2016 FIFPRO GLOBAL EMPLOYMENT REPORT

Working Conditions in Professional Football
WE FOOTBALLERS STAND TOGETHER, PROUD AND UNITED AND THIS SOLIDARITY GIVES US OUR STRENGTH.

Didier Drogba
Striker, Ivory Coast
Honorary President, FIFPro Division Africa
The global football employment market is a tale of three worlds

Published for the first time, the 2016 FIFPro Global Employment Report is the most comprehensive and far-reaching survey of its kind, analysing the labour conditions of professional players in the world’s most popular team sport.

Football is deeply rooted in our societies and generates passion, commitment and a strong sense of community. As a consequence, it has developed into a global economy and the employment of professional players is at the heart of the game.

The global employment market for professional footballers is as fragmented as the competitiveness and wealth in football overall. The borders of this segmented world map can neither be grouped by geography nor by league – and striking differences sometimes exist even within a single club.

The global football market is broadly defined in three tiers:

**THE TOP TIER** is formed by a global elite of players with superior talent and skill. They enjoy very good working conditions at the highest level and a very strong market position. These footballers play predominantly in the Big Five European leagues (Premier League, Bundesliga, La Liga, Serie A, Ligue 1). Other wealthy clubs in growing markets around the world offer selected players comparable conditions.

**THE SECOND TIER** includes a large number of professional footballers playing for clubs offering more moderate, but decent employment conditions in well-regulated and relatively sustainably financed markets such as Scandinavia, Australia, the United States, and top clubs in South America, as well as in the second divisions and competitions of major football markets.

**THE THIRD TIER** represents the majority of players, who are under constant pressure to extend their careers in professional football and face precarious employment conditions, including a large degree of personal and contractual abuse. As this report shows, these conditions can be found in large parts of Eastern Europe, Africa and some countries in South and Latin America.
Public perceptions of professional footballers are largely influenced by the image of players in the top leagues. While these players attract the highest exposure, they also represent the smallest segment within professional football. As a consequence, people often assume that the benefits enjoyed by these players are the norm for most footballers. But the vast majority of players are in the second and third tier where employment conditions are very different.

This report aims to provide a balanced and realistic overview of the conditions and experiences of players throughout the industry, where very little research has been undertaken until now. It looks beyond the bright lights of the top tier and reveals the realities of the working conditions experienced by the large majority of players.

The survey is based on anonymous feedback via questionnaires. However, given the sensitivity of some of the questions and the direct effect which open answers might have on the players, we can assume that in some cases the actual figures might even be higher than portrayed.

The top findings tell a compelling story about the realities of the large majority of professional players who are faced with uncertainty, modest pay and a remarkably short career.

For the first time, this report provides a holistic insight into the different worlds of professional football. It is the joint responsibility of player unions, clubs, leagues, federations and public policy makers to ensure, through effective regulation, that more players benefit from decent employment conditions at sustainably run clubs.

It looks beyond the bright lights of the top tier and reveals the realities of the working conditions experienced by the large majority of players.
1. **GLOBAL ICONS AND MINIMUM WAGE WORKERS**
   Less than 2% of players earn more than 720,000 USD a year while over 45% earn less than 1,000 USD a month.

2. **(DIS)RESPECT OF CONTRACTS**
   41% of players experience delayed payments.

3. **A SHORT CAREER AND EVEN SHORTER CONTRACTS**
   The global average for a player’s contract is less than two years.
FINDINGS

4 CAREER PATH INTERFERENCE
29% of transferred players are moved between clubs against their will.

5 UNREGULATED WORKING CONDITIONS
The majority of players face precarious employment.

6 ISOLATION FROM THE TEAM
22% of players are aware of forced training alone, used by some clubs to pressure players.

7 ABUSE OF PLAYERS
9% players suffer from violence, 8% from discrimination, and 16% harassment.

8 YOUNG PLAYERS NEED PROTECTION
Youngsters are the most vulnerable in the football economy.

9 INTEGRITY AT RISK
On average, one player per line-up will be approached by match-fixers in his career.
1 TOP FINDINGS

Top finding

GLOBAL ICCONS AND MINIMUM WAGE WORKERS

Less than 2% of players earn more than 720,000 USD a year while over 45% earn less than 1,000 USD a month

FOOTBALL IS MORE THAN JUST A SPORT. IT IS ALSO A SPECTACLE THAT ATTRACTS A WORLDWIDE AUDIENCE IN THE MILLIONS. THE FOOTBALL INDUSTRY IS A PEOPLE BUSINESS, DRIVEN BY THE SAME ECONOMIC FACTORS AS THE ENTERTAINMENT SECTOR. SUPPLY AND DEMAND ALLOW THE MOST TALENTED PLAYERS TO MAXIMISE THEIR REWARDS, WHILE THE MAJORITY OF PLAYERS COMPETE FOR A LIMITED NUMBER OF JOBS. THIS MAKES THEIR MARKET POSITION WEAK AND THEIR EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS OFTEN PRECARIOUS.

In many countries the general economic climate also determines the potential for football’s growth and professionalization, as well as the number of decently paying full-time jobs for players. Outside the top markets the financial models for the game are often fragile and unsustainable. Players are usually the first to see the downside of “jackpot economics” and poor club management. The objective for all stakeholders must be to ensure that as many jobs as possible provide sustainable employment conditions.

OUTSIDE THE GLOBAL ELITE, PLAYER SALARIES ARE MUCH LOWER THAN THE PUBLIC IMAGINES

![Percentage of players receiving monthly salary](image)

- **21%** of players earned less than 300 USD net per month
- **45%** made less than 1,000 USD net per month
- **74%** made less than 4,000 USD net per month
- **2%** earned above 720,000 USD net a year

GLOBAL ICONS AND MINIMUM WAGE WORKERS

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- **2%** earned above 720,000 USD net a year
The analysis of such numbers should obviously be viewed in the context of the general income and economic power of the country that a player plays in – $300 USD in the Congo is worth considerably more than the same amount in the United States. Yet, globally speaking, most players are far removed from an income that provides them with financial security for a lengthy period after professional football – many even struggle to make ends meet during their careers.

GLOBALLY, 45% OF PLAYERS EARN LESS THAN 1,000 USD A MONTH

This applies to 73% of players in Africa, 47% in South America and 32% in Europe.

PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS EARNING UNDER 1,000 USD A MONTH BY REGION
In addition to large income differences, many players are exposed to significant, deliberate and abuse of their employment rights and contract breaches.

Football is facing a global epidemic of delayed payments of salaries and other remuneration. This is a global problem, which cannot be left unaddressed in any continent or region. Countries with less developed labour market standards – in football or overall – are more prone to non-payment.

This situation is compounded by weak regulatory standards within the industry, a lack of labour market oversight at national level, as well as the economic unsustainability of many clubs and leagues.

41% of players experience delayed payments

Some of these delays last for very long periods of more than 3, 6 or even up to 12 months or longer.

The likelihood of delayed salary payments varies significantly between regions:

- **Americas**: 40%
- **Europe**: 35%
- **Africa**: 55%
- **Asia**: 26%

**PUNCTUALITY OF PAYMENT OVER THE LAST TWO SEASONS**

- **Fully paid on time**: 58.70%
- **1 month delay**: 13.80%
- **1-3 months delay**: 19.40%
- **3-6 months delay**: 5.60%
- **6-12 months delay**: 1.70%
- **Over 12 months delay**: 0.80%
TWO FACTORS THAT INCREASE THE RISK OF DELAYED PAYMENTS ARE LOW INCOME AND POOR CONTRACTUAL STANDARDS

Low income and delayed payments

In Europe and the Americas in particular, players in lower salary brackets were significantly more likely to experience payment delays, putting them at extra risk of financial hardship.

- **EUROPE**
  - Less than $1000: 40%
  - $1000 - $1800: 35%
  - More than $8000: 26%

- **AFRICA**
  - Less than $1000: 53%
  - $1000 - $1800: 54%
  - More than $8000: 55%

- **AMERICAS**
  - Less than $1000: 44%
  - $1000 - $1800: 41%
  - More than $8000: 31%

- **GLOBAL**
  - Less than $1000: 45%
  - $1000 - $1800: 39%
  - More than $8000: 29%

PAYMENT DELAYS AND WAGE LEVELS PER REGION
PLAYERS WITH A COPY OF THEIR CONTRACT HAD A 15% BETTER CHANCE OF BEING PAID ON TIME

Having a written contract (as opposed to only a verbal agreement) improved the chances of timely payment.

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS WERE 20% MORE LIKELY TO BE HONoured THAN CIVIL- OR SELF-EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS

Civil law or self-employment contracts are largely an Eastern European phenomenon, a region with generally high rates of non-payment.
“It’s one of the best jobs in the world, but people should also know that it’s difficult to reach a high level and only very few make it to the top.”

Defender, Italy
A SHORT CAREER AND EVEN SHORTER CONTRACTS
Labour conditions at risk under market pressure

The significant difficulties that players face in ensuring their employment rights are respected are compounded by the fact that a player’s career is short and his contract is shorter still. The high pressure on players to maximize their short career forces them to accept new contracts at the expense of poor labour conditions.

Unlike any other industry, the transfer system incentivizes clubs to consider players as both employees and assets. Clubs often seek to earn income by selling their assets before the expiry of the contract to gather a fee. The impact of this market structure strongly affects both the players who are subject to transfers and those who are not.

The majority of players face constant pressure to extend and maximize their careers, which demands a lot of sacrifices – education, personal abuse, delayed payments, etc. At the same time, this majority finds itself in a market position where many have to endure such experiences as alternative employment opportunities are rare and often give little hope for improved conditions.

The global average length of a player’s contract is 22.6 months

- 22.6 months: The global average length of a player’s contract
- 30.1 months: Players joining the pro-teams from the academy
- 25.4 months: Players joining their current club via transfer
- 19.5 months: Players joining as free agents (self-employed)

The lower the salary, the shorter the contract

The large majority of players at the low end of the income pyramid are under constant pressure to secure future employment. At the other end of the scale, the most talented players are bound by longer contracts, limiting their opportunities to offer their services to other clubs.
Players commanding a transfer fee tend to be the most talented – talent for which clubs must pay by offering competitive wages and, at the same time, talent that is protected through longer contracts by current clubs as they seek to maximise their return on investment in a future transfer. However, most economic analysis argues that the current transfer system reduces wages overall, suggesting that the limited number of potential employers puts negative pressure on salaries. This finding also shows that the transfer market – with the limited redistributive benefits it provides – excludes those clubs offering lower wages.

There is a positive correlation between being transferred for a fee and receiving a higher wage.

The vast majority of players endure non-payment for long periods and yet stay at the club – even when having a just cause to terminate their contracts. Reasons for this can vary: the weak market position of the player, which provides him with no other options for employment, and a lack of trust in the judicial process for retrieving his owed remuneration, are only two common factors.

63% of players experienced a delay of payment at their current club – a signal of their weak market position.
TOP FINDINGS

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CAREER PATH INTERFERENCE

29% of players are forced to change their clubs against their will

THE GENERALLY WEAK MARKET POSITION OF THE MAJORITY OF PLAYERS IS ALSO EXEMPLIFIED BY THE FACT THAT 29% OF PLAYERS ARE FORCED TO CHANGE THEIR CLUB AGAINST THEIR WILL, DESPITE HAVING AN ONGOING CONTRACT.

Freedom of movement is important for footballers and clubs alike. A short career, possibly ending tomorrow with the next injury, means that any player must seek to exploit his talents and physical skills as quickly as possible. At the same time, looking for short-term success, clubs are always out to strengthen their squad and access the talent pool.

While overall there is a lot of mobility, there is strong evidence that such movement is often not free. For many players the market powers are stacked against them — low pay, short career, short contracts, and a high probability of facing abuse and disrespect of contracts.

ROUGHLY 25% OF PLAYERS MOVE AFTER THE PAYMENT OF A TRANSFER FEE

This confirms other studies’ findings that a sizable minority of players are subject to such payments. While a big share of low-income players is moving frequently as free agents, for others — especially young players — different forms of compensation are usually payable. This includes RFAs and domestic training compensation systems, as well as fees for agents or third party owners.

HOw DID YOU ENTER INTO YOUR CURRENT CONTRACT?

- 44.5% Free agent
- 25.3% Transferred for a fee
- 16.4% Promoted from academy
- 13.8% Renewed contract
This shows that the transfer system not only continues to limit employment opportunities for many players, but that a significant number are being sold to clubs they had no intention to play for.

**Some countries findings were particularly striking:**

- 82% of players in Serbia state that they were pressured into the transfer by agents or other third parties.
- In Kazakhstan, Switzerland, Denmark, Malta and Ecuador, more than 40% of players reported having been transferred against their interest.

### Reasons for Club Transfer

- **29%** Players transferred for a fee who were pressured to join a club against their wishes or not of their choice
- **70.8%** Requested to join current club
- **19.0%** Requested to join different club
- **6.6%** Previous club pressurised me to transfer
- **3.6%** Agent/3rd party pressurised me to transfer

**Players transferred for a fee who were pressured to join a club against their wishes or not of their choice**
**47% OF PLAYERS WHO WERE PRESSURED INTO A TRANSFER BY THEIR FORMER CLUB ALSO REPORTED EXPERIENCES OF DELAYED PAYMENT**

Not only are players made to move against their will, but many end up with clubs that do not respect their contractual obligations.

