5% of respondents overall claimed they had been the victims of a delayed payment of over 6-months, this increased to 3.9% for those who had been approached to fix a match.

It is impossible to be certain about the cause-and-effect relationship here, but the survey provides supporting evidence for the argument that those players who receive delayed payments are more likely to be approached to fix matches, and that those players who are the victims of long payment delays are even more likely to be targeted

The purpose of the project was to gain the most extensive insight into the labour conditions and experiences of professional football players globally. The definition of "professional" here means that we were surveying full-time employees and those operating under a civil law contract but with formal obligations to their club; we also included here players working part-time who are sometimes referred to as being "semi-professional". We excluded amateur players and those paid on an informal match-by-match basis and who had no obligation to play for a particular club. FIFPro wanted... When interpreting the results, it is also important to remember that the survey was of FIFPro-affiliated players: players not represented by a union may be exposed to worse working conditions and may have more limited recourse to the effective enforcement of their labour rights. We are very grateful for the time and input provided by FIFPro and the national unions regarding the design and dissemination of the survey as well as to the players who kindly agreed to participate in the survey.

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## RESEARCH INSTITUTION AND TEAM

The research was commissioned by FIFPro, the international federation of professional football players, who approached the University of Manchester in late 2015 to assist in the construction and analysis of a questionnaire. The University of Manchester, is the largest single-site University in the UK and has origins going back to 1824. It is part of the prestigious Russell Group of Universities and in 2016 it was ranked in the top-30 higher-education institutions in the world (2016 QS University Global Rankings).

The academic team consisted of Dr Aristeia Koukiadaki, a senior lecturer at the School of Law with expertise in Labour

Law and Industrial Relations and Dr Geoff Pearson, also a senior lecturer at the School of Law and previously Director of the MBA (Football Industries) programme. Aristeia has conducted comparative research in working conditions and collective labour rights and published her work in (amongst others) the Industrial Law Journal and the European Journal of Industrial Relations. Geoff has previously published on the football player market in the European Law Journal and European Law Review and worked with the European Commission analysing the legality of the UEFA Home-Grown Player Rule. To assist with analysis of the data, Niall Coogan from the Manchester Business School was brought on to the team. Data inputting assistance came from Dr Jacqueline Austin and Robyn Jelley (Manchester Business School), and Rishabh Misra (MBA Football Industries candidate, University of Liverpool).

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## THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The final questionnaire was a collaborative effort between FIFPro and Drs Koukiadaki and Pearson. The strategic decision was made to ensure the greatest number of responses possible and with this in mind the questionnaire was limited to 23 questions which would be relevant across all of the countries participating. Inevitably this meant a number of questions that either FIFPro or the academics wanted in the survey being excluded, especially questions on sensitive topics that it was feared might discourage potential respondents. Potentially sensitive questions which were included were drafted to encourage responses although in some cases this limited the ways in which they could be analysed or compared to previous studies (e.g. questions requesting exact salary and whether a player had participated in match-fixing were avoided). Because the questionnaire would need to be translated into different languages, responses were almost exclusively limited to 'tick boxes'. Where possible, questions were written to allow comparison with the Black Book and Asia Surveys and other labour conditions surveys carried out by organisations such as the ILO, OECD, and Eurofound. A complete copy of the survey can be found in Chapter 10. The questionnaire is focused on six subfields: Contracts, Payment (remuneration), Training Alone, Health, Safety and Well-being, Violence and Match Fixing. There are 23 questions, 21 closed-ended and 2 partial open-ended questions.

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## RESEARCH PROCESS AND DATA RELIABILITY

Players unions from 66 countries were approached to participate in the survey. Players based in Asia were not approached as they had completed a similar survey in 2014 for FIFPro, some results of which are included in this report. However the Asia survey results are not subsumed into the Global Survey data as most of the questions are not directly comparable. Players from Israel and Kazakhstan (and potentially Asian-Russia) were included as they fall under the auspices of the European governing body, UEFA. In our analysis they are included as Europe, despite their geographical location in Asia.

The questionnaire was then translated into the national languages of all the participating countries. Players' unions from 55 countries in Africa, America, and Europe distributed paper copies of questionnaires to union representatives of clubs participating in the national league. Representatives were provided with written guidance on how to explain the questions to players, and a glossary of terms. Questionnaires were then completed by players anonymously. In some cases, where players were illiterate, representatives filled in surveys for respondents. The results of these were checked in detail by the research team to guard against potential manipulation. Data collection took place in May and June 2016.

Questionnaires were returned to FIFPro and scanned into pdf form before being sent to the University of Manchester for data entry. The largest number of questionnaires from one country was Cameroon (712), and the lowest included was Slovenia (95). Collected data was manually entered into SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) by a research team trained in the use of the software. Of the 55 countries who returned surveys, only one (Spain) was excluded as the number of returns was too low to be representative of different clubs or leagues. Surveys from Belgium were also excluded as these arrived too late to be inputted. The final number of returns was 13,846, which was more than was originally anticipated. This accounts for 21% of all FIFPro registered players. We should note that not all player unions or professional players are affiliated to FIFPro (although candidate and observer countries were included in the survey).

All responses were inputted, and questionnaires missing answers to some questions were not excluded (unless this omitted demographic data necessary to ensure reliability of data). For some questions, we noted a blanket 'null-response' across a small number of countries. Here we were concerned about potential cultural pressures affecting the ability of players to answer the questions truthfully. As a result of our concerns about the veracity of the blanket null-responses to these questions, the data was excluded from the overall analysis of the relevant questions.

SPSS software was used to perform the statistical analysis and the research team looked to, (a) describe the current state of labour conditions for professional footballers, (b) identify trends over time in comparison with earlier FIFPro surveys, and (c) look for relationships in the data which may explain some of the findings. Data analysis consisted of examining frequencies across all themes, analysing the data in order to provide information about the distribution of variables through

descriptive statistics, and conducting cross-tabulation analysis to show the relationship between two or more categorical variables.

The final report was written for FIFPro by Dr Aristeia Koukiadaki and Dr Geoff Pearson in August-October 2016, with statistical data analysis support from Niall Coogan.

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## ETHICS AND ANONYMITY

Given that some of the questions were sensitive, the questionnaire was anonymous. Players were not asked their name or the name of their team, but instead to merely put the country in which they were playing, the league in which they played, and whether they were a national of that country. Anonymity was aimed for in order to encourage players to answer truthfully about issues such as abuse and match-fixing. It is common practice in the social sciences to protect the anonymity of research participants answering questions which could have adverse effects for them if they were identified.

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## LIMITATIONS

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### Sampling

FIFPro were keen to give voice to as many of their members as possible and as such the survey sought to gather the maximum number of responses as possible at country and league levels. Spain was excluded because it was not possible to reach there the acceptable level of responses or guarantee anonymity of players. All other responses from the different countries and leagues were inputted. A response from the Belgian Football Players Union unfortunately arrived too late to be included.

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### Missing Participants

Unfortunately a small number of national unions did not participate in the study or return sufficient surveys to be included. These included the three biggest football markets in the world: England and Wales, Germany, and Spain. A number of other important countries in terms of profile in the football industry and number of professional players are also missing, including Argentina, Mexico, the Netherlands, and Portugal. The inclusion of these nations would of course have improved the quality and veracity of the data and analysis. As noted above, the survey also did not include countries from the Asian Football Confederation although comparison— where possible — was made with the 2014 FIFPro Asia Survey.

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### Missing Data

As the questionnaire was administered by hand, respondents were able to pass over questions they did not wish to answer, or did not have information for. Some questions went unanswered on a national basis and in these instances the data does not appear in the comparative graphs. Specifically, blanket-null responses to some questions from players in Russia, Tunisia, and Ukraine were excluded, although answers to different questions from players in these countries were still included in our analysis. Data pertaining to nationality from players in Morocco was also excluded after concerns were raised about its reliability. Finally, around 100 questionnaires from Scotland were inputted late meaning that they could not be included into the final regional or global figures (with the exception of chapter 7 where they were included). Their absence will have little discernible effect on the figures in other chapters. All figures pertaining to Scotland on a country-by-country basis were updated to include all returns with the exception of Figures 4.4, 4.7 and 6.5.

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### Adverse Influence and Data Reliability

Although the survey was designed to be anonymous, and those inputting the data and carrying out the analysis knew neither the players nor clubs who had completed questionnaires, there is a risk that respondents could be adversely influenced by other players or club management individuals present at the time they completed the questionnaire. In order to gain the highest number of responses, paper questionnaires were distributed and collected by local player union representatives. Many questionnaires were filled out in a group setting (e.g. a changing room) and in some cases illiterate players were assisted in completing the survey by their teammates. There is therefore a danger that for sensitive questions in particular (e.g. admitting match-fixing approaches or reporting abuse by other players or club management), players may not be willing to admit they have experienced this. This is a serious methodological problem which compounds the methodological issues that generally attach themselves to survey research on sensitive topics in comparison to, for example, longitudinal observational studies.

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### Analysis of Trends over Time

Given that this is the first Global Survey, it was impossible in most cases to comment on trends and changes over time. The survey is very much a snapshot of the life of a professional footballer in 2016. Some comparison over time can be made in terms of the professional football in Eastern Europe as a result of the 2013 Black Book but even here some of the questions in our survey needed to be drafted slightly differently to improve the quality of the data.

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### Gender Limitation

This survey is only of the experience of male professional footballers. We are of course aware of the increasing number of female professional players and the overall development of the women's game internationally. At the current time, however, the labour market for male and female players is fundamentally different. Although there will of course be shared experiences and concerns, many different problems are faced by male and female professional players and a separate survey of the women's game is needed.

## PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES AND NUMBER OF QUESTIONNAIRES RETURNED

53

PARTICIPATED  
UNIONS

87

LEAGUES

13.876

QUESTIONNAIRES

Unions that Participated	Leagues	Number of Questionnaires
Austria	2	154
Bolivia	2	317
Botswana (Candidate)	1	297
Brazil	4	103
Bulgaria	2	412
Cameroon	2	712
Congo	1	150
Costa Rica <sup>2</sup>		327
Croatia	1	170
Czech Republic	1	238
Cyprus	1	235
Denmark	2	355
Ecuador	2	184
Egypt	1	111
Finland	2	220
France <sup>3</sup>		435
Fyrom (Observer)	1	125
Georgia (Observer)	1	112
Ghana	1	204
Greece <sup>2</sup>		350
Guatemala	1	363
Hungary	1	208
Ireland	2	176
Israel (Candidate)	2	334
Italy	3	276
Ivory Coast	1	262
Kazakhstan (Candidate)	1	171

Unions that Participated	Leagues	Number of Questionnaires
Kenya (Observer)	1	242
Malta	1	112
Montenegro	1	188
Morocco <sup>1</sup>		288
Namibia	1	204
Norway	2	299
Paraguay	2	158
Peru <sup>2</sup>		288
Poland	2	314
Romania	2	511
Russia	2	191
Scotland	2	169
Serbia	1	267
Slovenia	19	5
South Africa <sup>2</sup>		223
Sweden	2	381
Switzerland	2	200
Venezuela	1	325
Ukraine	1	495
Uruguay	2	341
USA	1	383
Zimbabwe <sup>1</sup>		331
Tunisia (Observer)	1	198
Iceland	1	148
Gabon	1	152
Turkey	2	353

# ANNEX

Duis aliquam convallis nibh, eu tincidunt turpis elementum vel. Morbi a mattis sem. Sed a elementum sapien. Vivamus efficitur sodales nisi eget sollicitudin. Maecenas scelerisque nisl at neque vehicula mollis. Cras sagittis tempus risus, at vulputate orci congue id. Fusce massa nulla, aliquam quis metus ut, feugiat iaculis risus. Fusce interdum sollicitudin nunc in interdum. Suspendisse potenti. Mauris rutrum ut velit sed commodo.

MANCHESTER  
1824

The University of Manchester



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## DEFINITIONS

### **Training alone**

The instruction of the club to a player to train separately from the squad.

### **Harassment**

'A person (A) subjects another person (B) to harassment where, on the grounds of (insert social identity basis), A engages in unwanted conduct which has the purpose or effect of (i) violating B's dignity or (ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B. "The conduct shall be regarded as having this effect only if, having regard to all the circumstances and in particular the alleged victim's perception, it should be reasonably considered as having that effect'.

### **Discrimination**

Discrimination is defined as "less favourable treatment" of player based on one or more of: gender, age, race, nationality, religion or belief, sexuality.

### **Bullying**

Unwanted conduct and including either harassment or bullying as: 'Where one person or persons engage in unwanted conduct in relation to another person which has the purpose or effect of violating that person's dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for that person' The conduct shall be regarded as having this effect only if, having regard to all the circumstances and in particular the alleged victim's perception, it should be reasonably considered as having that effect'.

### **Match-fixing**

Dishonest activity with the intention of manipulating a match, usually for financial gain (most often through gambling). This includes influencing the result of the match and also less significant match-events (e.g. the timing or number of bookings, red cards, throw-ins etc.).

### **Labour contract**

The relationship between a club and a player is a labour contract governed by national labour law, national FA and FIFA regulations.

### **Civil contract**

A contract between a club and a player that is not a labour contract. In many occasions such contract is additional to a labour contract but lacks the protection of such contract. Most civil contracts are not registered with the FA.

### **Paid by addendum/annex**

The remuneration of a player should be mentioned in the labour contract that is registered with the FA. The payments agreed upon by addendum or annex is not always registered and will be difficult to prove when there is no registration of this annex.

## FOOTNOTES

- 1 The analysis in this section excludes Morocco due to issues related to data reliability.
- 2 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2015 Revision (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2015).
- 3 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound), European Quality of Life Survey 2012 (Eurofound, 2012). Interestingly, the reduced life satisfaction of those with only primary education (compared with secondary) disappears after controlling for income.
- 4 Due to data reliability issues, data on Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan was excluded from the analysis here.
- 5 In addition, we suspected problems in respect of the interpretation of the terminology used in the question by respondents in some countries. As a result, the data from Russia and Ukraine was excluded from the analysis here.
- 6 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Education at a Glance 2016 (OECD, 2016). Migrant Stock: The 2015 Revision (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2015).
- 7 World Bank education statistics database.
- 8 Eurostat, Vocational Education and Training Statistics. A 2013 study on the working conditions of professional sports players also identified that many players took part in some form of education or study while working as a professional sports player. Even so, many were not aware of the educational opportunities they could take advantage of, and others find that their employers are unwilling to help them take those opportunities (Uni-Europa Sport-Pro, An Analysis of the Working Conditions of Professional Players of Basketball, Hockey, Handball and Rugby across a Number of European Member States (Uni-Europa Sport-Pro, 2013).
- 9 A 2013 study on the working conditions of professional sports players also identified that many players took part in some form of education or study while working as a professional sports player. Even so, many were not aware of the educational opportunities they could take advantage of, and others find that their employers are unwilling to help them take those opportunities (Uni-Europa Sport-Pro, An Analysis of the Working Conditions of Professional Players of Basketball, Hockey, Handball and Rugby across a Number of European Member States (Uni-Europa Sport-Pro, 2013).
- 10 Informal employment refers here to jobs that generally lack basic social or legal protection or employment benefits, irrespective of whether they are performed inside or outside the informal sector. In addition to informal sector employment, it also includes informal employment in formal enterprises, employers and own-account workers, contributing unpaid family workers, own-account workers producing goods exclusively for their own household's consumption, and members of informal producer cooperatives (see ILO, World of Work Report 2014: Developing with Jobs (ILO, 2014).
- 11 The findings here concerning the lack of contract are consistent with previous studies of other professional sports in Europe; Uni-Europa Sport-Pro, An Analysis of the Working Conditions of Professional Players of Basketball, Hockey, Handball and Rugby across a Number of European Member States (Uni-Europa Sport-Pro, 2013).
- 12 In the European Union, a Directive (91/533/EEC), which aims to provide employees with improved protection, to avoid uncertainty and insecurity about the terms of the employment relationship and to create greater transparency on the labour market, establishes the employer's obligation to inform employees of the conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship. Under the Directive, every employee must be provided with a document containing information on the essential elements of his contract or employment relationship. Although the Directive does not oblige the employer to provide a copy of the contract as such, it may have promoted indirectly the provision of a contract copy as a means of compliance and this may hence explain the difference in the rates of players with and without copies of contracts between EU and UEFA countries.
- 13 The analysis does not include those that answered in Q5 that they did not have a written contract in place.
- 14 See, among others, European Parliament, The Impact of New Forms of Labour on Industrial Relations and the Evolution of Labour Law in the European Union, IP/A/EMPL/ST/2007-019, Policy Department Economic and Scientific Policy (European Parliament, 2007). For an analysis of non-employment relationships and precarious work in Central and Eastern Europe and Greece, see the national reports for the project 'The Rise of the Dual Labour Market: Fighting Precarious Employment in the New Member States through Industrial Relations', available at [http://www.celsi.sk/en/publications/research-reports/Hatfield\\_1\\_Self-Employment\\_in\\_Europe](http://www.celsi.sk/en/publications/research-reports/Hatfield_1_Self-Employment_in_Europe), (Institute for Public Policy Research, 2015).
- 15 More recently, there is some evidence of states trying to limit the extent such payments are protected against taxation. See, for instance, the case of France, where the government terminated the system of 'Collective Image Rights' considering that this tax loophole should not exist while the country was heavily indebted (KEA and CDES, The Economic and Legal Aspects of Transfers of Players, Study carried out for the European Commission, Directorate-General for Education and Culture: KEA European Affairs, 2013).
- 17 Article 8 of the agreement on image rights stipulates that the club and the player have to agree how the players' image rights are exploited. As a recommendation and principle the individual player may exploit his rights by himself (if not conflicting with Clubs' sponsors/partners) whilst the Club may exploit the Players' image rights as part of the whole squad.
- 18 FIFA Global Transfer Market Report 2016, p.6.
- 19 KEA/CDES terminology.
- 20 FIFA TMS Monthly highlights August 2016
- 21 FIFA Global Transfer Market Report 2016, p.3. This data was drawn from players engaged in international transfers who will on average receive higher wages than players not transferred in such a way.
- 22 We must, however remember the average wages in other sectors may still be much lower than what a footballer earns. The national daily minimum wage in Ghana stands at GH¢8, just over \$2.
- 23 Iceland, which performs very well on the OECD measures of mean monthly income (\$4,843: Source: OECD database, 2015), had 42.3% of respondents earning \$650 or under. Similarly in Ireland (OECD mean \$3,947: Source: OECD database, 2015), 56.4% of players earned \$650 or under.
- 24 Richard Duhaiois states that the average career length of a professional footballer in France is 6-7 years (Le Marché du Travail des Footballeurs Professionnels: Un Miroir Aux Alouettes? (CEE no.122, June 2015). This is two years more than Goddard and Wilson suggest: 2004 study cited in: 'Free agency and employment transitions in professional football', in Frick, B., Pietzner, G. and Prinz, J. 'Career duration in a competitive environment: The labor market for soccer for Players in Germany' 2007 Eastern Economic Journal Vol. 33, Issue 3: 429-42. In 2010 it was reported that the average length of a professional footballer's career in the UK was eight years but the methodology for reaching this figure was not disclosed (The Guardian, 19 March 2010).
- 25 FIFA Global Transfer Market Report 2016, p.7. figure was not disclosed (The Guardian, 19 March 2010).
- 26 This is despite the fact that in the EU, following repeated fixed-contract terms an employer should make the next contract being made permanent (Council Directive 99/70/EC).
- 27 As the questionnaire was administered by hand, respondents were able to pass over questions they did not wish to answer for or have information for. Some questions went unanswered on a national basis and in these instances the data does not appear in the comparative graphs. In Fig 4.4 data from Romania and Russia is excluded.
- 28 This refers to the 1995 European Court of Justice case where the requirement to pay a transfer fee for an out-of-contract player was declared unlawful where it could restrict free movement of players between EU member states (Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman (1995) C-415/93).
- 29 KEA and CDES, The Economic and Legal Aspects of Transfers of Players, Study carried out for the European Commission, Directorate-General for Education and Culture: KEA European Affairs, 2013; Szymanski, S. (2015) 'The economic arguments supporting a competition law challenge to the transfer system' <https://www.fifpro.org/attachments/article/6241/Embargoed%20Stefan%20Szymanski%20Transfer%20System%20Analysis.pdf>
- 30 It should be noted that the Scottish sample was very small – only 12 players reported joining their current contract after being transferred for a fee. However other sample sizes were much bigger. 62 players in the Czech Republic and 92 in Sweden reported joining their current club after the payment of a transfer fee.
- 31 40 players compared with 22 who were transferred to the club of their choice.
- 32 FIFPro Black Book Eastern Europe 2012
- 33 UEFA 'Financial Fair Play' regulations only target clubs in UEFA competitions and as such directly affect 5% of European clubs.
- 34 Reports also suggest that this may involve players signing a declaration saying everything is in order even if they had not received all due salaries. For instance, see the problem of payment delays in Portuguese football clubs (Reuters, Wage Delays Push Players to Seek Aid in Portugal, July 17 2013, available at <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-soccer-portugal-crisis-idUKBRE96GON920130717>).
- 35 Morocco was excluded from this analysis, as there were concerns regarding the accuracy of the data in respect of players that were non-citizens.
- 36 See, among others, H v A and FC L, Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 24 November 2011 and N v Club A, Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 17 January 2014.
- 37 FIFA Commentary on the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players, available at [http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/51/56/07/transfer\\_commentary\\_06\\_en\\_1843.pdf](http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/51/56/07/transfer_commentary_06_en_1843.pdf)
- 38 Whether it is the club or the player that terminates a contract is important in terms of future financial liability of the parties for breach of contract. A player who terminates their contract is less likely to be able to claim wrongful or unlawful dismissal. That said, forcing a player to train alone for punitive reasons may allow players in some countries to be able to resign and claim constructive unfair dismissal.
- 39 Analysis of the regularity of abuse for the national versus non-national populations suggested actual discrimination on the grounds of nationality was likely to be higher.
- 40 For comparison, the Sixth European Working Conditions Survey found that 16% of workers reported having been subject to adverse social behaviour (such as acts of violence, harassment and unwanted sexual attention). European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, First Findings: Sixth European Working Conditions Survey (Eurofound, 2015). In the sports sector, the 2013 report by Uni Europa Sport Pro and EU Athletes also highlighted incidences in which players were subjected to threats, bullying and discrimination on grounds of ethnicity and age (Uni-Europa Sport-Pro, An Analysis of the Working Conditions of Professional Players of Basketball, Hockey, Handball and Rugby across a Number of European Member States: Uni-Europa Sport-Pro, 2013).
- 41 No findings have been yet reported on the rate of physical violence by the sixth (2015) European Working Conditions Survey run by Eurofound.
- 42 R. Verheijen, Study on Recovery Days (World Football Academy, 2012).
- 43 See, among others, Drawer S, Fuller C. W. Evaluating the Level of Injury in English Professional Football Using a Risk-based Assessment Process, British Journal of Sports Medicine 36 (2002) 446–451; Hawkins R. D., Fuller C. W., An Examination of the Frequency and Severity of Injuries and Incidents at Three Levels of Professional Football. British Journal of Sports Medicine 32 (1998) 326–332.
- 44 V. Gouttebarge, B. A. Hughes Schwab, A. Vivian and G. M. M. J. Kerkhoffs, Injuries, Matches Missed and the Influence of Minimum Medical Standards in the A-League Professional Football: A 5-Year Prospective Study, (2016) 7 Asian Journal of Sports Medicine, e31385 [online first].
- 45 Weekly rest refers here to a minimum break of 24 consecutive hours (1 day) from work obligations within a seven day period.
- 46 International Labour Organisation, (Revised), 1970 (No. 132)
- 47 ILO, Conditions of Work and Employment Programme: Paid Annual Leave (International Labour Office, 2004).
- 48 Please note here that the questionnaire asked players to state only the days of annual leave they were provided with, excluding public holidays. This was important for comparison with other industry as well as recognising that many football matches are deliberately scheduled on public holidays for historical reasons and/or to increase attendances.
- 49 It is important to note though that in the case of Malta, there is a high percentage of part-time professional football players.
- 50 Weekly rest refers here to a minimum break of 24 consecutive hours (1 day) from work obligations within a seven day period.
- 51 On evidence of this, see Gouttebarge V et al, op.cit.
- 52 Responses from players in Russia were excluded from the analysis due to problems with the validity of the data.
- 53 <https://www.fifpro.org/attachments/article/4960/2015%20Gouttebarge%20Prevalence%20of%20CMD%20in%20retired%20professional%20footballers.pdf>
- 54 For example in Greece only 3.5% reported they had been approached to fix a match compared with 30.3% in 2012. This apparent reduction must be treated with extreme caution given that only 3.5% of players said they were aware of match-fixing in their league compared with 47.2% in 2012. We find it implausible that only 3.5% of current players could be aware of this given the approaches and awareness only four years earlier and the length of a football player's career.