- **REQUESTED + CLUB AGREED**: 38.60%
- **REQUESTED + CLUB SENT TO DIFFERENT**: 36.20%
- **PRESSURE TRANSFER BY FORMER CLUB**: 46.80%
- **PRESSURE BY AGENT**: 37.00%

**PAYMENT DELAYS AND CONTRACTING VIA TRANSFER**

**62.5% OF PLAYERS WHO WERE FORCED INTO RENEWING THE CONTRACT WITH THEIR CLUB EXPERIENCED DELAYED PAYMENT**

Those who mutually agreed a renewed contract had a lower risk of not receiving due payments (30%).

- **MUTUALLY RENEWED WITH CLUB**: 30.00%
- **PRESSURED INTO RENEWED BY CLUB**: 82.50%
- **PRESSURED INTO RENEWED BY AGENTS**: 54.50%

**PAYMENT DELAYS AND CONTRACT RENEWAL**
“There are a lot of lies in football. A lot of promises about contracts and salaries don’t come true.”

Defender, Ireland
Top finding

UNREGULATED WORKING CONDITIONS

Many players face precarious and unregulated employment

THE WORK OF PLAYER UNIONS AND OVERALL PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE GAME HAVE LED TO SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN CONTRACTUAL STANDARDS IN MANY COUNTRIES. HOWEVER, MANY POOR QUALITY CONTRACTS ARE STILL BEING USED IN LARGE PARTS OF THE INDUSTRY AND FOR MANY PLAYERS THE MOST BASIC CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT ARE NOT FULFILLED. IN PARTICULAR, DEVELOPING FOOTBALLING COUNTRIES IN AFRICA, THE AMERICAS AND EASTERN EUROPE REQUIRE AN URGENT IMPROVEMENT IN BASIC EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS.

In some countries, secondary contracts which usually cover remuneration for the use of image rights are frequently used by clubs and players. Given the market value of domestic competitions and the marketing potential of players, many of these contracts appear to be misused, for example as a means to decrease social security or tax payments. Such contracts are also significantly harder for a player to enforce in a court in case of a dispute with their club.

ON AVERAGE, 8% OF PLAYERS DO NOT HAVE A WRITTEN CONTRACT WITH THEIR CLUB

The data highlights significant regional differences:

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<th>Region</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>15%</td>
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Having a written contract and being able to personally access it are the most basic requirements for any employee. Players without such a protection are easily taken advantage of and will have no chance of enforcing their rights in a dispute.
CIVIL LAW CONTRACTS WERE PROVEN BY THIS STUDY TO BE PRIMARILY AN EASTERN EUROPEAN PHENOMENON WITH THE GLOBAL AVERAGE OF SUCH CONTRACTS STANDING AT 9%.

Of the 10 countries around the world with significant shares of civil contracts, seven are in Eastern Europe. Players in these countries are not only deprived of workers’ protections under labour laws but also significantly more likely to face other forms of problems such as breaches of contracts through e.g. delayed payments.

1. CROATIA  94.00%  6. TUNISIA  55.60%
2. CZECH REPUBLIC  93.50%  7. ICELAND  40.20%
3. TURKEY  78.00%  8. POLAND  37.60%
4. SLOVENIA  72.50%  9. UKRAINE  35.10%
5. ROMANIA  59.90%  10. CONGO  18.20%

PREVALENCE OF CIVIL LAW OR SELF-EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS BY COUNTRY
**20 TOP FINDINGS**

**CLUBS OFTEN USE SECONDARY OR IMAGE RIGHTS’ CONTRACTS TO SAVE ON INCOME TAX, NATIONAL INSURANCE AND CIRCUMVENT LABOUR STANDARDS OR MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE FOOTBALL INDUSTRY**

Few players possess an intellectual property value justifying a separate contract for its use by the club. For most players, the use of image rights’ payments is a means for clubs to circumvent legal protections and reduce employment costs.

Secondary contracts allow clubs to separate payments to players for playing football under their employment contracts, from payments to a secondary company for the use of the player’s image rights. The image rights’ payments are not treated as salary, therefore subject to lower tax and exempt the club and player from social security contributions. At the same time such payments are much more difficult for a player to enforce in an employment dispute or in case of insolvency.

The proportion of players receiving remuneration via secondary payments is as follows:

- Africa: nearly 11%
- Europe: almost 9%
- Americas: 8%
- Some of the highest shares nationally were in Cyprus (50.5%), Poland (34%), FYROM (26%) and Zimbabwe (30%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Remuneration from Second Contract</th>
<th>No Remuneration for Second Contract</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>92.10%</td>
<td>7.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>91.30%</td>
<td>8.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>89.10%</td>
<td>10.90%</td>
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</table>

**REMUNERATION FROM SECOND CONTRACT PER REGION**
There is no stability. You have one, two, three-year contracts your whole career so you’re always looking over your shoulder thinking, where am I going next?

Defender, New Zealand
ABUSIVE PRACTICES TO PRESSURE PLAYERS TO ACT IN THE INTEREST OF THE CLUB AND AGAINST THEIR OWN WILL ARE RELATIVELY COMMON. FORCED AND PUNITIVE TRAINING IN ISOLATION IS A TACTIC EMPLOYED IN PARTS OF THE FOOTBALL WORLD TO FORCE A PLAYER INTO EITHER ENDING, SIGNING OR CHANGING A CONTRACT OR AGREEING TO A TRANSFER. FORCED TRAINING ALONE IS OF COURSE DIFFERENT TO INDIVIDUAL TRAINING FOR LEGITIMATE MEDICAL OR REHABILITATION REASONS.

One of the main reasons why clubs resort to such tactics is down to the phenomenon of “jackpot economics”, whereby clubs commit to contracts and speculate on future revenue (e.g. through qualification to international competitions); if the income fails to materialize, they pressure players to try to decrease their expenditure. This explains why, up to a certain extent, that the higher a player’s salary, the more likely he is to find himself training alone if things go wrong for the club.

OVERALL 22% OF PLAYERS ARE AWARE OF THE PRACTICE OF ISOLATED TRAINING

- 6.2% have personally been a victim of isolated training, with foreign players twice as likely to be victimised compared with the global average
- 63% of those forced to train alone reported that the club wanted them to end their contract
- 22% were pressured to sign a new contract
- The rest reported pressure to agree to a transfer.

HAVE YOU OR YOUR TEAMMATES BEEN FORCED TO TRAIN ALONE FOR REASONS OTHER THAN INJURY?
69% of players forced to train alone also reported having experienced delays of payment.

The likelihood of being forced to train alone increases drastically with higher salaries.

Interestingly, players in the higher — but not the highest — wage brackets were significantly more likely to experience being forced to train alone, adding weight to the anecdotal evidence that clubs employ this tactic to cut contracts and wage costs for economic reasons.
The stadium atmosphere, public attention and cultural importance of football are among the factors which make playing professional football a very special job. But the positive sides of the game also come at a price - the pressure of performing your work every week in a very stressful, often hostile and sometimes violent environment is often overlooked. This study surveyed different forms of abuse and their perpetrators, suggesting widespread problems among players themselves, between fans and players, as well as abuse from management towards players.

Stories of physical and psychological abuse of players are commonplace, yet this survey has for the first time gathered global data on the extent to which this takes place. Comparison to similar surveys in other industries shows that footballers are five times more likely to experience violence at work.

Almost one in ten players reported personally having been a victim of violence

- Almost 10% of players experienced physical violence
- Almost 16% have received threats of violence
- 15% were victims of bullying or harassment
- 7.5% faced discrimination based on ethnicity, sexuality or religious beliefs.

% of respondents who have experienced abuse

Experiences of violence, harassment and discrimination
FANS ARE THE MAIN PERPETRATORS OF VIOLENCE

Fans were responsible for 55% of violent acts against players. In 22% of cases, other players are the perpetrators (normal physical contact during a game was explicitly excluded) and in 23% of cases the club management, coaching staff or third parties acting allegedly on behalf of the club were responsible for violent acts against the players.

THE PERPETRATORS OF PHYSICAL VIOLENCE

- **30%** fans matchday
- **22%** players
- **17%** fans non-matchday
- **13%** management coach
- **10%** other 3rd party

RACISM, XENOPHOBIA AND OTHER FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION CONTINUE TO BE OF SIGNIFICANT CONCERN

Foreigners were more than twice as likely to experience discrimination (17%) than domestic players and were also more likely to be victims of physical violence, suggesting continued high levels of racism in the game.
THE FINDINGS OF THIS REPORT SUGGEST THAT IN A VARIETY OF WAYS THE YOUNGEST PLAYERS (IDENTIFIED IN THE TWO LOWEST AGE GROUPS MEASURED, UNDER-18 AND 18-23) FACE THE SAME AND, IN SOME AREAS, EVEN WORSE ADVERSE EFFECTS THAN OLDER PLAYERS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE VAST MAJORITY OF YOUNG AND MINOR PLAYERS SACRIFICE THEIR TERTIARY OR EVEN THEIR SECONDARY EDUCATION TO PURSUE THEIR DREAM OF BECOMING A FOOTBALLER.

THE MATCH AND COMPETITION CALENDAR ALSO POSE SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES FOR YOUNG TALENTS. HOWEVER, ONLY A SMALL MINORITY SUCCEED IN THEIR AMBITIONS AND ARE OFTEN ILL-EQUIPPED FOR A CAREER OUTSIDE OF FOOTBALL.

ALMOST 72% OF THOSE QUESTIONED HAD NOT COMPLETED EDUCATION BEYOND HIGH-SCHOOL, WITH 10% NOT EVEN STAYING IN EDUCATION BEYOND PRIMARY SCHOOL

Given the severe employment risks described in this report, missing out on their education is an enormous risk for the long-term professional development of players. For many this decision never pays off. That those surveyed had at least made it into the professional game must also be taken into account; a huge number of aspiring players making similar sacrifices never make the grade in professional football.

EDUCATION DEMOGRAPHICS
Players under 24 were at particular risk of personal abuse such as violence and discrimination

In the first few years of their professional career, young players had already been exposed to the same frequency of such misconduct as other players in the survey. This suggests that young players are either a particular target or that the overall rate of such behaviour has increased in recent years – both being an equal concern.

The survey questioned players about their experiences throughout their career. If a player’s risk of being the victim of violence is constant, then the longer a player’s career, the greater the likelihood of them being a victim. If the risk was constant then we would expect younger players to report fewer incidents of violence than players at the end of their career. We consider it probable, therefore, that younger players are significantly more at risk than older players when it comes to violence.

In addition, the report confirms the anecdotal evidence that young players often ‘run’ harder than older players. Players promoted from youth academies lacked access to higher levels of paid annual leave, compared to players who joined their club via a transfer or had their contracts renewed.
INTEGRITY REMAINS A KEY ISSUE IN PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL. DESPITE ATTRACTING LESS PUBLIC ATTENTION IN RECENT YEARS COMPARED WITH OTHER FORMS OF FOOTBALL CORRUPTION, MATCH-FIXING CONTINUES TO BE AN IMMINENT THREAT TO THE GAME AND TO PLAYERS. THE STUDY PRESENTS A FIRST GLOBAL STUDY INTO THE EXTENT TO WHICH PLAYERS ARE BEING APPROACHED BY MATCH-FIXERS AND IS BACKED UP BY PREVIOUS FINDINGS IN FIFPRO’S 2012 BLACK BOOK EASTERN EUROPE.

For years, expert opinions and whistle-blowers have shown how criminal match-fixers strategically target players, referees and other officials who are more easily corrupted for personal reasons. The key incentive is financial desperation. This report confirms that match-fixing is still happening and that to prevent it, football must do more to protect the key protagonists in the game.

BY THE END OF HIS PLAYING CAREER, A FOOTBALLER ABOVE THE AGE OF 33 HAS AN ALMOST 11% CHANCE OF HAVING BEEN APPROACHED AT LEAST ONCE BY MATCH-FIXERS.
MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES AND AWARENESS: OVERALL AND BY REGION

PLAYERS IN LOWER INCOME BRACKETS WERE TWICE OR THREE TIMES MORE LIKELY TO BE APPROACHED BY MATCH FIXERS.

Players who had been suffering from delayed salary payments were significantly more likely to be targeted as well.

This correlation grew even further the longer the delay in payment endured.

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES AND DELAY IN SALARY PAYMENT

Players approached to fix a match, with delay in payment

Players with delay in payment
Decent employment conditions for players fuel the overall positive development of both club and national team football. It must be a core objective of the industry to improve the working conditions of the large majority of footballers. It must also be a core objective to create as many quality jobs as possible for players and move them from the third into the second tier.

Factors to improve employment conditions in football include:

- Stronger minimum employment and arbitration standards
- Better and greatly reformed international regulation of transfer and transfer-related activities
- Strengthening of collective bargaining as a core component of football governance
- Increased economic sustainability, innovation and better management standards
- Tackling the social and criminal risks faced by football and its players.

All professional football stakeholders, FIFA under its new leadership, the confederations, FAs as well as public policy makers and legislators must act together and with decisiveness in the interest of the world’s game and its players.

These include:

- Global implementation of minimum requirements for standard player contracts as agreed by European social partners, UEFA and FIFA
- Improved arbitration at national (NDRCs) and international level, which ensures swift recourse to justice
- Club licensing systems, which must properly address employment standards on many levels
- Labour laws at national and supranational level, which must be more consistently applied to professional football

### BETTER INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS

The regulations and operation of the transfer system and related activities such as agents must also be thoroughly reviewed and fundamentally reformed.