# COUNTRY REPORTS

The report covers the member markets of player unions in Africa, the Americas and Europe: Austria, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, FYROM (Macedonia), Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malta, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Scotland, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.

MANCHESTER  
1824

The University of Manchester





## Country Reports

## BOTSWANA

Players  
nationality91%  
Botswanan292 Players  
surveyed

**As in other African nations, players in Botswana are often left to recover from injury without medical or financial assistance. Half of the players surveyed were not satisfied with medical support from their clubs.**

Forty percent do not have a copy of their contract, leaving them unprotected when things go wrong. The players union said it recently helped draw up a new standard contract and club licensing system with football authorities that is "turning around" the working conditions of its members.


## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +267 72 783 233

E-mail: unionfootballers@gmail.com

## CONTRACT DATA



29 MONTHS

Average contract length

40% No copy  
of contract3% Self-employed  
(civil law contract)5% Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)EMPLOYMENT  
PRESSURE

2%

Forced to train alone  
during career

17%

Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

24%



Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)

\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**41%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**  
Number of  
respondents (283)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**52%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**50%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**29%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**44%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week



**39%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**12%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**11%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**16%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**6%**  
Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports

## CAMEROON

Players  
nationality

98%

Cameroonian

458 Players  
surveyed

### Players in Cameroon work hard for little or no money. Almost half of players do not have a day off.

David Low, a Singaporean who played in the first division for several months in 2015 and 2016, said he trained every day from 6am to 8am apart from on match days. "Players in Cameroon are used to hardship," Low said. Only 25% of players had a copy of their contract and typically, Low said, they get paid only one month in six.

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT




Phone: +237 94 852 621

E-mail: info.synafoc@yahoo.fr

Website: www.afcamerounais.org

## CONTRACT DATA



20 MONTHS

Average contract length

68% No copy  
of contract3% Self-employed  
(civil law contract)7% Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)EMPLOYMENT  
PRESSURE

6%

Forced to train alone  
during career

3%



Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

27%

Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)

\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**64%** Less than 10 days paid vacation

**49%** Unsatisfied with medical support

**45%** Insecure about employment as footballer

**48%** Generally no day off per week



**22%**  
Vocational training or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**12%** Victim of violence by fans

**23%** Threatened by fans

**24%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**7%**  
Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports

# DR CONGO



Players  
nationality

**94%**  
Congolese

**130** Players  
surveyed

**Congo is one of most dangerous places in the world to be a footballer with almost one in four players the victim of fan violence and 39 percent threatened by supporters.**


Working conditions are precarious -- 89 percent of players have no written contract. Club bosses have too much autonomy because many have close ties with government, the union said. Another concern: 31 percent of players have been approached about fixing matches.

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +243 15 129 949  
E-mail: [ufcinfo\\_rdc@yahoo.fr](mailto:ufcinfo_rdc@yahoo.fr)  
Website: [www.ufcongo.org](http://www.ufcongo.org)

## CONTRACT DATA



**N/A**

Average contract length

**85%** No copy  
of contract

**44%** Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

**17%** Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

**6%**  
Forced to train alone  
during career

**21%**  
Pressured by club  
to renew current contract



**24%**  
Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)

\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**26%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**  
Number of  
respondents (69)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**73%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**52%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**45%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**57%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week



**35%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**25%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**39%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**49%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**31%**  
Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports

## EGYPT

Players  
nationality95%  
Egyptian72 Players  
surveyed

**Players in Egypt's first division mostly receive satisfactory conditions but standards deteriorate in the second division, according to their union.**


Almost half (48%) said they were not satisfied with the medical support their club provides. The union said it has to pay the fees for surgery for footballers at smaller clubs. It is also educating players about the risk of match fixing. Ten percent have been approached to manipulate games.

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +20 23 303 3833  
E-mail: [info@epfaegypt.com](mailto:info@epfaegypt.com)  
Website: [www.epfaegypt.com](http://www.epfaegypt.com)

## CONTRACT DATA



N/A

Average contract length

25% No copy  
of contract3% Self-employed  
(civil law contract)0% Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)EMPLOYMENT  
PRESSURE

6%

Forced to train alone  
during career

N/A

Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

N/A

Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)



\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**67%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of respondents (68)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**93%** Less than 10 days paid vacation

**48%** Unsatisfied with medical support

**27%** Insecure about employment as footballer

**17%** Generally no day off per week



**92%** Vocational training or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**3%** Victim of violence by fans

**3%** Threatened by fans

**69%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**10%** Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

# GABON

Players  
nationality

## 81%

  
Gabonese


## 140

 Players  
surveyed

### Gabon's football league has the highest incidence of delayed pay in the world.

"Players endure precarious and undignified conditions," said the national player union, which wants a standard contract fixing minimum requirements. 68% of players said they felt insecure at their club, 66% were unsatisfied with medical support and 62% do not have a copy of their contract.

## CONTRACT DATA



## 21 MONTHS

Average contract length

## 62%

 No copy  
of contract

## 4%

 Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

## 28%

 Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

## 8%

Forced to train alone  
during career

## N/A

Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

## 23%

Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)



\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**96%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of  
respondents (140)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**83%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**49%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**66%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**45%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week



**20%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**16%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**14%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**14%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**1%**  
Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports

## GHANA

Players  
nationality96%  
Ghanaian246 Players  
surveyed

### Young players in Ghana, as in countries across Africa, yearn to play in Europe to earn more money.


"I will do whatever I need to do to go," one 21-year-old player, who earns \$100 a month in the first division, said. He said he recently had to pay \$300 from his own pocket for medical fees to treat an injury. Only 3 percent of players are aged over 29. However, even though careers are short, most players (77%) said they felt secure in the profession.

### LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +233 27 102 2196  
E-mail: info@pfag.com.gh  
Website: www.pfag.com.gh

### CONTRACT DATA



28 MONTHS

Average contract length

12% No copy  
of contract7% Self-employed  
(civil law contract)3% Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

### EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

1%

Forced to train alone  
during career

N/A

Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

30%

Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)

\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

99,1

**23%** Late payment (last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of respondents (230)



0\$  
300\$

**0,4**

301\$  
600\$

**0,4**

601\$  
1.000\$

**0,0**

1.001\$  
2.000\$

**0,0**

2.001\$  
4.000\$

**0,0**

4.001\$  
8.000\$

**0,0**

8.001\$  
15.000\$

**0,0**

15.001\$  
30.000\$

**0,0**

30.001\$  
60.000\$


**0,0**

60.001\$  
1000.000\$

**0,0**

Above  
100.000\$

Net remuneration/month/US dollars



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**98%** Less than 10 days paid vacation

**16%** Unsatisfied with medical support

**3%** Insecure about employment as footballer

**24%** Generally no day off per week

**12%**

Vocational training or university degree



## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**12%**

Victim of violence by fans

**18%**

Threatened by fans

**12%**

Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**6%**


Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

# IVORY COAST

Players  
nationality

**93%**  
Ivorian

**197** Players  
surveyed

**Clubs in the Ivory Coast are perennially short on money and footballers are only paid occasionally, and at the whim of club directors, according to the national players union.**

Sixty-seven percent do not have a copy of their own contract and 55 percent feel insecure in their profession. The working conditions of players would be improved if there was a licensing system for clubs, the union said

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT




Phone: +225 22 416 945

E-mail: [contactafi@yahoo.fr](mailto:contactafi@yahoo.fr)

Website:

[www.association-footballeurs-ivoiriens.org](http://www.association-footballeurs-ivoiriens.org)

## CONTRACT DATA



**26 MONTHS**

Average contract length

**67%** No copy  
of contract

**4%** Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

**4%** Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

**1%**

Forced to train alone  
during career

**0%**

Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

**21%**



Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)

\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**31%** Late payment (last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**  
Number of respondents (156)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**10%** Less than 10 days paid vacation

**52%** Unsatisfied with medical support

**55%** Insecure about employment as footballer

**11%** Generally no day off per week



**8%** Vocational training or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**4%** Victim of violence by fans

**3%** Threatened by fans

**6%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**5%** Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports


## KENYA

Players  
nationality80%  
Kenyan152 Players  
surveyed

**Kenyan clubs often don't respect contracts, firing players without compensation, according to Sammy (not his real name) who plays for first-division Gor Mahia. "They just tell you to leave," Sammy said.**

"They know they can get away with it." In a rare victory, the Kenyan players union in June 2016 helped eight players win compensation for unjust dismissal. One in five players have been attacked on match days and Sammy said his club's own fans throw stones at them if they play badly.

## CONTRACT DATA



19 MONTHS

Average contract length

26% No copy  
of contract3% Self-employed  
(civil law contract)6% Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)EMPLOYMENT  
PRESSURE

2%

Forced to train alone  
during career

N/A

Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

0%

Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)



\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**43%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of  
respondents (117)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**39%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**56%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**37%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**22%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week



**23%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**20%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**18%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**13%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**2%**  
Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports

# MOROCCO



Players  
nationality

**N/A**  
Moroccan

**289** Players  
surveyed

**Players in Morocco enjoy reasonable conditions, according to their union, and report less incidence of violence and harassment than in most other African countries.**

Three percent said they were the victim of fan attacks on match days, and two percent experienced bullying or harassment by management. However, they are regularly promised signing-on fees they don't receive. Only 16 percent said their pay arrived on time the last two years.

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT




Phone: +212 52 236 9240

Website:

[www.association-marocaine-footballeurs.org](http://www.association-marocaine-footballeurs.org)

## CONTRACT DATA



# 28 MONTHS

Average contract length

**5%** No copy  
of contract

**2%** Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

**5%** Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

**54%**  
Forced to train alone  
during career

**9%**  
Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

**36%**  
Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)


\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**84%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of respondents (N/A)



N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
0\$ 300\$	301\$ 600\$	601\$ 1.000\$	1.001\$ 2.000\$	2.001\$ 4.000\$	4.001\$ 8.000\$	8.001\$ 15.000\$	15.001\$ 30.000\$	30.001\$ 60.000\$	60.001\$ 1000.000\$	Above 100.000\$

Net remuneration/month/US dollars

## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**8%** Less than 10 days paid vacation

**70%** Unsatisfied with medical support

**9%** Insecure about employment as footballer

**3%** Generally no day off per week



**45%**  
Vocational training or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**4%** Victim of violence by fans

**5%** Threatened by fans

**8%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES


**4%** Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

# NAMIBIA

Players  
nationality

## 93%

  
Namibian

## 209

 Players surveyed

**Sixty-three percent of players do not have a copy of their own contract and according to the national players union some have had their contracts altered by clubs without their consent.**


Only the top four clubs offer decent salaries. Players at other teams do not earn enough to live on, leaving them more vulnerable to match-fixing bribes, the union said. Twelve percent have been approached to fix matches.

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +264 61 212 643  
E-mail: nafpunion@gmail.com

## CONTRACT DATA



## N/A

Average contract length

## 63%

 No copy  
of contract

## 4%

 Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

## 6%

 Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

## 3%

 Forced to train alone  
during career

## 12%

 Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

## 39%



 Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)

\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**54%** Late payment (last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**  
Number of respondents (170)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**58%** Less than 10 days paid vacation

**50%** Unsatisfied with medical support

**28%** Insecure about employment as footballer

**31%** Generally no day off per week



**13%** Vocational training or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**8%** Victim of violence by fans

**12%** Threatened by fans

**23%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES


**12%** Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

# SOUTH AFRICA

Players  
nationality

## 89%

South African

## 265

Players surveyed

**South Africa's league has one of the lowest rate of salary defaults on the continent.**


"Mostly, there is no stress," Peter (not his real name), who plays for second-division Santos, said. "We are covered by an insurance scheme if we get injured." However, 28 players of 265 surveyed said they had been forced to train alone as a way of pressuring them to leave or sign a new deal. "I have seen a club try to make a player's working environment unpleasant," Peter said.

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +27 11 339 1906  
E-mail: safpu@safpu.org  
Website: www.safpu.org

## CONTRACT DATA



# 25 MONTHS

Average contract length

## 19%

No copy of contract

## 1%

Self-employed (civil law contract)

## 17%

Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

## 12%

Forced to train alone during career

## 4%

Pressured by club to renew current contract

## 45%



Restricted freedom of movement\* (in transfer with fee)

\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**25%** Late payment (last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**  
Number of respondents (195)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**38%** Less than 10 days paid vacation

**39%** Unsatisfied with medical support

**22%** Insecure about employment as footballer

**35%** Generally no day off per week

**9%**

Vocational training or university degree



## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**14%**

Victim of violence by fans

**16%**

Threatened by fans

**29%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**7%**

Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

# TUNISIA

Players  
nationality

## 88%

  
Tunisian


## 198

 Players  
surveyed

### Tunisian football has been hit by a dramatic slowdown after terrorism attacks in the country in 2015.

Several clubs owned by businessmen in the ailing tourism industry are not paying footballers on time, according to the players union. Ninety-four percent of players have had pay delays the last two years, the second-highest amount in Africa. Fifty-five percent don't have social security cover and 67 percent feel moderately insecure at their current club.

## CONTRACT DATA



## 32 MONTHS

Average contract length

## 0%

 No copy  
of contract

## 56%

 Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

## 0%

 Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

## 3%

  
Forced to train alone  
during career

## 3%

  
Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

## 3%



  
Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)

\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**94%** Late payment (last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**  
Number of respondents (196)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**6%** Less than 10 days paid vacation

**38%** Unsatisfied with medical support

**11%** Insecure about employment as footballer

**1%** Generally no day off per week



**56%**  
Vocational training or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**N/A**

Victim of violence by fans

**N/A**

Threatened by fans

**N/A**

Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**1%**


Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports

# ZIMBABWE



Players  
nationality

**97%**  
Zimbabwean

**340** Players  
surveyed

### While most players in Zimbabwe receive their salary on time, some go months and even years without receiving pay.

Joseph (not his real name) who plays for a first-division club said he did not receive a promised \$15,000 signing-on fee and is owed two months of salary payments and bonuses. "We cannot keep on playing for nothing," Joseph said. Non-payment can increase the risk of footballers accepting bribes. Nineteen percent said they have been approached to manipulate the results of games.


## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Footballers Union Of Zimbabwe

Phone: +263 11 512 381  
E-mail: [desmaringwa@yahoo.com](mailto:desmaringwa@yahoo.com)  
Website: [www.fuz.co.zw](http://www.fuz.co.zw)

## CONTRACT DATA



**22 MONTHS**

Average contract length

**34%** No copy  
of contract

**1%** Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

**29%** Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

**4%**

Forced to train alone  
during career

**X%**

Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

**38%**


Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)

\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.


## PAY DATA

**37%** Late payment (last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**  
Number of respondents (306)



Net remuneration/month/US dollars



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**46%** Less than 10 days paid vacation

**17%** Unsatisfied with medical support

**20%** Insecure about employment as footballer

**25%** Generally no day off per week



**24%** Vocational training or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**17%** Victim of violence by fans

**29%** Threatened by fans

**17%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**19%** Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports

## BOLIVIA

Players  
nationality85%  
Bolivian307 Players  
surveyed

### Bolivian clubs have the worst record in the Americas for paying players on time.

Bolivian football federation rules are partly to blame: clubs are not required to honour the unpaid wages of players until halfway through the following season, according to David Paniagua, general secretary of the national players union. A club licensing system scheduled to come into effect in 2017 should slowly improve conditions.


### LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +591 33 397 208

E-mail: [info@fabolivia.com](mailto:info@fabolivia.com)Website: [www.fabolivia.com](http://www.fabolivia.com)

### CONTRACT DATA



22 MONTHS

Average contract length

38% No copy  
of contract3% Self-employed  
(civil law contract)0% Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

### EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

10%

Forced to train alone  
during career

2%

Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

11%

Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)


\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA


**95%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of  
respondents (297)



Net remuneration/month/US dollars



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**88%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**56%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**33%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**33%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week



**25%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**4%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**31%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**34%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**17%**  
Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

# BRAZIL

Players  
nationality

## 94%

  
Brazilian

## 105

 Players  
surveyed

**Many Brazilian players surveyed need to take second jobs because they cannot survive on money from football, including 23-year-old Geovani Cortes Gomes who sells hamburgers on a street stall in a suburb of Rio de Janeiro.**

He plays for just four months of the year in the state championship. Gomes said his \$620 a month football salary arrives three months late. "So we wait and wait and continue training," Gomes said. "What can we do?"


## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +55 21 986 682233

E-mail: [fenapaf@gmail.com](mailto:fenapaf@gmail.com)Website: [www.fenapaf.org.br](http://www.fenapaf.org.br)

## CONTRACT DATA



# 11 MONTHS

Average contract length

## 46%

 No copy  
of contract

## 1%

 Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

## 20%

 Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

## 9%

Forced to train alone  
during career

## 5%

Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

## 17%

Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)



\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**52%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of  
respondents (92)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**71%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**44%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**14%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**48%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week



**7%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**6%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**29%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**31%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**2%**  
Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

# COSTA RICA

Players  
nationality

## 94%

Costa  
Rican

## 327

 Players  
surveyed

**Costa Rica's league is enjoying a fillip after the national team reached the 2014 World Cup quarterfinal, according to Allan Miranda, a defender for Club Herediano.**

It is the only championship in Central America in which players contracts have guaranteed minimum standards. However, it's not all good news: one 21-year-old player for first-division Municipal Liberia said he is often paid late and earns less than former schoolmates who work as tourist guides.


## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +506 22 413 206

E-mail: [info@asojupro.com](mailto:info@asojupro.com)Website: [www.asojupro.com](http://www.asojupro.com)

## CONTRACT DATA



## 15 MONTHS

Average contract length

## 55%

 No copy  
of contract

## 5%

 Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

## 14%

 Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

## 3%

Forced to train alone  
during career

## 0%

Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

## 20%



Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)

\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**44%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**  
Number of  
respondents (265)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**72%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**35%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**16%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**13%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week



**33%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**8%**

Victim of violence  
by fans

**13%**

Threatened  
by fans

**20%**

Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**4%**


Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports

# ECUADOR



Players  
nationality

**90%**  
Ecuadorian

**183** Players  
surveyed

### Ecuador's football league is suffering the effects of a faltering national economy.

Javier (not his real name) who plays for Centro Deportivo Olmedo said wages have halved in the last couple of years and it is common for club payments to be two months overdue. Some 12% of the 180 players surveyed have been attacked by fans during their career. "When the team is doing badly fans sometimes punch and kick us when we are leaving the stadium," Javier said.

### LOCAL UNION CONTACT




Phone: +593 42 693 796

E-mail: afecuador@hotmail.com

Website: www.afe.com.ec

### CONTRACT DATA



**N/A MONTHS**

Average contract length

**28%** No copy  
of contract

**2%** Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

**11%** Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

### EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

**11%**

Forced to train alone  
during career

**0%**

Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

**44%**



Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)

\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**45%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**  
Number of  
respondents (168)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**56%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**19%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**7%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**13%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week



**26%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**14%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**21%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**48%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**17%**  
Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

# GUATEMALA

Players  
nationality

**90%**  
Guatemalan

**308** Players  
surveyed

## Guatemalan players tend to have minimal legal protection

Some 56% of footballers surveyed said they did not even have a copy of their own employment agreement with their club. Players get little or no paid holiday and do not get paid for preseason training which lasts 30 days according to the national players union. "It's frustrating knowing that you are working for free," said Tomás (not his real name).


## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +502 23 380 220

E-mail: [afg.guate@gmail.com](mailto:afg.guate@gmail.com)Website: <http://www.afg.com.gt>

## CONTRACT DATA



**12 MONTHS**

Average contract length

**56%** No copy  
of contract

**4%** Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

**12%** Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

**3%**  
Forced to train alone  
during career

**0%**  
Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

**8%**  
Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)



\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**31%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of  
respondents (300)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**71%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**28%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**16%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**6%**

Generally  
no day off  
per week



**72%**

Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**19%**

Victim of violence  
by fans

**24%**

Threatened  
by fans

**25%**

Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**4%**

Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports

# PARAGUAY



Players  
nationality

**93%**  
Paraguayan

**199** Players  
surveyed

### Players in the Paraguayan league had the lowest rates of salary non-payments in South America, the survey found.


However, clubs can be up to 60 days late with salaries under national football regulations and therefore players may not consider payments within this period as an infraction, according to the national players union. Footballers tend to have long contracts but clubs can break contracts unilaterally after each season.

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +595 97 122 0276

## CONTRACT DATA



**42 MONTHS**

Average contract length

**25%** No copy  
of contract

**1%** Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

**1%** Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

**2%**  
Forced to train alone  
during career

**2%**  
Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

**8%**  
Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)


\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA


**10%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of respondents (196)



Net remuneration/month/US dollars



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**90%** Less than 10 days paid vacation

**0%** Unsatisfied with medical support

**5%** Insecure about employment as footballer

**4%** Generally no day off per week



**7%** Vocational training or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**N/A** Victim of violence by fans

**11%** Threatened by fans

**N/A** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**7%** Approached by match fixers






## PAY DATA


**32%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of  
respondents (232)



Net remuneration/month/US dollars



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**63%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**31%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**13%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**9%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week



**28%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**8%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**13%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**21%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES


**9%**  
Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports

# URUGUAY



Players  
nationality

**94%**  
Uruguayan

**345** Players  
surveyed

**Players at a few elite clubs receive better treatment but smaller clubs often do not have their own doctor or physiotherapist so when a player gets injured he has to hitch a lift to the hospital.**


For rehabilitation, most injured players have to travel to the national player union clinic in Montevideo. Late salary payments are commonplace. "Last season I received one month's wages out of six," goalkeeper Germán (not his real name) said. "I had to spend my savings."

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +598 27 072 008  
E-mail: [info@mutual.com.uy](mailto:info@mutual.com.uy)  
Website: [www.mutual.com.uy](http://www.mutual.com.uy)

## CONTRACT DATA



**16 MONTHS**

Average contract length

**10%** No copy  
of contract

**2%** Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

**10%** Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

**6%**  
Forced to train alone  
during career

**0%**  
Pressured by club  
to renew current contract



**12%**  
Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)

\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**55%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**  
Number of  
respondents (302)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**32%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**26%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**15%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**6%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week

**11%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree



## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**2%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**13%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**11%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**4%**  
Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports

## USA

Players  
nationality59%  
American382 Players  
surveyed

### Major League Soccer players enjoy higher pay and more legal protection than most footballers.

"We get paid directly by the MLS and that makes us a lot more stable," said Tim (not his real name) who plays for Colorado Rapids. Of nine percent of players paid late the last two seasons, almost half said the delay was at a previous club in another country. MLS holds considerable power: players can only become free agents at age 28, having played eight years in the league.


### LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +1 30 165 73535

E-mail: [info@mlsplayers.org](mailto:info@mlsplayers.org)Website: [www.mlsplayers.org](http://www.mlsplayers.org)

### CONTRACT DATA



### 30 MONTHS

Average contract length

1% No copy  
of contract0% Self-employed  
(civil law contract)3% Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

### EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

3% Forced to train alone  
during career1% Pressured by club  
to renew current contract20% Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)



\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**9%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of respondents (357)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**3%** Less than 10 days paid vacation

**5%** Unsatisfied with medical support

**7%** Insecure about employment as footballer

**2%** Generally no day off per week



**42%** Vocational training or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**2%** Victim of violence by fans

**11%** Threatened by fans

**15%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**1%** Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

# VENEZUELA

Players  
nationality

## 93%

Venezuelan

## 299

Players  
surveyed

### Because of hyperinflation and scarcity of food in shops, footballers struggle to make ends meet like most Venezuelans.

"It's difficult to live, at the end of the month you are short of money," said 30-year-old José (not his real name), who has three young children. His \$200-a-month salary barely covers the cost of a well-balanced diet. He prefers to sign short contracts because – with annual inflation at about 500% - "after six months your wages are not worth as much."

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT




Phone: +58 21 276 12168

E-mail: aufpvenezuela@gmail.com

Website: www.aufpvenezuela.com.ve

## CONTRACT DATA



# 20 MONTHS

Average contract length

## 27%

No copy  
of contract

## 3%

Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

## 1%

Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

## 3%

Forced to train alone  
during career

## 2%

Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

## 30%



Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)

\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**37%** Late payment (last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**  
Number of respondents (285)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**52%** Less than 10 days paid vacation

**26%** Unsatisfied with medical support

**12%** Insecure about employment as footballer

**16%** Generally no day off per week



**28%**  
Vocational training or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**12%** Victim of violence by fans

**15%** Threatened by fans

**15%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**10%** Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

# AUSTRIA

Players  
nationality

## 90%

  
Austrian

## 149

 Players  
surveyed

**Players in Austria have solid conditions protected by national employment law and a standard contract for footballers.**

There is no danger players won't get paid," the union said. The standard contract prohibits clubs from excluding players from the first team squad, a tactic used to pressure them to leave. At the start of the 2016-17 season, the union helped two players at St. Polten win a court case that allowed them to return to the first team.

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT




Phone: +43 13 131 683805

E-mail: office@vdf.at

Website: www.vdf.at

## CONTRACT DATA



# 25 MONTHS

Average contract length

## 1%

 No copy  
of contract

## 1%

 Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

## 1%

 Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

## 2%

 Forced to train alone  
during career

## 2%

 Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

## 6%



 Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)

\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**9%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**  
Number of  
respondents (119)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**14%** Less than 10 days paid vacation

**23%** Unsatisfied with medical support

**15%** Insecure about employment as footballer

**8%** Generally no day off per week



**18%** Vocational training or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**1%** Victim of violence by fans

**1%** Threatened by fans

**6%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**1%** Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports

# BULGARIA



Players  
nationality

**89%**  
Bulgarian

**408** Players  
surveyed

### Clubs in Bulgaria's league are relatively efficient at paying on time.


The national players union said state legislation means employees can leave a club if their pay is one month late. In most other countries, in line with FIFA rules, footballers have to wait for 3 months without pay. Clubs can also be docked points for being behind with salary payments.