This survey confirms the failure of market regulations in football to achieve their core stated objectives of ensuring respect of contracts and fairly balancing the interests of clubs and players.

A reform of the regulations on transfers of players must, at the very least, provide stronger protections of players against material breaches of contracts by clubs such as: shorter and proportionate periods of overdue payment justifying a termination, prohibitions of abusive practices such as forced training alone and stronger deterrents for actions in bad faith. The overall impact of transfers on the employment market and interference with the career path of a player must be addressed.

Via a new industry agreement, the global reach and enforceability of such regulations must be put to better use to ensure that players are paid and employment conditions performed with mutual respect.
THE BEAUTIFUL GAME

DEMOCRATIC INDUSTRY GOVERNANCE

There is no denying that football today is an industry. The challenge of adapting all levels of governance at club, league, FA and overall industry levels, while protecting and strengthening the essence of the game, is football’s supreme challenge.

Collective bargaining between employers and players as a requirement of decent governance must be universally accepted and integrated into all relevant decision making structures. Shared responsibility and the democratic checks and balances of institutionalised collective bargaining helps redefine the governance of football. In many cases it has served as vehicle for stability, growth and innovation.

SOLUTIONS FOR IMPROVED ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Football has enjoyed continuous economic growth, even throughout the financial crisis and still provides the biggest employer in sport. Yet, the financial growth is clustered around a select few markets and clubs. Therefore, employment conditions have substantially improved only for few players – mostly at the top of the game.

At the same time football is continuously driven by “jackpot economics” as the incentives for growth are speculative and therefore management and investment not sustainable.

Professional football needs to address its financial redistribution structures to ensure a greater share of countries, clubs and players benefit from its growth.

In parallel, more responsibility needs to be established in club management, more decency ensured in ownership and less speculative investment incentivised.

The perceived financial dependency on the volatile transfer market, as a source of revenue for clubs, has to be addressed as it is harmful to employment and unsustainable.

New opportunities of growth for different countries and conditions need to be explored to allow a broader growth and more even pyramid of professional football.

TACKLING CRIMINAL AND SOCIAL RISKS

This report also uncovered and reconfirmed various prevailing social and criminal risks effecting football – match-fixing, violence, discrimination, protection of minors and career support for players transitioning in and out of the game.

All parties need to embark on new efforts to tackle these issues in cooperation with governments and civil society.

A football club and stadium remain the work place of players and their safety in this environment must be guaranteed.

The threat of match-fixing is current and continuous efforts are needed to combat it. Preventing match-fixing starts with players enjoying decent employment conditions.

More advanced international and national standards for protection of the personal, educational and professional development of minors and young players, which complement current existing regulations, must be established.

The findings on violence, discrimination and harassment are severe and show that an urgent response is required from club managements, fans and players.

Based on these findings FIFPro will approach and work with all relevant institutions and stakeholders in and around football to find solutions to all the problems unearthed by this study. We will continue to bring evidence to the forefront of decision making to ensure that step by step, more and more footballers can enjoy decent, just and fair conditions of work when pursuing their profession and bringing life to the beautiful game.
The 2016 FIFPro Football Employment Report is the world’s most comprehensive survey of its kind. It builds on the success of the FIFPro Black Book Eastern Europe and a similar survey conducted by FIFPro Division Asia in 2015. The 2016 FIFPro Football Employment Report is based on a 23-question survey jointly developed by FIFPro and the University of Manchester. The survey was conducted during the first half of 2016 by the FIFPro unions with their member players around the world. The responses were analysed by the University of Manchester.

THE SURVEY COVERS SIX KEY AREAS:

- DEMOGRAPHICS
  Key personal information – age, education and citizenship

- MATCH-FIXING
  Approaches and awareness of match-fixing and its relation to employment conditions of players.

- HEALTH AND WELL-BEING
  Medical standards, rest periods and more

- ABUSE
  Personal and contractual abuse faced by players

- CONTRACTS
  Key facts about contract standards between clubs and players

- THE MARKET
  Details on the economic and legal position of players on the employment market

54 | PARTICIPATED UNIONS
87 | LEAGUES
13,876 | QUESTIONNAIRES
Working conditions
In professional football

The analysis of the responses by the University of Manchester sought to identify global trends, regional and national phenomena, as well as particularities in the employment market for professional footballers, vis-à-vis workers in other sectors.

Cross tabulations, comparing results of two or more questions, can lead to a deeper understanding of the prevalence of certain phenomena as regards, for example, certain age groups, national or international players, or, more broadly, how results relate to each other. As this survey is intended to be the first of a series, its findings will provide a baseline for future comparison and measurement of specific areas.

The report covers the member markets of player unions in Africa, the Americas and Europe: Austria, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, FYROM (Macedonia), Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malta, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Scotland, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.

As FIFPro Asia conducted a similar regional report in 2015, the results were used for global comparisons in some areas of this report but are not integrated in their entirety due to methodological differences. The full data is available in a separate section of the report.

The report does not cover England, Spain and Germany. While data from these markets would have certainly been interesting, it would have had only a minimum impact on the report’s focus, in revealing the working conditions of the large majority of professional players represented by the second and third tier of the global employment market.

The women’s game continues to make great strides in terms of participation, attracting crowds and revenues in some countries. Yet the economic and development gap between male and female football is still a reality of today’s game, which makes it difficult to compare these two markets. FIFPro will be conducting a separate survey on professional women’s football.
2016 Football Employment Report

Working conditions in professional football

FIFPro is the worldwide representative organisation for all professional footballers; more than 65,000 players in total, male and female. The world players’ union has 58 national players’ associations as its members.
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THEO VAN SEGGELEN
FIFPro Secretary General

We are proud to present the first ever global study of working conditions in men’s professional football. With nearly 14,000 players surveyed across Europe, Africa and the Americas, these findings are a reference point on the current state of the game and highlight the realities that professional players face in their daily lives.

Our objective was to learn as much as possible about a wide range of leagues and divisions through the eyes of the players themselves, from the world’s elite to those further down the pyramid.

What we discovered was a silent majority, afraid to speak openly for fear of being blacklisted by clubs. We are grateful to them for confiding in FIFPro and telling us their stories.

Flick through these pages and you will find a variety of interviews, mostly given on condition of anonymity. They are just the tip of the iceberg. We have spoken to many more.

Until now, we could only speculate about the extent of the issues players are forced to deal with, such as not receiving what is contractually owed to them.
As a former player myself, I know what it means to be treated like a commodity. At the same time, I enjoyed every moment of the short and fragile career I had to experience the wonders of this great game.

That players are often pressured to join a club not of their choosing is now a hard fact, an undeniable reality which is at the heart of a dysfunctional transfer system in urgent need of reform. The findings show that players are too often at the mercy of clubs who exploit the system to bully them into submission.

Like most of us, players should be able to feel secure in their workplace. They should be given adequate rest, be well cared for by medical staff, and expect protection against violence from fans and club management. Sadly, we found this is not always the case.

One popular misconception is that all players are wealthy individuals, leading privileged lives. The data we have uncovered destroys that myth once and for all.

Our goal at FIFPro is to ensure players are guaranteed decent, stable jobs that allow them to pursue their chosen profession with dignity.

As a former player myself, I know what it means to be treated like a commodity. At the same time, I enjoyed every moment of the short and fragile career I had to experience the wonders of this great game.

I truly believe this data can be a turning point for football and a platform for FIFPro to pursue future negotiations with football’s leading authorities.

The critical findings contained in this report confirm that much work still needs to be done to ensure players are afforded the same rights as other workers.
CASE STUDY

Public perceptions of professional footballers are largely influenced by the image of players in the top leagues. For the first time this report provides an insight into the labour conditions of professional football, telling a compelling story about the realities of the large majority of professional players.

**AVERAGE AGE**

- 74% of players are between 18 and 28 years old
- 17% between 29 and 33
- 5% are above 33
- 3% under 18

**EDUCATION LEVEL**

- 72% of players did not complete education beyond high-school
- 9% only finished primary school
- 14% completed vocational training
- 12% completed a university degree

**AVERAGE CONTRACT**

- 22–23 months was the average length of a player contract
- 25 months for players who joined via a transfer fee
- 30 months for players who joined via the academy
- 20 months for players who joined as a free agent as a general rule the contract length will decrease the lower the salary is.
**How Players Join Their Club**

- **45%** of players join their club as free agents.
- 16% of players are promoted via the academy.
- 25% of players are transferred for a fee.
- 14% of players renewed their contract.

**Monthly Salary**

- **74%** of players earn less than 4000 USD net per month.
- 45% of players make less than 1000 USD net per month.
- 21% of players make less than 300 USD net per month.
- 2% of players make more than 720,000 USD a year.

**Delayed Payments**

- **59%** of players were paid on time.
- 41% of players experienced delay of payments.
- 14% of players experienced up to 1 month delay.
- 19% of players experienced 3 to 6 month delay.
- 6% experienced 6 to 12 month delay.
- The rest experienced over 12 month delay.
The 2016 FIFPro Global Employment Report is the world’s largest most comprehensive survey on the working conditions in professional football. The survey is based on 13,876 player questionnaires and provides for the first time a country-by-country analysis to better understand the working conditions of players by region and country.
AVERAGE CONTRACT LENGTH 11.6 MONTHS

ISRAEL

48.9% of players has a 2nd contract

CYPRUS

94% of players do not have an employment contract

CROATIA

95% does experience late pay

BOLIVIA

43% of players transferred against their will

DENMARK

Only 52.5% has a day off a week (vs. Scotland at 100%)

BRAZIL

48.9% of players has a 2nd contract

CASE STUDY
THE AUTHORS

Dr Aristea Koukiadaki, is a senior lecturer in the School of Law at the University of Manchester, UK. She has expertise in the empirical study of law and in applied legal and policy analysis, with particular reference to labour market regulation, corporate governance and EU social policy. Her work has been funded by a number of organisations, including the Economic and Social Research Council, the European Commission, the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions and the International Labour Organisation.

aristea.koukiadaki@manchester.ac.uk

Dr Geoff Pearson, LLB(Hons) PhD(Law) is a senior lecturer in the School of Law at the University of Manchester, UK. He is an expert on Sports Law, Criminal Law, and football crowd management and was for 11 years the Director of the MBA (Football Industries) programme at the University of Liverpool. Geoff has previously published on the football player market in the European Law Journal, European Law Review, and European Sports Management Quarterly, and in 2013 he co-authored the European Commission report on the legality of the UEFA Home-Grown Player Rule.

geoff.pearson@manchester.ac.uk
INTRODUCTION

The objective of the FIFPro Global Professional Football Players Survey is to present the most comprehensive and far-reaching study to date of the labour conditions and experiences of professional footballers throughout the world.

This report analyses and provides academic commentary from researchers at the University of Manchester on nearly 14,000 questionnaires completed by professional (and in some cases semi-professional) footballers in 54 different nations, in Africa, the Americas, and Europe. The FIFPro Global Survey provides a snapshot of a professional footballer’s life in 2016, covering issues such as age, education and salary, to the topics of contract renewal and transfers. It also gathers data about longer-term experiences of footballers throughout their careers on issues such as abuse, violence, and match-fixing. The Global Survey is designed to assist FIFPro, national player unions, and also clubs, leagues, federations, event organisers, fans, and public authorities to understand some of the challenges and problems facing professional footballers and, where appropriate, to develop strategies to manage or counteract problems.

FIFPro’s Task Force Group highlighted five different areas where, potentially, the problems and challenges affecting professional footballers across different countries could be detected. Those fields of interest, which form the main body of this report, are: Contracts, the Market, the Abuse of Contracts and Players, Health and Wellbeing, and Match-Fixing. The second chapter of the report presents the main comparative findings concerning demographics. This is then followed by an analysis of the findings in respect of contracts at global, regional and national level (chapter 3) and an analysis of the findings in respect of the market and transfer system (chapter 4). Chapter 5 then presents the main findings regarding the abuse of contracts and players and chapter 6 deals with questions related to health, safety, and well-being. The final chapter of the analysis discusses the findings on match-fixing.

In order to better understand the relationship between different issues, and highlight potential causes, cross-tabulation analyses were made. This kind of statistical analysis shows a distribution between two variables, revealing how respondents answered on two or more questions at the same time. In other words this means that cross-tabulations bring together two variables and display possible relationships between them in a table. Cross-tabulation analyses are included in all chapters for many of the previously defined fields of interests.

This is FIFPro’s third major survey into the labour conditions of Professional Football Players and is by far the most comprehensive. In 2012 FIFPro’s ‘Black Book’ on football players in Eastern Europe was published, surveying players across the region. In 2014, the FIFPro Asia Survey surveyed 1,078 players affiliated to the Asian and Oceania Football Confederations. The results of this latter survey are included in this report where possible to allow comparisons between the continents. The 2016 Global Survey has been conducted on a much larger scale. FIFPro sent the invitation to participate in the above-mentioned project to players unions in 86 countries around the world.

The survey did not include player unions from Asia, due to the just recently conducted research mentioned above. 56 Unions responded and agreed to cooperate and assist in distributing and collecting the anonymous questionnaires to all the professional football players in their leagues, asking them about their working conditions and experiences. The survey was conducted at clubs across professional divisions to ensure that the experiences of both the elite players and those playing further down the pyramid were represented.

This report contains data from 54 Unions (one provided too small a sample to be included, another provided completed surveys too late to be included) and in total gives voice to 13,876 footballers. This accounts for 21% of FIFPro-affiliated players. When the Asia survey is added (1,078 respondents), 23% of FIFPro affiliated players were surveyed. In research terms this is a very large global sample. It is also by far the largest survey of professional sportspersons utilising direct participant data ever conducted.