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +359 29 806 506  
E-mail: [office@abf-bg.org](mailto:office@abf-bg.org)  
Website: [www.abf-bg.org](http://www.abf-bg.org)

## CONTRACT DATA



**18 MONTHS**

Average contract length

**8%** No copy  
of contract

**1%** Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

**17%** Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

**6%**  
Forced to train alone  
during career

**4%**  
Pressured by club  
to renew current contract



**10%**  
Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)

\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**22%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**  
Number of  
respondents (269)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**19%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**22%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**20%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**5%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week



**31%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**5%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**8%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**4%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**11%**  
Approached by match fixers





Country Reports


## CROATIA

Players  
nationality87%  
Croatian184 Players  
surveyed

**Most footballers in Croatia are on self-employed contracts because, according to the national players union, it means clubs do not have to pay social security tax.**

While most clubs “do their best for players,” a few do not treat players fairly, the union said. Andrej (not his real name) has not been paid for four months because his team expects him to move when he recovers from injury. “I could go to the president and complain but he is not rational,” Andrej said.

## CONTRACT DATA



29 MONTHS

Average contract length

3% No copy  
of contract94% Self-employed  
(civil law contract)3% Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)EMPLOYMENT  
PRESSURE

1%

Forced to train alone  
during career

N/A

Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

44%

Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)



\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**49%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of  
respondents (152)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**50%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**13%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**8%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**25%** Generally  
no day off  
per week

**10%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree



## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**4%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**5%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**14%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**6%**  
Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports

# CYPRUS



Players  
nationality

**50%**  
Cypriot

**235** Players  
surveyed

### Cyprus is starting to tackle delayed pay, docking clubs points for falling behind.


However, clubs can still delay pay by giving players second contracts they don't disclose to the federation. Almost half of those surveyed said they have a second contract. Another widespread issue is the threat of match-fixing: nineteen percent received offers to manipulate matches. The union is asking the government to do more to investigate criminal gangs offering bribes to players.

### LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +357 22 466 508  
E-mail: [info@pasp.org.cy](mailto:info@pasp.org.cy)  
Website: [www.pasp.org.cy](http://www.pasp.org.cy)

## CONTRACT DATA



**18 MONTHS**

Average contract length

**17%** No copy  
of contract

**3%** Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

**49%** Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

**6%**

Forced to train alone  
during career

**13%**

Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

**14%**

Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)


\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA


**65%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of  
respondents (216)



Net remuneration/month/US dollars



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**55%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**27%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**13%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**9%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week



**21%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**7%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**15%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**12%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**19%**  
Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

# CZECH REPUBLIC

Players  
nationality

## 81%

  
Czech

## 234

 Players  
surveyed

**Some 93% of players in the Czech Republic have self-employed contracts and do not have the same employment rights, holiday pay and pension contributions as regular workers.**

While players at the biggest clubs have good working conditions, others do not, according to the national players union. "Clubs speculate they will earn more than they actually do and make promises they cannot keep," the union said. The union is lobbying the government to make employment contracts compulsory.

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT




Phone: +420 60 418 1487

E-mail: info@cafh.cz

Website: www.cafh.cz

## CONTRACT DATA



# 23 MONTHS

Average contract length

## 2%

 No copy  
of contract

## 93%

 Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

## 1%

 Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

## 3%

 Forced to train alone  
during career

## 1%

 Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

## 65%

 Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)


\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA


**33%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### AVERAGE INCOME

Number of respondents (207)



Net remuneration/month/US dollars



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**9%** Less than 10 days paid vacation

**31%** Unsatisfied with medical support

**21%** Insecure about employment as footballer

**4%** Generally no day off per week



**11%** Vocational training or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**12%** Victim of violence by fans

**9%** Threatened by fans

**6%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**10%** Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports

# DENMARK



Players  
nationality

**78%**  
Danish

**332** Players  
surveyed

**Ninety-six percent of players in Denmark said they felt at least modestly secure in their profession.**


"You take the security for granted but it is really good," Magnus (not his real name) said. "Players I know who went to Turkey and Russia are talking about wages coming in late or not at all. We don't have those problems." For disputes over minor issues such as holiday pay the union always "comes through" for us, Magnus said.

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +45 33 121 128  
E-mail: mail@spillerforeningen.dk  
Website: www.spillerforeningen.dk

## CONTRACT DATA



**28 MONTHS**

Average contract length

- 0%** No copy of contract
- 1%** Self-employed (civil law contract)
- 3%** Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE



- 2%** Forced to train alone during career
- 0%** Pressured by club to renew current contract
- 43%** Restricted freedom of movement\* (in transfer with fee)

\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**9%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**  
Number of  
respondents (297)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**8%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**12%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**4%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**5%** Generally  
no day off  
per week

**17%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree



## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**2%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**10%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**19%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**3%**  
Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports

## FINLAND

Players  
nationality75%  
Finnish222 Players  
surveyed

**Finnish clubs are well-organized even if the facilities can be basic for some of the smaller team, according to one player at Kemi Kings.**

Players in the first and second division have to use a standard contract that helps to reduce the amount of unfair treatment, according to the national player union. "Everyone does his job and when your form drops off you work with the coach to improve," a player at HJK Helsinki said. "There is not the same level of pressure as in some countries."


## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +358 22 306 888

Website: [www.jpjy.fi](http://www.jpjy.fi)

## CONTRACT DATA



17 MONTHS

Average contract length

3% No copy  
of contract2% Self-employed  
(civil law contract)2% Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)EMPLOYMENT  
PRESSURE5% Forced to train alone  
during career1% Pressured by club  
to renew current contract30% Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)



\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**22%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of  
respondents (192)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**18%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**7%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**10%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**3%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week



**22%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**4%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**6%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**14%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**6%**  
Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

## FRANCE

Players  
nationality88%  
French418 Players  
surveyed

**Players in France have some of the best conditions with high wages, long contracts and the smallest incidence of late salaries in the survey.**


Ninety percent of footballers surveyed said they felt at least moderately secure at their current club. The national players union, which was founded in 1961, said its experience is one of the reasons players are well-protected. The league's financial regulator also helps ensure players rights are respected, the union said.

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +33 14 039 9107  
Website: [www.unfp.org](http://www.unfp.org)

## CONTRACT DATA



32 MONTHS

Average contract length



2% No copy  
of contract0% Self-employed  
(civil law contract)2% Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)EMPLOYMENT  
PRESSURE5% Forced to train alone  
during career2% Pressured by club  
to renew current contract12% Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)

\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**5%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**  
Number of  
respondents (408)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**6%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**10%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**12%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**7%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week



**79%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**3%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**7%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**13%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**2%**  
Approached by match fixers





Country Reports


## FYROM

Players  
nationality80%  
Macedonian121 Players  
surveyed

—  
**Typically earn slightly above the average wage, Pance Kumbev, president of the national players union, said.**

More than 30% of the 121 players surveyed have a second contract, a way for clubs to reduce their tax costs. "Young players often agree with these kind of contract because they don't think about the consequences," Kumbev said. He said the agreements are often not legally binding and it can take three years to resolve a dispute through arbitration.

## CONTRACT DATA



26 MONTHS

Average contract length

35% No copy  
of contract2% Self-employed  
(civil law contract)30% Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)EMPLOYMENT  
PRESSURE

8%

Forced to train alone  
during career

N/A

Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

N/A

Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)


\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA


**28%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### AVERAGE INCOME

Number of respondents (117)



Net remuneration/month/US dollars



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**21%** Less than 10 days paid vacation

**19%** Unsatisfied with medical support

**13%** Insecure about employment as footballer

**0%**

Generally no day off per week



**41%**  
Vocational training or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**7%**

Victim of violence by fans

**3%**

Threatened by fans

**14%**

Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**11%**

Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports

# GEORGIA



Players  
nationality


**94%**  
Georgian

**114** Players  
surveyed

**Players in Georgia reported the highest rate of match-fixing approaches in the world.**

The Georgian football association has assembled a group of experts to target fixing and last year handed down sanctions to some players and clubs. Club officials sometimes have a poor grasp of budgeting so late salaries are common even though many teams are supported by regional governments, the national players union said. One in three players has been bullied, either by fans, club staff or their peers.

## CONTRACT DATA



**29 MONTHS**

Average contract length

**0%** No copy  
of contract

**2%** Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

**1%** Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

**5%**  
Forced to train alone  
during career

**8%**  
Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

**N/A**  
Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)


\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA


**34%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### AVERAGE INCOME

Number of  
respondents (113)



Net remuneration/month/US dollars



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**0%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**27%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**4%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**1%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week

**13%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree



## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**N/A**

Victim of violence  
by fans

**N/A**

Threatened  
by fans

**33%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**34%**  
Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

## GREECE

Players  
nationality67%  
Greek367 Players  
surveyed

**The financial crisis that began in 2008 has hit the Greek league hard, reducing wages as much as 50 percent, according to one player, Theodore (not his real name).**


However, 92 percent of footballers said they felt at least moderately secure in their career. Theodore said pressure from the national player union is making clubs more reliable in paying wages on time. The union has also introduced a medical insurance scheme for players and their families, he said.

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +30 21 082 39179  
E-mail: psap@otenet.gr  
Website: www.psap.gr

## CONTRACT DATA



25 MONTHS

Average contract length

2% No copy  
of contract2% Self-employed  
(civil law contract)8% Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)EMPLOYMENT  
PRESSURE9% Forced to train alone  
during careerN/A Pressured by club  
to renew current contract12% Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)


\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA


**55%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### AVERAGE INCOME

Number of  
respondents (340)



Net remuneration/month/US dollars



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**25%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**16%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**8%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**3%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week



**22%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**4%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**13%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**12%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**4%**  
Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports

# HUNGARY



Players  
nationality

**88%**  
Hungarian

**207** Players  
surveyed

**Hungarian clubs are becoming more stable financially thanks to government tax breaks, according to Gabor Gyepes, who plays for Soroksar**


However, some 12% of footballers surveyed have been excluded from the first squad during their career as a way to force them into signing a new contract or leaving a club. The national players union negotiated a standard contract that was introduced in July 2016 prohibiting this treatment unless there are medical or sporting reasons.