The Methodology chapter towards the end of this report provides greater detail about how the survey was developed and the data collected, collated, and analysed. It is important to note four limitations here though. First, this survey is only of male
professional footballers; FIFPro is currently preparing a targeted survey for female professional footballers. Secondly, a number of key football markets did not return surveys, including Argentina, England, and the Netherlands. Germany and Mexico - who are not FIFPro members - were also not included. Thirdly, we did not look to collect a specific sample from each country but instead looked to include all players who had completed a questionnaire provided there were sufficient responses to make a meaningful contribution and to guarantee anonymity of players (this led to Spain’s exclusion).

Finally, because this is the first global survey, a comparison over time is not possible (although in some areas we were able to compare the situation globally to data from the Eastern Europe Black Book and the Asia Survey). It is foreseen that the data in this report will be the starting point for longer term analysis of the issues in the future that will allow meaningful comparison.

The Global Survey is designed to assist FIFPro, national player unions, and also clubs, leagues, federations, event organisers, fans, and public authorities to understand some of the challenges and problems facing professional footballers and, where appropriate, to develop strategies to manage or counteract problems.
This chapter analyses the findings of the questionnaire relating to the demographic information of the respondents. It identifies that 14% of players were playing in a foreign country, and highlights which countries had the highest and lowest number of non-national players. It looks at the distribution of age across respondents, identifying how players over 28 find it more difficult to retain employment in professional football. Finally, it looks at the highest education achieved by players, noting how football players are relatively under-educated when compared to workforce groups in other economic sectors.
OVERVIEW

THIS CHAPTER ANALYSES THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE PLAYERS THAT RESPONDED TO THE SURVEY. ON THE BASIS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NATURE OF THE DATA, OUR ANALYSIS CONFIRMS A NUMBER OF TAKEN-FOR-GRADED TRUTHS ABOUT THE CONTEMPORARY FOOTBALL INDUSTRY.

FIRST, THERE IS A HIGH DEGREE OF MOBILITY OF PLAYERS ACROSS ALL REGIONS AND A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PLAYERS ARE EMPLOYED BY CLUBS OUTSIDE THEIR HOME COUNTRY. WHETHER THERE ARE ANY DIFFERENCES IN HOW THESE PLAYERS ARE TREATED IS THE FOCUS OF MUCH OF THE SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS IN THIS REPORT (E.G. CHAPTER 5 ON ABUSE OF CONTRACTS/PLAYERS). SECONDLY, THE MAJORITY OF PLAYERS BELONG TO THE 18-28 AGE RANGE. IN LIGHT OF THIS, ACCESS INTO THE SPORT AND THE TREATMENT OF MORE SENIOR PLAYERS WARRANTS GREATER ATTENTION. THIRDLY, THE FINDINGS INDICATE THAT PLAYERS ONCE IN THE FOOTBALL INDUSTRY TYPICALLY DO NOT CONTINUE TO PURSUE EDUCATION. ONLY 28% OF PLAYERS ARE LIKELY TO HAVE ATTAINED VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING OR HIGHER EDUCATION. THEREFORE THE MAJORITY OF PLAYERS MAY NOT BE EQUIPPED WITH ADEQUATE SKILLS AND EXPERTISE TO ENTER THE ORDINARY LABOUR MARKET, ONCE THEIR SHORT FOOTBALL CAREER HAS ENDED.
If you speak to people who know nothing about football and tell them footballers should receive a pension, they look at us as though we’re thieves.

Defender, Italy
Demographics

NATIONALS AND NON-NATIONALS

The survey asked the respondents to indicate whether they were citizens of the country in which they were playing professional football.

The global average for non-nationals stood at 14%. In terms of regional variation, the highest percentage of non-nationals (as proportion of the population by region) was found in Europe (16%). The second largest was in Americas (14%) and in Africa, this stood at 8% (figure 2.1).

The variation between countries was notably higher (figure 2.2). The country with the greatest percentage of non-nationals was Cyprus (50%), followed by the USA (41%), and Greece (33%). At the other end, low percentages of non-national players were reported in a number of countries in Africa, including Cameroon (2%), Zimbabwe (3%), and Ghana (4%). As we will see in chapter 4.2, these three countries were all in the bottom four of respondent countries when it came to average salary. In Europe, Serbia and Ireland but also Italy were among the countries with low percentages of non-nationals with 4% of non-nationals in the cases of Serbia and Italy and 5% in the case of Ireland. Very low rates of non-nationals were also reported in parts of the Americas, with Uruguay at 5% and Brazil at 6%.

The findings overlap to some extent with the latest UN data on the total number and share of international migrants: countries such as the USA and Switzerland seem to attract non-nationals in both football and other sectors. However, significant variation was found in migration rates for the majority of the other countries. The most obvious differences included Russia and France, where the rate of non-national football players was much lower than the total migration rates for these countries. These discrepancies between the total number of migrants and number of non-national footballers indicate that sector specificity is a very important determinant. While it was not possible in the survey to uncover the reasons for moving across countries, the sector specificity may include factors such as the extent of the migrant network, wage levels in the sport, and the regulatory and institutional framework governing the football sector in the country (e.g. competition quotas for “foreign players”).

**FIGURE 2.1: PERCENTAGE OF NON-NATIONALS AS PROPORTION OF POPULATION BY REGION**

**TABLE:**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
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<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>13.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>7.60%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>16.00%</td>
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**FIGURE 2.2: THE PROPORTION OF FOOTBALL PLAYERS PLAYING IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY**
FIGURE 2.2: PERCENTAGE OF NON-NATIONALS AS PROPORTION OF POPULATION BY COUNTRY

% OF RESPONDENTS WHO ARE NON-NATIONAL IN EACH COUNTRY

5 BEST COUNTRIES
- CYPRUS 50.2%
- GREECE 33.2%
- SWITZERLAND 31.7%
- MALTA 30%
- SLOVIA 27.7%

5 WORSE COUNTRIES
- USA 41.5%
- GREECE 33.2%
- SWITZERLAND 31.7%
- MALTA 30%
- SLOVIA 27.7%

Demographics
Respondents were asked in the survey to identify their age group.

First, there is a high degree of mobility of players across all regions. The findings suggest that the majority of the respondents belonged to two age groups: 18-23 (39%) and 24-28 (35%). Only 5% were above 33 years old and 3% were under 18 years old. The limited number of very young and older players is significant. On the one hand, it points to the existence of barriers for young players in accessing the professional football market; on the other hand, it seems to confirm the considerable challenges that older players may face for staying in the game. In the case of older players, the findings also demonstrate a very early retirement age for players when compared with the retirement age of those in other professions (more detail on the average duration of a player’s professional career can be found in chapter 4.3).

In light of the fact that most players will not have attained sufficient levels of educational achievement (see below section 2.3) and that only a small minority will have earned enough to be financially stable for their entire lives (see chapter 4 on remuneration), it is highly likely that most players will be faced with a significant and daunting career transition challenge. This may include seeking new employment in a related area, e.g., sports’ broadcasting or coaching - where only limited employment opportunities exist - or even developing an entirely new career in an unrelated area.

Only 5% were above 33 years old and 3% were under 18 years old. The limited number of very young and older players is significant.

**FIGURE 2.3: AGE DEMOGRAPHICS**

![Age Demographics Chart]

77% of players are under 28 years old.
Demographics

As a general principle, highly-educated individuals are more likely to be protected from unemployment, simply because educational attainment makes an individual more attractive in the workforce.

Higher educational achievement can also be translated to greater lifetime earnings, including — importantly — during the period following the end of a football career. Research evidence supports this: the third (2012) European quality of life survey, for instance, reported that having completed tertiary education is associated with higher life satisfaction compared with only having completed secondary education.

Unfortunately in football, the effort to become a top-level player means that it is difficult, sometimes impossible, to commit to the achievement of educational qualifications. In some countries (e.g. England), clubs who take on younger players on school-release programs are now obliged to provide them with an adequate level of education. However, this is far from the picture elsewhere in the world. As such, a lack of sustainable and decent remuneration employment conditions in a given country may deter players from pursuing longer careers.

A breakdown of age groups by region points to considerable differences in terms of the distribution of respondents per age group (figure 2.4). Broadly speaking, the rates of younger players (under-18 and 18-23) were higher in Africa than in Europe and America. However, the trend was reversed in the older age groups, where there was a greater proportion of players 29-33 and above-33 in Europe and the Americas: 18% and 19% of respondents belonged to the 29-33 age group in the Americas and Europe respectively. The figure for above-33 stood at 6.5% and 5% respectively for these regions. These findings suggest that either football clubs in Europe and the Americas have embraced age diversity to a greater extent than those in Africa when it comes to offering contracts, or that players in these regions are on average physically more able to perform at an older age. Various reasons may be in operation here, including changes in cultural and societal expectations regarding older players, indirectly influenced sometimes by anti-discrimination legislation. They may also reflect differences in the provision of medical support and treatment of players in the older age groups, either at club level or at the level of the country (see chapter 6 on medical support). Finally, a lack of sustainable and decent remuneration employment conditions in a given country may deter players from pursuing longer careers.

Higher educational achievement can also be translated to greater lifetime earnings, including — importantly — during the period following the end of a football career.
former players may face significant challenges, including in many cases unemployment and substandard quality of life. Our results demonstrate that professional footballer players compare very unfavourably to male workers across other industries when it comes to the level of education achieved.

Respondents to the survey were asked to describe the highest level of education or training they had successfully completed. As illustrated in figure 2.5, the majority of respondents had finished high school (62%). This was followed by respondents that had completed vocational education and training (15%) and those that had a university degree (12%). In Europe, nearly one fifth of respondents possessed a university degree (although we are aware those with a higher level of education may have been more inclined to complete the survey). The figures here do, however, demonstrate that combining education with a professional football career is achievable for some; further research could identify the circumstances under which such educational achievements are more likely to be fulfilled.

At the other end of the scale, 1% of the respondents had not finished primary school education and 9% had only completed primary school education. In total, only 28% of respondents were likely to have achieved such a level of education that would enable them to enter into the ordinary labour market at the end of their football career.

Our results demonstrate that professional footballer players compare very unfavourably to male workers across other industries when it comes to the level of education achieved.

![Figure 2.5: Education Demographics](image-url)
Finally, a regional breakdown of the groups of respondents by educational level does not suggest the existence of a clear pattern across the different regions (figure 2.6). Players in Europe were somewhat more likely to have completed successfully high school education or have a university-level qualification than players in Africa and the Americas; however, the percentage of those with only primary level qualification was higher than in Africa and the Americas. Conversely, a greater proportion of players in Africa had finished high school while a considerable percentage of players in the Americas had completed vocational training courses. Countries with particularly high ratios of educational achievement (i.e. university-level education) included France and the USA. In a number of countries, a significant percentage of players had high-school qualification. This included a number of European countries (e.g. Austria, Cyprus, Croatia and Montenegro) but also Uruguay (74%), South Africa (80%) and the Ivory Coast (80.5%).

These findings have to be read taking into account the fact that different educational standards exist in different countries. Bearing in mind this, a comparison with the OECD data suggests that footballers are far less likely to graduate from tertiary education: the average for footballers is 13% while the average rate of completion in the OECD countries stands at 41%. Comparison with global data from the World Bank reveals that the rates of completion of secondary education by footballers and the general male population are broadly similar (the completion rate of lower secondary education for males is 74% according to World Bank data).

There is no global data on the rate of vocational education and training for the general population. Data from EU countries reveals that close to half (48%) of all upper secondary school pupils in the EU-28 followed vocational programmes in 2013, with the share for males standing at 53%. The respective rate for footballers was much lower and stood at 15%.

A comparison with the OECD data suggests that footballers are far less likely to graduate from tertiary education: the average for footballers is 13% while the average rate of completion in the OECD countries stands at 41%.
The football player’s relationship with his club should be governed by his employment contract. However, the protections supposedly provided by the contract are much harder to access if there is no employment contract, or if the player and/or his agent do not have a copy. The survey found that a sizable minority of players reported not having an employment contract, or if they did, they did not possess a copy which they could refer to. The chapter also considers the number of players who possess a secondary image rights contract and the geographical distribution of this type of contracts.
OVERVIEW

THE CHAPTER DEALS WITH THE WAY PLAYERS ENTER INTO THEIR CONTRACTS AND DRAWS ATTENTION TO THE CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH THE LEGAL EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF FOOTBALL PLAYERS AND THE GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE LABOUR MARKET.

A SINGLE AND CLEAN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT IS KEY TO ENSURING THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES, INCLUDING SALARY AND OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT. UNDER THE FIFA REGULATIONS ON THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS (RSTP), THE EXISTENCE OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT IS A NECESSARY (BUT NOT SUFFICIENT) CONDITION TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN A PROFESSIONAL AND AN AMATEUR FOOTBALL PLAYER.

At regional level, policy initiatives in the European Union culminated in 2012 to the conclusion of the first social partners agreement in the sector regarding minimum contract requirements. The agreement includes a number of commitments to ensure that player employment contracts throughout Europe meet certain minimum standards, including among others that contracts must be in writing, that they must define the rights and duties of club and player, and that they must address matters such as salary, health insurance, social security, or paid leave.