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +36 12 376 050  
E-mail: profifoci@profifoci.hu  
Website: www.hlsz.hu

## CONTRACT DATA



**22 MONTHS**

Average contract length

**11%** No copy  
of contract

**1%** Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

**7%** Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

**12%**

Forced to train alone  
during career

**N/A**

Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

**10%**

Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)



\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**47%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of respondents (169)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**20%** Less than 10 days paid vacation

**33%** Unsatisfied with medical support

**9%** Insecure about employment as footballer

**4%** Generally no day off per week



**16%** Vocational training or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**1%** Victim of violence by fans

**3%** Threatened by fans

**11%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**2%** Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

# ICELAND

Players  
nationality

## 80%

  
Icelandic


## 147

 Players  
surveyed

**Most players in Iceland – a surprise quarterfinalist at the 2016 European Championship - earn a modest wage and supplement their earnings with a second job, sometimes arranged by the club they play for, according to the national players union.**

Eighty-seven percent described themselves as secure at their current team even though one in three are self-employed. The union is pushing to change the standard contract for all footballers to have extensive medical insurance and social security cover.

## CONTRACT DATA



# 28 MONTHS

Average contract length

## 3%

 No copy  
of contract

## 41%

 Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

## 7%

 Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

## 0%

 Forced to train alone  
during career

## 3%

 Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

## 22%

 Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)


\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA


**36%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### AVERAGE INCOME

Number of respondents (141)



Net remuneration/month/US dollars



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**15%** Less than 10 days paid vacation

**21%** Unsatisfied with medical support

**6%** Insecure about employment as footballer

**7%** Generally no day off per week

**28%** Vocational training or university degree



## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**3%** Victim of violence by fans

**3%** Threatened by fans

**14%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**4%** Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

## IRELAND

Players  
nationality95%  
Irish244 Players  
surveyed

**About 60 percent of players in Ireland have a second job because pay is low, according to the national players union.**

Many work flexible jobs, such as driving a taxi, so they can fit in with club commitments. Clubs have become more efficient at paying salaries on time recently but have also shortened the typical length of a contract to 11 months, PFA Ireland said. Eighty-five percent of players had less than 10 days paid leave.

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT




Phone: +353 18 999 350

E-mail: info@pfai.ie

Website: www.pfai.ie

## CONTRACT DATA



11 MONTHS

Average contract length

32% No copy  
of contract2% Self-employed  
(civil law contract)2% Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)EMPLOYMENT  
PRESSURE3% Forced to train alone  
during career1% Pressured by club  
to renew current contract30% Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)



\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**9%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### AVERAGE INCOME

Number of  
respondents (201)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**85%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**6%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**22%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**6%** Generally  
no day off  
per week



**32%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**4%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**16%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**13%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**2%**  
Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

## ISRAEL

Players  
nationality86%  
Israeli324 Players  
surveyed

**Eighty-nine percent of players in Israel said they feel secure at their current club even though the average contract is just 12 months long.**

The national players union said it has secured extra measures from the league to help reduce delayed salary payments which affected 14 percent of players the last two years. From the 2017-18 season clubs that fall behind with wages will miss out on a \$25,000 bonus.


## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



הנציגות החדשה של שחקני הכדורגל בישראל  
The New Organization of Football Players in Israel

Phone: +972 36 921 373

## CONTRACT DATA



12 MONTHS

Average contract length

4% No copy  
of contract1% Self-employed  
(civil law contract)3% Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)EMPLOYMENT  
PRESSURE1% Forced to train alone  
during career0% Pressured by club  
to renew current contract23% Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)


\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA


**14%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of  
respondents (318)



Net remuneration/month/US dollars



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**13%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**5%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**5%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**5%** Generally  
no day off  
per week

**16%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree



## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**7%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**23%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**8%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**1%**  
Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports

## ITALY

Players  
nationality96%  
Italian270 Players  
surveyed

### Footballers in Italy are well-paid although salaries are sometimes late.

More than half a dozen clubs in the second and third-division were docked points last season for being behind with wages according to the national players union. In the third division, "there's always the chance you could lose money," said Adriano Russo, a player for Frosinone. Fifty-nine percent of players who moved to their current club for a fee said they did not go to their first choice team or were pressured into a move.


### LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +39 44 423 3233

E-mail: [assocalciatori@telemar.it](mailto:assocalciatori@telemar.it)Website: [www.assocalciatori.it](http://www.assocalciatori.it)

### CONTRACT DATA



27 MONTHS

Average contract length

3% No copy  
of contract0% Self-employed  
(civil law contract)4% Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

### EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

6% Forced to train alone  
during career2% Pressured by club  
to renew current contract59% Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)



\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**45%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of  
respondents (216)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**21%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**20%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**21%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**4%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week



**13%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**7%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**32%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**9%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**3%**  
Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

# KAZAKHSTAN

Players  
nationality

## 88%

Kazakh


## 156

Players surveyed

**Players in Kazakhstan are among the best-paid in Eastern Europe, although they do not receive pension contributions and contracts are short.**

“Being a professional footballer is one of the better jobs here,” one of 19 foreign players surveyed said. However, Kazakh player Maxim (not his real name) said second-division players have to travel as many as 40 hours for a match and most are paid late. “We have a lot of money in our game but we don’t know how to spend it,” Maxim said.

## CONTRACT DATA



## 14 MONTHS

Average contract length

## 14%

No copy of contract

## 0%

Self-employed (civil law contract)

## 8%

Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

## 13%

Forced to train alone during career

## N/A

Pressured by club to renew current contract

## 40%

Restricted freedom of movement\* (in transfer with fee)



\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**59%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of respondents (101)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**26%** Less than 10 days paid vacation

**11%** Unsatisfied with medical support

**3%** Insecure about employment as footballer

**6%** Generally no day off per week



**75%** Vocational training or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**1%** Victim of violence by fans

**1%** Threatened by fans

**22%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES


**25%** Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports

## MALTA

Players  
nationality70%  
Maltese112 Players  
surveyed

**Because salaries are low most players in Malta's Premier League hold another job. John (not his real name) is a delivery driver.**


"When I play on weekdays I take half a day off," he said. Poor management means clubs are repeatedly late with wages and standard contracts allow clubs to jettison players if injured for three months, the Malta Football Players Association said. Another issue is clubs can still require transfer compensation for out-of-contract players, more than 20 years after the Bosman ruling.

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +356 79 449 989  
E-mail: info@maltafpa.com  
Website: www.maltafpa.com

## CONTRACT DATA



21 MONTHS

Average contract length

13% No copy  
of contract3% Self-employed  
(civil law contract)7% Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)EMPLOYMENT  
PRESSURE

3%

Forced to train alone  
during career

N/A

Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

47%

Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)


\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA


**79%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of  
respondents (101)



Net remuneration/month/US dollars



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**29%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**49%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**38%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**7%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week



**35%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**1%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**4%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**12%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**16%**  
Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports

## MONTENEGRO

Players  
nationality88%  
Montenegrins186 Players  
surveyed

**Almost quarter of players in Montenegro said they do not have a copy of their own employment contract, and therefore risk mistreatment if they get injured or become involved in a dispute with club management.**


According to Stefan (not his real name), who recently quit football, clubs typically do not take out insurance to cover players against injury and sometimes "abandon" them when they are sidelined for months.

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



E-mail: [sindikatspfcg.org](mailto:sindikatspfcg.org)  
Website: [www.spfcg.org](http://www.spfcg.org)

## CONTRACT DATA



15 MONTHS

Average contract length

23% No copy  
of contract7% Self-employed  
(civil law contract)8% Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)EMPLOYMENT  
PRESSURE

4%

Forced to train alone  
during career

N/A

Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

25%

Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)


\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA


**53%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of  
respondents (172)



Net remuneration/month/US dollars



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**44%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**25%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**30%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**3%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week

**15%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree



## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**2%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**3%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**5%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**4%**  
Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

# NORWAY



**299** Players surveyed

**Players in Norway earn enough money to live comfortably, according to Otto (not his real name), who plays in the second division.**


“Not in the same way as Cristiano Ronaldo but you can just focus on the game and nothing else. You don’t have to work on the side.” Ninety-nine percent of players surveyed said they felt at least moderately secure in their profession. Sixty-seven percent had between 26 and 30 days paid holiday last year.

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +47 98 260 590  
E-mail: niso@niso.no  
Website: www.niso.no

## CONTRACT DATA



**N/A**

Average contract length

**2%** No copy of contract

**0%** Self-employed (civil law contract)

**3%** Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

**2%** Forced to train alone during career

**4%** Pressured by club to renew current contract



**31%** Restricted freedom of movement\* (in transfer with fee)

\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**6%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**  
Number of  
respondents (263)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**4%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**13%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**1%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**7%** Generally  
no day off  
per week



**30%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**2%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**4%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**12%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**2%**  
Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

# POLAND

Players  
nationality

## 91%

  
Polish

## 322

 Players  
surveyed

**In Poland, there is a licensing system in the first division but not in the second tier where there is a higher incidence of teams not paying wages on time.**


Players this year campaigned on social media against clubs making squad members train alone to put them under to pressure to lower their wages or break contracts following the case of Sebino Plaku, who according to a court ruling, received "appalling treatment" at Slask Wroclaw.

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +48 42 673 0092  
E-mail: [biuro@pzp.info.pl](mailto:biuro@pzp.info.pl)  
Website: [www.pzp.info.pl](http://www.pzp.info.pl)

## CONTRACT DATA



# 24 MONTHS

Average contract length

## 1%

 No copy  
of contract

## 38%

 Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

## 32%

 Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

## 8%

Forced to train alone  
during career

## 0%

Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

## 28%

Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)


\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA


**45%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of  
respondents (268)



Net remuneration/month/US dollars



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**25%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**29%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**8%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**6%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week

**17%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree



## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**8%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**21%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**15%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**2%**  
Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

# ROMANIA

Players  
nationality

## 76%

Romanian

## 231

Players  
surveyed

**Romanian clubs are among the worst offenders for defaulting on salary payments.**

"If you play in the first league there is a good chance that you will get paid but in the second league you don't know," Adrian (not his real name) said. In April 2016, following lobby from the national players union, the government absolved legislation that had allowed clubs in financial administration to retain players without paying them.