Our findings suggest that regional specificity is an important factor in respect of whether players had written contracts and copies of these. The prevalence of labour market informality meant that written contracts and copies of contracts were less available in Africa than in the Americas and Europe. Regional differences were still important in respect of the employment status of footballers, and considerable variation was found between regions in the use of non-employment contracts. There were also considerable variations on a country-by-country basis. The use of non-employment contracts in the sector (with a severe regional cluster in parts of Eastern Europe) may have significant implications, including lacking access to basic labour standards, such as working-time entitlements and dismissal protection, lack of coverage by collective agreements or representation by trade union channels, and a limited degree of entitlement to social protection.
“There are a lot of lies in football. A lot of promises about contracts and salaries don’t come true.”

Defender, New Zealand
The existence of a written contract is an essential prerequisite for limiting labour market informality, especially in transition economies.

In our survey, football players were asked whether they had a written contract with their club. The findings suggest that 8% of respondents did not have a written contract.

At the same time, the findings may be consistent with the regional differences in respect of the rates of informal employment. Many of those counted as being informally employed are either without a proper labour contract or social security coverage, or are self-employed in precarious conditions. According to the 2014 World at Work report by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), informal employment is widespread in developing countries but is also increasingly common in advanced economies, including, among others, transition economies in Eastern Europe. The latest estimates show that informal employment accounts for a large share of total non-agricultural employment, ranging from 33% in South Africa to 82% in Mali; in Latin American countries it ranges from 40% in Uruguay to 75% in Bolivia.

A regional breakdown reveals that the largest percentage of footballers without a written contract were in Africa (15%), followed by footballers in Americas (8%) and Europe (3%) (figure 3.2). The difference in the availability of a written contract may be attributed to the different degree of professional management combined with the very low income-employment of football in some of the regions included in the survey. Regulatory standards within football such as club licensing programs and labour market oversight differs greatly and might also be causes for the large variations.

Informal employment is widespread in developing countries but is also increasingly common in advanced economies, including, among others, transition economies in Eastern Europe.
In terms of country distribution (figure 3.3), the greatest percentage of footballers without written contracts was found in African countries: in Congo, 89% of players did not have a written contract, in Botswana the rate stood at 36% and in Ivory Coast at 21%. The findings seem to confirm the evidence on labour market informality in Africa generally. In countries such as Congo, it is only top clubs that conclude written contracts with their players and oral agreements tend to be the norm in lower leagues. However, high rates of footballers without written contracts were also reported in some European countries, including Montenegro (46%) and Slovenia (albeit at a much lower rate, i.e. 8%). Interestingly, little difference was found here between EU and non-EU Member States within UEFA: 95% of respondents in UEFA countries had a written contract with their club and the respective rate in EU Member States stood at 98%. In the Americas, the highest rate was found in Peru (20%), followed by Costa Rica (16%). At the other end, countries where the majority of respondents confirmed that they had written contracts in place included a large number of European countries: in Sweden, Kazakhstan and Georgia, all respondents had written contracts with their clubs. High rates of written contracts were also found outside Europe, including Brazil.

**High rates of footballers without written contracts were also reported in some European countries, including Montenegro (46%) and Slovenia (albeit at a much lower rate, i.e. 8%).**
### FIGURE 3.3: LACK OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT PER COUNTRY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>89.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 5 WORSE COUNTRIES

1. Congo
2. Botswana
3. Ivory Coast
4. Peru
5. Costa Rica

#### 5 BEST COUNTRIES

1. Poland
2. Brazil
3. Georgia
4. Israel
5. Kazakhstan
The availability of a written contract may be more prevalent where certain factors are in operation, including higher educational qualifications. The findings indicate that within the group of players that had a written contact, the proportion of respondents with primary school or university degree education was much higher compared to those that had not completed primary education (figure 3.4). But no notable difference was found in respect of other educational levels, including high school and vocational education and training. The greater exposure of players with very limited levels of education to abuse through the lack of a written contract, may result to a ‘double penalty’: first during their football career, this category of players may be deprived of better working conditions as a result of the lack of a written contract; and secondly, in their post-football career, they may be penalised further as their limited educational attainment will most probably be a hindrance for their transition into the ordinary labour market.

The findings indicate that young players may experience significant problems when transitioning to a professional career, even in cases where this transition may take place through youth academies, and as such may be more exposed to precarious working conditions.

Further cross-tabulations concerning the availability of a written contract and different age groups point to an equally significant problem in football, i.e. the discrepancy in treatment between different age groups and especially the problems associated with the working conditions of very young or older players. As shown in figure 3.5, the proportion of younger players, especially under-18 years’ old, that did not have a written contract with the club, was much higher than other age groups (77% of under-18s had written contracts in comparison to 96% in the case of those in the 29-33 age range). The findings indicate that young players may experience significant problems when transitioning to a professional career, even in cases where this transition may take place through youth academies, and as such may be more exposed to precarious working conditions.
In our analysis, we also explored the extent to which there was a relationship between the existence of a written contract and whether the respondents were citizens or not of the country in which they were playing. Overall, the findings do not suggest any significant difference at global level regarding the availability of a written contract between nationals and non-nationals. However, the picture was very different at regional level (figure 3.6). In both Africa and the Americas, it was disproportionately more likely that non-nationals had written contracts with their clubs. In contrast, the difference between the two groups, i.e. nationals and non-nationals, was negligible in Europe. What explains this regional variation? A common sense explanation would be that non-national players would be more inclined to relocate only when they had secured a written contract with a club (which may also be encouraged by having to conform to FIFA regulations on international transfers). Another explanation, which may complement the explanation offered just above, would relate to the higher rates of informal work and requirements concerning working-permissions for foreign players.

**FIGURE 3.6: AVAILABILITY OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT AND CITIZENSHIP**

In both Africa and the Americas, it was disproportionately more likely that non-nationals had written contracts with their clubs. In contrast, the difference between the two groups, i.e. nationals and non-nationals, was negligible in Europe.
Aside from the issue of having a written contract in place, awareness of the terms and conditions of employment is significant.

Also, in case of legal dispute with a club, having access to the employment contract is a critical requirement to enforce one’s rights. In this respect, having a copy of the contract personally (or at least through the agent) is crucial. In our survey, respondents were asked whether they had a copy of the contract personally, whether their agent had one, or whether they had no access to a copy at all. The findings indicate that a considerable proportion of players personally had a copy of their club contract (78%) and in a further 7% of the cases, a copy was kept by the agent (figure 3.7). However, a high rate of respondents, i.e. 16%, did not have a copy at all. When interpreting these results, it is important to remember that in some cases (especially in African countries) there was a problem of lack of written contracts (see discussion above); respondents who answered that they did not have a written contract were excluded from the analysis here. Our findings are broadly similar to the findings of the 2014 FIFPro Asian Survey: 77% of the respondents in Asian countries had a copy of their contract with the club, in 8% of the cases there were two contracts, the so-called ‘double contract’ and in 15% of the cases there was only one contract but the player did not have a copy.
Further analysis at national level reveals significant variation (figure 3.9), suggesting that country specificities are equally important. The greatest percentage of respondents with no copy at all was found in Cameroon, where the percentage stood very high (65%). This was followed by other African countries, including Gabon (60%), the Ivory Coast (60%) and Namibia (56%). However, high rates of players without a contract copy were found in countries in the Americas and Europe. In Europe, this included a number of countries such as Turkey (37%), FYROM (29%) and Ukraine (20%). In the Americas, it included Peru (39%), Guatemala (58%) and, importantly, Brazil, where the rate of players with no copy of contract stood at a worrying 47%.

The regional distribution in terms of availability of a copy of contract indicates some interesting trends (figure 3.8). Of the respondents who personally had a copy of their contract, the proportion of players in Europe was much higher than the players in Africa (89% of players in Europe had personally a copy in comparison to 60% in Africa). Significant difference was found between EU and non-EU Member States within UEFA: 14% of respondents in non-EU Member States did not have a copy at all in comparison with only 6% of respondents in EU Member States: the difference can be probably attributed to the regulatory framework applicable in the regions.

Significant difference was found between EU and non-EU Member States within UEFA: 14% of respondents in non-EU Member States did not have a copy at all in comparison with only 6% of respondents in EU Member States: the difference can be probably attributed to the regulatory framework applicable in the regions.

10 WORSE COUNTRIES PER REGION

**FIGURE 3.8 AVAILABILITY OF A CONTRACT COPY PER REGION**

![Graph showing availability of contract copy per region: AFRICA (31.00%), AMERICAS (26.10%), and EUROPE (5.70%).]

**FIGURE 3.9 PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS PER COUNTRY WITHOUT A CONTRACT COPY**

![Bar chart showing the percentage of respondents per country without a contract copy, with the highest percentage found in Cameroon (65%), followed by Gabon (60%), Ivory Coast (60%), Namibia (56%), Bolivia (39%), Peru (39%), Guatemala (58%), Brazil (47%), Costa Rica (37%), FYROM (29%), and Ukraine (20%).]

**FIGURE 3.10 TYPE OF CONTRACT**

- EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT: 7%
- SELF-EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT: 84%
- DON'T KNOW: 9%
- CIVIL LAW CONTRACT: 9%

12 Significant difference was found between EU and non-EU Member States within UEFA: 14% of respondents in non-EU Member States did not have a copy at all in comparison with only 6% of respondents in EU Member States: the difference can be probably attributed to the regulatory framework applicable in the regions.
FIGURE 3.9: AVAILABILITY OF A CONTRACT COPY PER REGION

- Croatia: 2.4%
- Iceland: 2.6%
- Montenegro: 2.9%
- Slovenia: 2.9%
- Ghana: 3.2%
- Morocco: 3.3%
- Malta: 3.4%
- Brazil: 47.4%
- Bulgaria: 7.9%
- Serbia: 8%
- Congo: 9.1%
- Uruguay: 9.1%
- Kazakhstan: 10.3%
- Scotland: 10.5%
- Hungary: 10.6%
- Cyprus: 13.3%
- South Africa: 14.9%
- Ireland: 18.3%
- Kenya: 18.5%
- Ukraine: 19.6%
- Egypt: 20%
- Paraguay: 20.6%
- Venezuela: 23.6%
- Botswana: 25.6%
- Ecuador: 27.2%
- FYROM: 28.6%
- Zimbabwe: 30.4%
- Turkey: 37%
- Bolivia: 39%
- Peru: 39%
- Costa Rica: 44.3%
- Brazil: 47.4%
- Namibia: 56.3%
- Guatemala: 57.6%
- Ivory Coast: 59.9%
- Gabon: 60.2%
- Cameroon: 65.4%
Contracts

THE LEGAL EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF PROFESSIONAL PLAYERS

The availability of an employment contract vis-à-vis other forms of contracting, including as self-employed or through so-called ‘civil law contract’ is significant in terms of the nature and range of rights that professional footballers may enjoy.

Lacking an employment contract is an indicator for precariousness, as non-employment contracts are often associated with worse employment protection and working conditions. The survey findings suggest that the majority of respondents (84%) had an employment contract in place (figure 3.10). However, 9% had a civil law contract or were self-employed and a further 7% of respondents did not know about the type of contract they had. The existence of a civil law contracts or the lack of awareness may become crucial data in cases of abuse of contracts and players (see analysis below in chapter 5).13

A breakdown of the empirical findings at regional level suggests that the greatest proportion of civil law/self-employment contracts was found in European countries (14% in comparison to 2% in the Americas and 8% in Africa). Country-level analysis on the type of club contracts reveals that in the vast majority of countries over 95% of players said they had an employment contract. At the top end, this included western European countries, such as Sweden, Italy and Norway, where none of the players reported being self-employed or having a civil law contract. High rates of employment contract also included countries in other regions, including South Africa (99.5%), Paraguay (99.5%) and the important market of Brazil (99%).

Lacking an employment contract is an indicator for precariousness, as non-employment contracts are often associated with worse employment protection and working conditions.
However, ten countries reported significantly lower rates of employment contracts. The data in table 3.1 presents the countries with the lowest rates of employment contracts. It becomes obvious that there is a cluster of Central and Eastern European countries, including the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Romania, Poland, and Ukraine, which are characterised by low rates of employment contracts. Our findings are broadly consistent with patterns of contracting in other economic sectors in these countries. While the problem of bogus self-employment is particularly prevalent in the ‘old’ EU Member States, Central and Eastern European states are characterised by disguised civil law relationships. Existing evidence suggests the prevalence of special ‘non-employment’ labour relationships (civil law contracts, occasional employment) in these countries. The proliferation of such contracts, including in the football sector, may be attributed to the regulatory deficiencies in respect of employment status but also to the poor enforcement of existing legislation to prevent abuse of non-standard contracts.

It becomes obvious that there is a cluster of Central and Eastern European countries, including the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Romania, Poland, and Ukraine, which are characterised by low rates of employment contracts.

This has significant implications for workers, including lacking access to basic labour standards, such as working time entitlements and dismissal protection, lack of coverage by collective agreements or representation by trade union channels, and a limited degree of entitlement to social protection.

This has significant implications for workers, including lacking access to basic labour standards, such as working time entitlements and dismissal protection, lack of coverage by collective agreements or representation by trade union channels, and a limited degree of entitlement to social protection. In this context, the case of Iceland should be best treated as symptomatic of the prevalence of part-time contracts in the sector, as the latter does not provide for sufficient levels of pay to allow full-time employment. Recent evidence on the rates of part-time workers as a proportion of overall self-employment suggests indeed that across Europe the likelihood of part-time work for the self-employed is greater. Yet this should not be a reason for non-employment contracts and may actually disguise genuine employment.