## CONTACT

Phone: +40 21 310 3540

E-mail: office@afan.ro

Website: www.afan.ro

## CONTRACT DATA



## N/A

Average contract length

## 8%

No copy  
of contract

## 60%

Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

## 2%

Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

## 15%

Forced to train alone  
during career

## 15%

Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

## 44%

Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)



\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**75%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### AVERAGE INCOME

Number of  
respondents (220)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**29%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**21%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**18%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**13%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week



**38%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**4%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**9%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**7%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**0%**  
Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

# RUSSIA



**242** Players surveyed

**Russian football offers some of the highest wages in the region but many clubs have an irresponsible attitude to finances, prejudicing the career of footballers.**

They “first sign contracts and then they look for the money,” according to Vladimir Leonchenko, president of the national players union. “We need a more-healthy model.” A weakening economy means that the budgets of clubs has tumbled in the last three years.

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT




Phone: +7 92 580 17474

E-mail: data@psft.ru

Website: www.psft.ru

## CONTRACT DATA



**N/A**

Average contract length

**0%** No copy of contract

**0%** Self-employed (civil law contract)

**13%** Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

**0%** Forced to train alone during career

**0%** Pressured by club to renew current contract

**N/A** Restricted freedom of movement\* (in transfer with fee)



\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**25%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of  
respondents (241)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**0%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**1%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**3%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**1%** Generally  
no day off  
per week



**39%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**N/A**

Victim of violence  
by fans

**N/A**

Threatened  
by fans

**N/A**

Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**2%**

Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports

# SCOTLAND



Players  
nationality

**84%**  
Scottish

**168** Players  
surveyed

### Scottish football has rigorous rules to make sure all players are paid on time.


However, some clubs “pick and choose” which players they cover with private medical insurance, the national players union said. “They will pay for the star striker but not the player who has 6 months left on his contract,” the union said. Some footballers have had to wait 6 months for surgery in the public health sector. Thirty-three percent are not satisfied with the medical support at their clubs.

### LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +44 14 135 30199  
E-mail: [info@pfascotland.co.uk](mailto:info@pfascotland.co.uk)  
Website: [www.pfascotland.co.uk](http://www.pfascotland.co.uk)

## CONTRACT DATA



**22 MONTHS**

Average contract length

**5%** No copy  
of contract

**1%** Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

**7%** Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

**2%**  
Forced to train alone  
during career

**2%**  
Pressured by club  
to renew current contract



**N/A**  
Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)

\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**5%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**  
Number of  
respondents (58)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**36%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**19%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**14%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**1%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week



**14%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**3%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**35%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**28%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**1%**

Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports

# SERBIA



Players  
nationality

**96%**  
Serbian

**265** Players  
surveyed

### Serbia's football league is among the least hospitable for footballers.

The national players union has overseen 250 cases of players going to court in the last two years in a league with 500 players. "When you sign a contract you have a 50% chance of ending up in court," Mirko Poledica, the union president, said. Footballers also face attacks from hooligans when their form dips. The Serbian federation plans to introduce licensing rules in 2017-18 with a view to improving conditions.

### LOCAL UNION CONTACT




Phone: +381 11

E-mail: [sindikاتفudbalera@gmail.com](mailto:sindikاتفudbalera@gmail.com)

Website: [www.sindikاتفudbalera.org](http://www.sindikاتفudbalera.org)

## CONTRACT DATA



**25 MONTHS**

Average contract length

**13%** No copy  
of contract

**0%** Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

**6%** Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

**9%**  
Forced to train alone  
during career

**21%**  
Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

**96%**  
Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)



\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**68%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of  
respondents (235)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**23%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**14%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**18%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**5%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week

**13%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree



## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**2%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**6%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**5%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**6%**  
Approached by match fixers





## Country Reports

# SLOVENIA



Players  
nationality

**72%**  
Slovenian

**95** Players  
surveyed

### Less than one-third of the 95 players surveyed get their pay on time.


"One club director even told the players: you play better when you are not paid on time," Dejan Stefanovic, president of the national players union, said. "They like to keep the pressure on." While most players have self-employed contracts with a lower income tax rate, the government is gradually phasing out these in favour of employment contracts.

### LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +386 14 341 280  
E-mail: office@spins-sindikat.si  
Website: www.spins.si

### CONTRACT DATA



# 23 MONTHS

Average contract length

**12%** No copy  
of contract

**73%** Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

**4%** Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

### EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

**7%**  
Forced to train alone  
during career

**12%**  
Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

**47%**  
Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)


\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA


**70%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of respondents (81)



Net remuneration/month/US dollars



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**30%** Less than 10 days paid vacation

**33%** Unsatisfied with medical support

**24%** Insecure about employment as footballer

**6%** Generally no day off per week



**26%** Vocational training or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**4%** Victim of violence by fans

**7%** Threatened by fans

**12%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**6%** Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

# SWEDEN

Players  
nationality

## 77%

  
Swedish

## 387

 Players surveyed

**Players in Sweden earn a decent salary but for many it's not enough to fall back on when they stop playing, Henrik (not his real name) said.**

Conditions in the league are good -- 67 percent felt very secure at their club. However, Henrik said footballers get only 80 percent of their salary when they are injured. "It means players are pulling out of tackles in training," he said. The national players union is lobbying to grant footballers an exemption from this state regulation.


## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +46 31 757 1500

E-mail: [info@spelarforeningen.com](mailto:info@spelarforeningen.com)Website: [www.spelarforeningen.com](http://www.spelarforeningen.com)

## CONTRACT DATA



# N/A

Average contract length

## 1%

 No copy  
of contract

## 0%

 Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

## 3%

 Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

## 4%

 Forced to train alone  
during career

## 6%

 Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

## 60%

 Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)



\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**12%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of  
respondents (346)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**7%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**17%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**4%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**3%** Generally  
no day off  
per week

**14%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree



## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**2%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**15%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**23%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**3%**  
Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

# SWITZERLAND

Players  
nationality**68%**  
Swiss**211** Players  
surveyed

**The Swiss football league is very-well organized and the national federation is quick to punish teams if they fall behind with salaries, according to Joseph (not his real name).**


In six years, he said, he had not had any problems with receiving pay. Seventy-seven percent of footballers said they felt either secure or very secure in their profession. Footballers are not under as much pressure as their counterparts in Mediterranean countries, Joseph said.

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +41 44 829 2250  
E-mail: [info@safp.ch](mailto:info@safp.ch)  
Website: [www.safp.ch](http://www.safp.ch)

## CONTRACT DATA



# 30 MONTHS

Average contract length

**1%** No copy  
of contract**1%** Self-employed  
(civil law contract)**2%** Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE



**5%**  
Forced to train alone  
during career**2%**  
Pressured by club  
to renew current contract**40%**  
Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**11%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of respondents (143)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**16%** Less than 10 days paid vacation

**17%** Unsatisfied with medical support

**8%** Insecure about employment as footballer

**6%** Generally no day off per week



**48%** Vocational training or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**3%** Victim of violence by fans

**2%** Threatened by fans

**10%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**5%** Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

# TURKEY

Players  
nationality

## 93%

Turkish


## 185

Players  
surveyed

**The finances of Turkish clubs are chaotic. Club presidents sign star players on time but don't pay the rest of squad.**

One trick clubs use is to fine players who they owe salary payments just before their contract expires. A few top teams are becoming more careful with their money because they risk breaking UEFA Financial Fair Play rules and exclusion from the Champions League and Europa League. Galatasaray is serving a UEFA ban.

## CONTRACT DATA



## 24 MONTHS

Average contract length

## 44%

No copy  
of contract

## 76%

Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

## 16%

Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

## 8%

Forced to train alone  
during career

## 2%

Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

## 20%

Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)



\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

## PAY DATA

**77%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

Number of  
respondents (169)



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**45%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**29%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**21%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**9%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week



**27%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**5%**  
Victim of violence  
by fans

**25%**  
Threatened  
by fans

**33%** Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**8%**  
Approached by match fixers





Country Reports

# UKRAINE

Players  
nationality

## 97%

Ukrainian

## 482

Players  
surveyed

**Conflict with Russia has severely affected the finances of the Ukraine league, forcing clubs in the north of the country to relocate and cut salaries in half.**


Some clubs have gone out of business, leaving players without jobs. "The situation of the league is slowly going down," Sergey (not his real name) said. Only a few of the biggest teams such as Dynamo Kiev are stable financially, he said.

## LOCAL UNION CONTACT



Phone: +380 44 279 2941  
E-mail: [office@apfu.org.ua](mailto:office@apfu.org.ua)  
Website: [www.apfu.org.ua](http://www.apfu.org.ua)

## CONTRACT DATA



## 20 MONTHS

Average contract length

## 22%

No copy  
of contract

## 35%

Self-employed  
(civil law contract)

## 11%

Secondary contract  
(for image rights,  
tax, other reasons)

## EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

## 4%

Forced to train alone  
during career

## 4%

Pressured by club  
to renew current contract

## 37%


Restricted freedom of movement\*  
(in transfer with fee)

\*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.


## PAY DATA

**43%** Late payment  
(last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**  
Number of  
respondents (461)



Net remuneration/month/US dollars



## HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

**14%** Less than 10 days  
paid vacation

**18%** Unsatisfied with  
medical support

**8%** Insecure about  
employment as footballer

**12%**  
Generally  
no day off  
per week



**83%**  
Vocational training  
or university degree

## VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

**N/A**

Victim of violence  
by fans

**N/A**

Threatened  
by fans

**4%**

Bullied or harassed (by fans,  
club staff or players)

## MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

**7%**

Approached by match fixers



# SURVEY ASIA

Data coming soon...







**#GAME**  
**CHANGERS**

**FIFPro**  
World Players' Union

**Scorpius 161**  
**2132 LR Hoofddorp**  
**Netherlands**

**Tel:** +31(0)23-5546970

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**fifpro.org**

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