FIGURE 3.11: LOWEST RANKING COUNTRIES FOR POSSESSION OF AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CROATIA</td>
<td>94.00%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>TUNISIA</td>
<td>55.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>CZECH REPUBLIC</td>
<td>93.50%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>ICELAND</td>
<td>40.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>TURKEY</td>
<td>78.00%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>POLAND</td>
<td>37.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>SLOVENIA</td>
<td>72.50%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>UKRAINE</td>
<td>35.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>ROMANIA</td>
<td>59.90%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>CONGO</td>
<td>18.20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Further, our survey evidence indicates that there was no relationship between the existence of an employment contract and whether the players were nationals or not of the country where their club was located. However, when looking at the relationship between age and type of contract, the findings indicated some interesting trends. 4% of under 18 years’ old had non-employment contracts (figure 3.12). In contrast, the highest percentages of non-employment contracts were found in the 24-28 and 29-33 age groups (10% respectively).

**FIGURE 3.12: AGE AND TYPE OF CLUB CONTRACT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Employment Contract</th>
<th>Civil Law Contract/Self-Employment Contract</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 18</td>
<td>96.30%</td>
<td>3.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 - 23</td>
<td>91.00%</td>
<td>9.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 - 28</td>
<td>89.90%</td>
<td>10.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 - 33</td>
<td>89.90%</td>
<td>10.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 33</td>
<td>90.60%</td>
<td>9.40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 3.1 LOWEST RANKING COUNTRIES FOR POSSESSION OF AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Employment Contract</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>94.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>93.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>78.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>72.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>59.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>55.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>40.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>37.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>35.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>18.20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Further analysis on the relationship between the type of contract and level of education indicates that within the group of respondents that had a civil law or self-employment contract, a large percentage of players had either not finished primary school (figure 3.13). More specifically, 17% of respondents who had not finished primary school had non-employment contracts. The distribution across different levels of educational attainment was more widespread in the case of respondents with employment contracts. At regional level, the majority of respondents that had an employment contract in place in Africa had completed high school qualifications. The figure was similar in the Americas but in Europe a considerable proportion of respondents with employment contracts had completed vocational education programmes.

**FIGURE 3.13: EDUCATION AND TYPE OF CONTRACT**
Contracts

SECONDARY CONTRACTS AND IMAGE RIGHTS

Football is part of the sports entertainment industry and for the elite players (or good players in small markets), the ability to endorse products and services can bring in a significant secondary income. In a number of countries, especially those that attract foreign players, image-rights contracts have become increasingly popular.

This type of contracts has provided scope for football clubs to isolate the payment of players for playing football under their employment agreements, from payments to a secondary company for the use of the player’s image when they are not part of a team group. These image rights payments are not treated as salary but payments to the (player’s) company for services provided, therefore saving income tax and national insurance for both the player and the club, creating a potential loophole for the abusive use of such contracts. The survey sought to find out the percentage of players that have such secondary contracts in place. The findings at global level regarding remuneration on the basis of a second contract indicate that the large majority of respondents (91%) did not receive such remuneration, suggesting that the practice of secondary contracts involving image rights was not widespread. Once again, it is clear that the benefits of being an elite and/or highly marketable player are not shared by the vast majority of players.

However, further analysis at regional and national levels reveals a pattern of possible strategic use of secondary contracts in certain cases. First of all, at regional level, the findings indicate that a considerable proportion of players in Africa received remuneration from second contracts (figure 3.14): 11% of players in Africa had such contracts in place. The respective rate in the case of players in Europe was lower (9%) and that of players in the Americas stood at 8%. Just as in the case of the use of non-employment contracts (see above), the use of secondary contracts in African and European countries could be related to governance deficiencies in the labour market of football players.

FIGURE 3.14 REMUNERATION FROM SECOND CONTRACT PER REGION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Remuneration from Second Contract</th>
<th>No Remuneration for Second Contract</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>92.10%</td>
<td>7.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>91.20%</td>
<td>8.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>89.10%</td>
<td>10.90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a number of countries, especially those that attract foreign players, image-rights contracts have become increasingly popular.
From a regulatory perspective, the seeming reliance on secondary contracts in these countries, as a means to evade existing tax or other duties, points to poor governance, undermining the sport’s ability to safeguard the interests of players, and reducing tax revenues and other income for the state authorities. These deficiencies are set against the agreement regarding the minimum requirements for standard player contracts in the professional football sector in the European Union and the rest of the UEFA territory, which regulates, among others, the use of image rights and stipulates that all matters concerning the employment relationship must be addressed in the employment contract.17

Analysis at national level identified a number of countries significantly above the global average. Surprisingly, the highest percentages were found in Cyprus (50.5%), Gabon (32%), Poland (34%), Zimbabwe (30%), and FYROM (26%). Less surprisingly, 21.5% of players in Brazil had a secondary image rights contract (figure 3.15). A significant number of other countries, including Bulgaria, South Africa, and Costa Rica had lower (albeit still above the average) rates of secondary contracts. The evidence seems to corroborate anecdotal and practical evidence gathered by FIFPro and its national representatives concerning the use of such practices in certain countries in order to circumvent taxes, protective labour legislation, club licensing regulations, and other provisions safeguarding the interests of football players. The high percentages in some countries in which at the same time the image rights value of the players are comparably low may constitute wages in disguise.
The market for professional football players is unique in global employment relations. Similar to other professional sports industries, footballers have a very short playing career, but in no other industry do employers have so much power over the future movement of their employees. The survey shows that while the payment of transfer fees is limited to a minority of players, for those affected fees are often used to restrict the player’s movement. Further, while the focus of much of the world’s media is on the elite players, the vast majority of respondents earned relatively modest salaries and were on short-term contracts providing little employment security.
However, the data in this chapter sets out in stark terms that the elite players are far from the norm when it comes to player salaries. Further, it provides evidence that rather than being able to bully their way to better contracts or clubs, many players have struggled to leave clubs they no longer wish to play for, or join the club they think will best support their career development. The majority of respondents were modestly paid, especially for an uncertain career that even without the risks of injury or loss-of-form remains remarkably short in duration.

Our findings support the analysis in the 2013 KEA/CDES European Commission Report into the Transfer System, that the player labour market is segmented, and that the (vast majority) of players exist in a secondary market which has the characteristics of an oligopsony. In other words there are far more suppliers (players) than there is demand (from the clubs). This has the effect of driving down wages for those operating in the secondary market. Meanwhile in the primary market for "good" and elite players, demand outstrips supply in turn driving up both wages and especially transfer fees. Overall, recent data from FIFA TMS suggests that wages in the top leagues in Europe are in a decline, while acquisition expenses in agent and transfer fees continue to climb steeply.
There is no stability. You have one, two, three-year contracts your whole career so you’re always looking over your shoulder thinking, ‘where am I going next?’

Defender, New Zealand
The Market

SALARIES

Due to anticipated sensitivities about revealing exact salaries, players were asked to identify which salary band they fell into.

The response rate was excellent but the drawback was that the wording of the question meant that we could not calculate a global or national mean which we could be compared with similar data from ILO and OECD data on average monthly wages.

Figure 4.1 shows the percentage of players globally receiving different monthly remuneration. Salaries of over $15,000 a month were rare, with only 8.2% of respondents being paid this amount or more. 20% of respondents received a wage of less than $300 a month and roughly 60% of the respondents received less than $2,000 a month.

The picture painted here is far less healthy than the $47,000 average monthly wage for 26-29 year olds identified in the 2015 FIFA Global Transfer Market Report. Our survey suggested that less than 4.5% of professional footballers received this salary or higher (although we did not survey specifically for the 26-29 year old age bracket where wages are at their highest). When we come to look at the findings set out in below (chapter 4.5.1), it is clear that players for whom a transfer fee is paid are on

FIGURE. 4.1 PERCENTAGE OF PLAYERS RECEIVING MONTHLY SALARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Salary Band</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0 - $1,000</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,001 - $4,000</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4,001 - $8,000</td>
<td>11.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ $8,001</td>
<td>14.20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Clubs are only willing to pay a transfer fee for the good and elite-level players who will also command the higher wages.

Broadly the payment of the lower wages fitted in with the data from organisations like the ILO, OECD and European Union identifying average wages in across all industries. Countries whose workers were paid the best generally tended to see their footballers also receive comparably higher wages. This meant that footballers in relatively small football markets but high-performing economies were typically well rewarded (e.g. Switzerland and the USA). Conversely, footballers in West Africa in particular were more likely to receive comparatively low wages; 100% of respondents from Ghana received less than $1,000 per month. However the prevalence of lower pay bands for footballers was not limited to economically-developing nations, particularly where the football market was dependent on part-time players.

In the biggest football markets that returned, Italy and France, the percentage of players earning under $1,000 was very low (2.3% and 2.7% respectively), although the survey was careful to include data from all professional

However the prevalence of lower pay bands for footballers was not limited to economically-developing nations, particularly where the football market was dependent on part-time players.

One other notable figure was that in the football powerhouse of Brazil, 83.3% of professional footballers were earning under $1,000.

There is an important caveat to these figures. We did not receive data from two of the ‘big five’ European leagues (England/Wales and Germany) and a third (Spain) provided too little data to be included in the analysis. This will invariably have the effect of bringing the salary level slightly down, but given the vast number of less developed nations that also did not provide data, this effect should not be over-emphasised. We also needed to be mindful of the breakdown responses by different leagues when commenting on the headline figure. For example the reported wage for players in Turkey was very low, but this can be explained by the lack of First and Second League responses.

One other notable figure was that in the football powerhouse of Brazil, 83.3% of professional footballers were earning under $1,000.

average paid higher than those moving on a free transfer. This is intuitive and supports the 2013 KEA/CDES European Commission Report into the Transfer Market; clubs are only willing to pay a transfer fee for the good and elite-level players who will also command the higher wages. Operating at the lower end of the player market are a larger number of players for whom a transfer fee may never be paid and whose average monthly wage even at the peak of the wage-earning power in their mid-late 20s will be many times lower than was reported in the FIFA Report.
FIGURE 4.3 PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS EARNING UNDER $1,000 A MONTH BY COUNTRY
There is a more general problem here, in that the football industry continues to rely almost exclusively upon fixed-term contracts. While many states, and the European Union, are looking to outlaw fixed-term contracts in all but the most unusual circumstances, footballers even early in their career will never enjoy a “permanent” contract (which would still leave the club the opportunity to dismiss a player who became incapable of playing at the required level). Towards the end of their career even the elite players may find themselves on repeated one-year contracts offering little employment security in the event of injury or illness.26

However while the media reports on elite players being given lucrative 5-year deals, this is unusual for the typical football player. Globally, the average footballer can expect a contract of just 22.6 months – less than two years. This is supported by other data suggesting that in 2015 alone, 13,358 professional players made an international transfer from one club to another,25 which does not take into account the tens of thousands of domestic transfers that take place each year. Players in some countries reported an average of considerably lower than this. The average contract length of players in Brazil, Ireland and Israel was lower than 12-months, suggesting a reliance on standard one-year contracts with little job security.

There are a couple of important caveats to these findings. First, there were a number of responses which reported contract lengths of over 6-years. The FIFA maximum contract length is 5-years and while we know in some countries longer contracts are signed, we had concerns that some players were adding together a number of shorter term contracts at the same club and reporting their total employment duration rather than their contract length. We were particularly concerned with the response from players in Congo, given that 89% of their players reported not possessing an employment contract (see 3.2). Once we removed players reporting over 6-year contract lengths, the average global contract dropped further, to 22.1 months.

How a player enters into their contract also has an impact upon the length that this new contract will be. Players who entered into their contract as a free agent reported a lower average contract length of 19.5 months, and those who renewed their contract 19.7 months. In contrast, players who entered into their contract following the payment of a transfer fee had a higher average (25.4 months) and those who signed following promotion from the academy higher still (30.1 months).

What this appears to show is a combination of the effect of the transfer system (clubs trying to secure the players of the highest quality for longer periods, to maximise their value as assets) and the short duration of a player’s career. More analysis of the transfer market is carried out below, but we found that older players were more likely to renew their contract or enter new employment as free agents than younger players. Unsurprisingly, older players were more likely to receive a shorter contract.

We found that older players were more likely to renew their contract or enter new employment as free agents than younger players. Unsurprisingly, older players were more likely to receive a shorter contract.
Working conditions in professional football

**Figure 4.4: Average Contract Length by Country**

*As the questionnaire was administered by hand, respondents were able to pass over questions they did not wish to answer for or have information for. Some questions went unanswered on a national basis and in these instances the data does not appear in the comparative graphs. In Fig 4.4 data from Romania and Russia is excluded.*
Given the short length of time of a player’s career, our data suggests that the average player would sign around four to five contracts in the course of their employment as a professional footballer. From what we have already seen in relation to the relative low pay of most professional players, this is nowhere near sufficient to provide financial security following retirement for the vast majority of players. When coupled with the data demonstrating the relative lack of (non-football) training education of the average professional footballer, this promises a future of severe financial insecurity for many players nearing the end of their playing career.

The problem of the prevalence of short-term contracts is exacerbated by the fact that there is also a strong positive relationship between average contract length and the salary a player is on; the lower the salary, the shorter the contract. Figure 4.6 shows an accelerating increase in the average length of a player’s contract up to the $30,001-$50,000 bracket when it levels out. Players on the lowest wages reported average contract lengths that were around a third shorter than those earning above $30,000 per month. This once again supports the argument of the segmentation of the player market. While a small number of good and elite players are paid very high wages coupled with longer contracts, players on more modest salaries are usually on shorter contracts, providing limited employment security.
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY

The survey also focussed on the level of security players felt within their football career, both in terms of their current employment and longer-term playing career.

The survey asked players “How secure do you currently feel about your employment at your current club and as a professional football player in general?” Respondents were asked to answer on the basis of a scale from 1 (feeling very insecure) to 5 (feeling very secure). The average across all countries in terms of security in employment at the current club stood at 3.58, indicating that overall the football player feels more secure than insecure in their employment. In this respect, significant country variations can be found. Countries where respondents felt very secure included Austria, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Israel, Norway.

The average across all countries in terms of security in employment at the current club stood at 3.58, indicating that overall the football player feels more secure than insecure in their employment.

There was a strong relationship between countries whose players rated their employment security as low and those countries whose players had a higher likelihood of being subject to payment delays.

Paraguay and Switzerland. At the other end of the spectrum, countries where respondents felt very insecure included Morocco, Gabon, Tunisia and Cameroon.

Interestingly, while there were some country-wide differences, the global mean for how secure players felt in football more generally was not notably higher, standing at 3.60.

There was a strong relationship between countries whose players rated their employment security as low and those countries whose players had a higher likelihood of being subject to payment delays. The four countries ranked lowest for employment security were all ranked in the top-5 for risk of payment delays (see chapter 5.2). Interestingly there did not seem to be a notable change in feelings of security as a professional footballer, or at the player’s current club, depending on age.
FIGURE 4.7 HOW SECURE DO YOU FEEL IN YOUR EMPLOYMENT AT YOUR CURRENT CLUB?
The Market

PLAYER MOVEMENT AND TRANSFER ISSUES

Players were asked how they entered into their current contract in order to gain a better understanding of the operation of the market for professional football talent.

We are aware that this situation may be confused when we take into account player loans, but we were solely interested here in the contract with a player’s parent club. The picture shows a large number of players moving as free agents between clubs and low levels of players renewing contracts with clubs. Given the short nature of player contracts seen in 4.3, this means that there is constant migration of players within the football industry, with the vast majority of players moving clubs once every 2 years or less.

Given the short nature of player contracts seen in 4.3, this means that there is constant migration of players within the football industry, with the vast majority of players moving clubs once every 2 years or less.

FIGURE 4.8 HOW DID YOU ENTER INTO YOUR CURRENT CONTRACT?

- 44.50% FREE AGENT
- 25.30% TRANSFERRED FOR A FEE
- 16.40% PROMOTED FROM ACADEMY
- 13.80% RENEWED CONTRACT

Working conditions in professional football
A comparison of regions on the whole demonstrated remarkable similarities in terms of how players entered into their current contract with only Africa showing significant differences. Here, the number of players entering a contract following the payment of a transfer fee was significantly higher (34.6%) than other regions, and the number of contract renewals less than a third of those in Europe or the Americas (a mere 5.5%). The data for Africa suggests a large amount of internal transfers where some kind of release fee is being paid (this is not reflected in the 2016 FIFA TMS Transfer Market data on international transfers). Player Union representatives also indicated that in many African states, “pre-Bosman” transfer systems are still in place, meaning that player registrations remained at their club even after the expiry of the contract. Combined with the short-term nature of the average contract in many African states this is particularly problematic for footballers in this region.

Player Union representatives also indicated that in many African states, “pre-Bosman” transfer systems are still in place, meaning that player registrations remained at their club even after the expiry of the contract.
The Market

PLAYER MOVEMENT AND CAREER DEVELOPMENT

How players moved between clubs changes as they (hopefully) progress through a full career.

While players over-18 were more likely to move as a free agent than any other reason, for those under-18, promotion from the club’s youth academy was the main route into the current contract, accounting for 54% of players in this age range. This was still an important route for players in the 18-23 age range (32% of cases). Club transfers for a fee were most likely for players in the 24-28 age range (29%). Players over-33 were almost twice as likely to remain at a club and sign a new contract than any other age range (30%).

Club transfers for a fee were most likely for players in the 24-28 age range (29%). Players over-33 were almost twice as likely to remain at a club and sign a new contract than any other age range (30%).

How a player enters into their contract also correlates with their wage. Fig 4.11 looks at the relationship between salaries and how the player entered into their contract. As might be expected, those promoted from the youth academy typically received lower wages. In contrast, those renewing contracts were more likely to receive higher wages. However both contract renewers (more likely to be the older players) and academy graduates were both well represented across all wage categories (except the lowest for contract renewers).

FIGURE 4.10 HOW PLAYERS ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT BY AGE GROUP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Under-18</th>
<th>18-23</th>
<th>24-28</th>
<th>29-33</th>
<th>Over 33</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free Agent</td>
<td>25.90%</td>
<td>33.40%</td>
<td>51.30%</td>
<td>55.50%</td>
<td>53.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Academy</td>
<td>54.50%</td>
<td>32.00%</td>
<td>5.60%</td>
<td>2.10%</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transferred for fee</td>
<td>15.00%</td>
<td>24.20%</td>
<td>29.20%</td>
<td>24.10%</td>
<td>16.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewed Contract</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
<td>10.50%</td>
<td>13.90%</td>
<td>18.30%</td>
<td>29.20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

54.5% - OF PLAYERS UNDER 18 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH YOUTH ACADEMY

51.3% - OF PLAYERS BETWEEN 24 AND 28 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH A FREE AGENT

55.5% - OF PLAYERS BETWEEN 29 AND 33 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH A FREE AGENT

53.1% - OF PLAYERS OVER 31 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH A FREE AGENT

OF PLAYERS UNDER 18 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH YOUTH ACADEMY

OF PLAYERS BETWEEN 29 AND 33 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH A FREE AGENT

OF PLAYERS OVER 31 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH A FREE AGENT

OF PLAYERS BETWEEN 24 AND 28 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH A FREE AGENT

OF PLAYERS UNDER 18 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH YOUTH ACADEMY

OF PLAYERS BETWEEN 29 AND 33 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH A FREE AGENT

OF PLAYERS OVER 31 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH A FREE AGENT

OF PLAYERS BETWEEN 24 AND 28 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH A FREE AGENT

OF PLAYERS UNDER 18 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH YOUTH ACADEMY

OF PLAYERS BETWEEN 29 AND 33 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH A FREE AGENT

OF PLAYERS OVER 31 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH A FREE AGENT

OF PLAYERS BETWEEN 24 AND 28 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH A FREE AGENT

OF PLAYERS UNDER 18 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH YOUTH ACADEMY

OF PLAYERS BETWEEN 29 AND 33 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH A FREE AGENT

OF PLAYERS OVER 31 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH A FREE AGENT

OF PLAYERS BETWEEN 24 AND 28 ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT WITH A FREE AGENT
Most interesting for us was the performance in terms of salary of free agents and those who were transferred for a fee. Over 50% of those receiving $600 or under a month were free agents whereas this dropped by half for those receiving above $30,001. The opposite was observed for those transferring for a fee. Here there was a positive relation.

between being transferred for a fee and receiving a higher wage (although there was a slight drop off in the highest wage bands). It is not the case that the payment of transfer fees leads to higher wages (indeed most economic analysis argues the system deflates wages overall), but rather that those players commanding a transfer fee tend to be the most talented: talent for which clubs must pay by offering competitive wages.

Over 50% of those receiving $600 or under a month were free agents whereas this dropped by half for those receiving above $30,001.

### FIGURE 4.11 PERCENTAGE OF PLAYERS RECEIVING MONTHLY WAGE AND HOW THEY ENTERED INTO THEIR CONTRACT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Wage Range</th>
<th>Percentage of Free Agents</th>
<th>Percentage of Transfer Fee Players</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 300 $</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301 - 600 $</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>601 - 1,000 $</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,001 - 2,000 $</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,001 - 4,000 $</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,001 - 8,000 $</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,001 - 15,000 $</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,001 - 30,000 $</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,001 - 80,000 $</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ 80,001 $</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When we focussed only on the younger players, the situation was slightly different but as we expected. For players under-23, those who renewed contracts with the same club performed better in terms of income (only 31% received under $601 a month). Players in this age range who were transferred for a fee also performed reasonably well in terms of income (38% were in the sub-$601 a month bracket). In contrast 47% of those who entered into their contract having been promoted from the academy received less than $601 and when we looked at free agents this rose to 55%. As might be expected, with the exception of those high-flyers who were already onto a second (or third) contract, younger players earned less than their senior colleagues (as we saw in 4.2, 34% of players overall received a monthly wage of under $601). At the other end of the scale, those moving for a fee performed the best in terms of income: 9.1% of under-23 players who moved for a fee earned over $15,001 compared with 6.2% of contract renewers and only 2.4% of promoted players and 2% of free agents.
The Market

CLUB TRANSFER REASONS AND ABUSE

The 25% of players who were transferred for a fee were then asked the reasons for the transfer to their current club.

The vast majority (70.8%) reported that they had requested to join their current club and that a fee had been agreed with their former club. This suggests that for most players, the current transfer system is not directly harming a player’s choice of employer. However we must remember that the operation of the transfer system may well be indirectly operating in a restrictive way, as players are more likely to request moves to clubs they think can meet the likely transfer fee.

For a significant minority of our respondents the transfer system worked against their wishes to move to the employer of their choice. 594 players (29%) reported to us that they had been transferred to their current club because either they had been pressured into it by their previous club or by a third party (often their agent), or following a request to move to a different club. The data shows that the abuse of the transfer system against a sizable minority of football players is continuing despite the changes to the international transfer system brought in by FIFA in 2001 and 2005 to allay European Commission concerns to this effect.

FIFPro is currently challenging the legality under EU Competition Law of the payment of transfer fees. It is important to note that this survey does not provide data either supporting or challenging the economic hypothesis of the negative effects of the system upon player wages overall, or on competition amongst clubs for employing sporting talent. A far more sophisticated but narrower survey comparing similar players moving in different ways would have been required to achieve this.

However the Global Survey does provide some food for thought for those who believe the system is both necessary and fair. First, the data shows that only a quarter of new contracts were the result of the payment of a fee, indicating that the use of fees to compensate clubs for investment in

FIG. 4.12 CLUB TRANSFER REASONS AND ABUSE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requested to join current club</td>
<td>70.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requested to join different club</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous club Pressured me to transfer</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent/3rd party Pressured me to transfer</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
training young players is - at best - inconsistent. This supports the conclusions of the 2013 KEA/CDES Report into the workings of the transfer system which found that the system is not working to redistribute wealth back down to those clubs developing young players. The payment of transfer fees largely at the top end of the market will also restrict the ability of the system to redistribute wealth back down the football "pyramid". Secondly, our analysis shows that where players are transferred for a fee, the system is placing unfair restrictions upon players, restricting free movement which is supposedly guaranteed under the Art.45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (and many domestic labour laws). As we will see in chapter 5, the system can also lead to abuse of players in the form of being forced to train alone by clubs wishing to pressurise them into a transfer.

A closer analysis of the responses revealed some startling geographical differences. When we analysed the responses of those players who had been transferred for a fee, there were a number of countries where the system was clearly restricting the right of a player to move to the club of their choice. Over 40% of players moving for a fee in Ecuador, Kazakhstan, Slovenia, and Switzerland reported they had been forced into it or had moved to a club not of their choice. In Serbia, 96% of players who were transferred for a fee reported that they did not move to the club of their choice, with an astonishing 82% saying they had been pressurised into the move by an agent or 3rd party.30

Players based in the European Union did not receive any more protection. In fact of the 13 nations where over 40% of players transferred for a fee did not move to the club of their choice, nine were EU member states (or territories within the EU). These were: Croatia (44%), Czech Republic (75%), Denmark (43%), Malta (47%), Romania (44%), Scotland (67%), Slovenia (45%), and Sweden (60%).

The Market

REASONS FOR CONTRACT RENEWAL

The same problems of pressure were not seen as frequently where players renewed contracts with their current club rather than moving on for a fee. Of those renewing, the overwhelming majority (94%) reported this to have been a mutual agreement with no pressure to renew coming from either club or agent. This slightly surprising figure is supported by our data on training alone and other forms of abuse set out below (chapter 5.3).

However players in Africa were more likely to be pressurised into renewing a contract; 8.6% of African players reported being pressurised by their club or a third party into renewing a contract. 16.7% of players renewing contracts in Botswana, and 21.1% in the Congo, reported being pressurised into doing this. These players are also earning considerably less than their counterparts elsewhere in the world; 83% and 90% respectively of players in these countries are earning a monthly wage of less than $1,000. While pressure to renew contracts was much less of a problem across Europe, there were notable hotspots in Romania (15.4%) and Cyprus (12.5%) although players were much better remunerated. As can be seen from chapter 5.2, being pressurised into contract renewal may drastically increase the risk that a player will suffer delays in the payment of his wages.
ABUSE

The survey uncovered that a significant proportion of players were the victims of contractual and personal abuse during the course of their employment. 41% of players reported delays in the payment of their wages, in extreme cases lasting for more than 12-months. A smaller number reported being forced to train alone, often in order to pressurise them into cancelling their contract. There was also evidence of psychological and physical abuse of players, including discrimination, harassment, threats, and physical violence, from a number of sources. Here it was clear that non-nationals and younger players were more likely to be the victims of either contractual or personal abuse.
**Abuse**

**OVERVIEW**

Throughout their career, footballers are likely to be exposed to challenging working conditions. They may experience abuse in respect of their contracts and also in respect of how they are treated physically and psychologically.

In the context of contract abuse, previous research\(^2\) has suggested that non-payment of footballers’ salaries may be a significant factor in increasing the risk of match-fixing approaches. Our findings confirm that a large percentage of players were exposed to payment delays. In light of the fact that players affected by delays were mostly lower paid, the analysis serves to illustrate the significant scope of contractual abuse in the sector. Additionally, verbal and physical abuse continues to be reported by football players. Most notably, our survey demonstrated that racial and nationality discrimination is a major problem. 16.1% of foreign players reported experiencing some form of discrimination, and foreign players were also twice as likely to be forced to train alone.
"Why should I be excluded from the first team? My wife is a nurse. When they don’t want her anymore, they don’t put her on a floor without any patients."

Forward, Switzerland
Abuse

THE ABUSE OF CONTRACTS: DELAYS IN PAYMENT

Recent developments in the football, including increased transfer spending and the global financial crisis, have increasingly exposed players to the risk of unpaid wages.

Signing players in hope of success but beyond the financial means of a club together with financial disparity and uncompetitive championships may explain the phenomenon of payment delays. As discussed elsewhere in the report (chapter 4.2), not all professional players are especially highly paid and this means that any delay in payment of wages can have a significant impact on their personal life. As we will see below (chapter 7.2.4), payment delays may also increase the likelihood of corrupt practices such as match-fixing. Respondents were asked whether they had experienced any delays in payment over the last two seasons and, if so, where this delay occurred (i.e. at their current club, at a former club in the same country, or at a former club in a different country).

Alarmingly, 41% of players had experienced delays in wage payments (figure 5.1). While in some cases these problems may be related to the difficult economic environment following the recent (and still ongoing in some countries) financial crisis, in others it could point to issues related to poor management of clubs, and problems in the regulatory governance of the sport.

In light of this evidence, it seems that country specificities are more important than regional ones.

FIGURE 5.1: PUNCTUALITY OF PAYMENT OVER THE LAST TWO SEASONS

A breakdown of the findings in terms of the duration of payment delays suggests that the most common period of payment delays was between one and three months (19% of respondents). The second highest percentage was in respect of payment delays of up to a month (14%). Lower percentages were reported in the cases of 3-6 months, 6-12 and over 12 months payment delays (figure 5.1).
At regional level, the findings suggest that the highest rate of payment delays was concentrated in Africa. Indeed, the majority of respondents (55%) in Africa had experienced payment delays. In the Americas and Europe, the rate of payment delays stood at 40% and 35% respectively. Although UEFA-zone countries performed better, the fact that over a third of players here had experienced recent payment delays suggests that the licensing systems of many national competitions, and UEFA’s own system, have had only a modest success in ensuring clubs are able to honour their contractual obligations to their players across the continent.
A more detailed breakdown per country indicates high percentages of payment delays across a number of countries (Figure 5.2). In Gabon, almost all respondents (96%) reported payment delays. Bolivia was the second worst case (95%), followed by Tunisia (94%) and Cameroon (85%). In Europe, the countries with the highest percentage of payment delays were Malta (79%), Turkey (75%) and Romania (74%). At the other end, respondents in some European countries (France, Norway and Scotland) but also the USA and Paraguay reported very low percentages of payment delays.

In light of this evidence, it seems that country specificities are more important than regional ones. Factors influencing this could include the extent to which employment relationships are regulated by collective agreements or statutory law and the scope for actually enforcing collectively-bargained standards or statutory labour standards. This was somewhat confirmed in respect of the countries in Europe. Romania, Malta, Slovenia and Cyprus, which reported the highest rates of payment delays in Europe, were also characterised by an absence of collectively agreed standards and lack of compliance with the National Dispute Resolution Chamber Standard Regulations.

An analysis of the relationship between payment delays and citizenship reveals only minor differences between nationals and non-nationals: 40% of players in clubs in their country of origin had experienced delays in comparison to 38% in the case of non-nationals. This relationship held true in respect also of payment delays of more than 6 months: 25% of non-nationals had experienced such payment delays in comparison to 27% of nationals. No significant differences were found at regional level, with the biggest difference found in the Americas, where a greater percentage of nationals (42%) experienced delays than non-nationals (32%). However, evidence of variation was found at country level. In some countries, e.g. Brazil, Cameroon, Congo, Costa Rica and Israel, it was predominantly nationals who had experienced payment delays. In contrast, in a number of European countries (e.g. Cyprus, Greece, Switzerland, Slovenia, Norway, Malta, France, Finland and Denmark), the distribution of payment delays was more even between nationals and non-nationals. This was most evident in the case of Cyprus, where 49% of players experiencing delays were non-nationals.

The survey findings also reveal an interesting pattern in respect of the relationship between payment delays and education levels. The relationship between higher education qualification and payment on time was positive; further, a lower percentage of players with such qualifications experienced payment delays of less than 6-months than respondents with lower educational qualifications. Interestingly, no significant difference between players with different levels of educational attainment was reported in respect of payment delays lasting longer than 6-months, suggesting that the advantage of higher educational attainment becomes neutralised once the extent of payment delays becomes extreme (Figure 5.3).
As discussed in chapter 3, the absence of a written club contract may be an indicator of labour market informality and as such be accompanied by an increased risk of abuse. Supporting the hypothesis that football players without written contracts may be more susceptible to adverse treatment, the findings suggest that there was a positive relationship between respondents without a written contract and payment delays (figure 5.4).

The findings suggest that there was a positive relationship between respondents without a written contract and payment delays.

**FIGURE 5.4 PAYMENT DELAYS AND AVAILABILITY OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT**

In a similar manner, there is a positive relationship in respect of payment delays and lack of a contract copy (figure 5.5). 54% of respondents with a written contract but without possessing an actual copy, either personally or through their agent, had experienced payment delays. The rate of those experiencing payment delays where the agent had a copy of their contract was much lower and stood at 33% and the rate for those that had personally a copy was 38%.

Evidence at a global level seems to suggest that the renewal of a club contract resulted in the least delays in payment under the new contract.
When examining the relationship between payment delays and means of entering into contract, the analysis of the survey findings points to some very interesting patterns. Evidence at a global level seems to suggest that the renewal of a club contract resulted in the least delays in payment under the new contract. A positive relationship was also found in respect of players who had been promoted from youth academies. However, the relationship was not so strong in the case of respondents contracting as free agents, suggesting that they were at a greater risk of contractual abuse in the form of payment delays.

The findings therefore indicate an additional negative impact of the transfer system; many players were being forced to move to a club which was then unable to pay their wages.
Further analysis shows differences in payment delays depending on whether the players were pressured into transferring or into renewing their existing club contracts (figure 5.6). In the case of players who were transferred, the proportion of respondents who experienced payment delays and who had been pressured into transferring from their previous club was much higher when compared to those that requested the transfer. The findings therefore indicate an additional negative impact of the transfer system; many players were being forced to move to a club which was then unable to pay their wages.

Similar findings were reported in respect of players who had been pressured into contract renewal by their club or their agent. Less than a third of players who mutually agreed to renew a contract suffered payment delays. But payment delays nearly doubled in comparison for players pressurised by the club to sign a new deal (figure 5.7).

FIGURE. 5.7 PAYMENT DELAYS AND CONTRACT RENEWAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MUTUALLY RENEWED WITH CLUB</th>
<th>30.00</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRESSURED INTO RENEWED BY CLUB</td>
<td>62.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESSURED INTO RENEWED BY AGENTS</td>
<td>54.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% RESPONDENTS WHO EXPERIENCED DELAY

It is not only the way players have entered into their club contracts but also the type of contract they have that may be relevant in the case of payment delays. The survey findings suggest that within the group of players that had civil law contracts or were self-employed, the proportion of respondents who experienced payment delays (57%) was much higher when compared to respondents with employment contracts (38%) (figure 5.8). The findings confirm the risks associated with non-employment contracts. Importantly, the greatest difference between respondents with employment contracts and those without was found in respect of over 6-months’ payment delays: 41% of those with civil-law/self-employment contracts had experienced such delays in contrast to 26% of respondents with employment contracts, suggesting that the scope of contractual abuse is indeed substantial in the case of players without employment contracts.

The survey findings suggest that within the group of players that had civil law contracts or were self-employed, the proportion of respondents who experienced payment delays (57%) was much higher [...]

FIG. 5.8 PAYMENT DELAYS AND TYPE OF CLUB CONTRACT

| EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT | 38.00 |
| CIVIL LAW / SELF-EMPLOYMENT | 57.40 |

5 OF RESPONDENTS WHO EXPERIENCED A DELAY
However, probing further into the relationship between payment delays and type of contract, our findings suggest that the correlation between non-employment contracts and payment delays does not indicate clear patterns. On the one hand, payment delays were particularly pronounced in some countries characterised by a prevalence of non-employment contracts. This included, for instance, Congo, where 50% of players in non-employment contracts experienced payment delays in comparison to 12.5% of players on employment contracts. Similar issues were identified in Croatia, where 55% of players on non-employment contracts had been subjected to payment delays vis-à-vis 25% of players on employment contracts. In Ukraine, the percentages stood at 50% and 36% respectively. This was not the case though in Turkey and Romania, where the rates of payment delays were similar across the two groups of players.

**FIGURE 5.9 PAYMENT DELAYS IN COUNTRIES WITH HIGH PREVALENCE OF NON-EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Employment Contract</th>
<th>Civil Law/Self-Employment Contract</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>87.50%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>75.00%</td>
<td>45.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>15.40%</td>
<td>19.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>63.80%</td>
<td>49.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>69.00%</td>
<td>62.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>24.70%</td>
<td>26.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
<td>4.40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As noted above, our data suggests that payment delays were more often experienced by players at the lower end of wage levels: the difference was more pronounced in respect of delays below 6-months (figure 5.10).

**FIGURE 5.10 PAYMENT DELAYS AND LEVEL OF PAYMENT**

**PAID ON TIME**

- **LESS THAN $1000**: 64,50%
- **$1000 - $1800**: 54,50%
- **MORE THAN $8000**: 61,70%

**1-6 MONTHS DELAY**

- **LESS THAN $1000**: 42,60%
- **$1000 - $1800**: 36,10%
- **MORE THAN $8000**: 34,20%

**MORE THAN 6 MONTHS DELAY**

- **LESS THAN $1000**: 2,90%
- **$1000 - $1800**: 2,30%
- **MORE THAN $8000**: 1,80%
Further analysis on at regional levels reveals some interesting dynamics. In Africa, there was evidence of an increase in payment delays from low to high wages. In contrary, payment delays were more prevalent in low-wage groups in both the Americas and Europe (figure 5.11). Among others, 53% of respondents earning $1,001-$8,000 per month in Croatia had experienced payment delays in comparison to 31% of respondents earning more than $8,001 per month. The opposite was true in Kenya, where 62% of respondents earning over $8,001 per month had experienced payment delays in comparison to 44% of respondents earning less than $1,000 per month.

**FIGURE. 5.11 PAYMENT DELAYS AND WAGE LEVELS PER REGION**

- **EUROPE**
  - Less than $1000: 39.70%
  - $1000 - $1800: 35.50%
  - More than $8000: 25.90%

- **AFRICA**
  - Less than $1000: 53.10%
  - $1000 - $1800: 54.10%
  - More than $8000: 55.40%

- **AMERICAS**
  - Less than $1000: 43.90%
  - $1000 - $1800: 41%
  - More than $8000: 31.30%

- **GLOBAL**
  - Less than $1000: 45.50%
  - $1000 - $1800: 39.20%
  - More than $8000: 29.50%
Finally, in cases where respondents had experienced payment delays, they were also asked to report where the delay had taken place, i.e. at their current club, at a different club in the same country or at a former club in a different country. Survey evidence suggests that in the majority of cases (63%), payment delays took place at the club where the respondents were at that time playing, followed by 29.5% of cases where the delays had taken place in a different club but in the same country (figure 5.12). Only 7.5% of payment delays were reported in respect of delays in different clubs in different countries.

**FIGURE 5.12 PLACE OF PAYMENT DELAYS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Club</th>
<th>62.7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Different Club Same Country</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Club Different Country</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Importantly, there was hardly any difference in respect of players leaving their club when experiencing a payment delay of less than 3 months versus a delay of more than 3-months. This finding is particularly interesting if considered in the light of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber case law36, and the Commentary on the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players37, which generally assumes that a delay of 3-months constitutes a just cause for termination of the contract by the players. The RSTP commentary points out that: ‘The fact that the player has not received his salary for such a long period of time entitles him to terminate the contract, particularly because persistent noncompliance with the financial terms of the contract could severely endanger the position and existence of the player concerned.’

The survey did not ask the respondents to identify the reasons for staying in the club despite experiencing payment delays. However, it is possible to hypothesize that one explanation for this could include concerns about the low likelihood and/or duration for receiving the wage arrears due to low trust in the procedures of arbitration courts (NDRC, DRC and CAS) or the ordinary courts. A complementary or alternative explanation could be that players in such circumstances would feel insecure finding new employment at a different club; in many national environments employment opportunities are very limited in number. In the secondary market described in chapter 4.1, players are competing with many others for a limited number of positions, making finding a new club difficult. Moreover, in countries with very high prevalence of delayed payment across various clubs, this in itself may be a discouragement for players as hopes to find a more secure employment environment are limited. Either way it is further evidence that players are choosing not to terminate their contracts with clubs and move as free agents even when they have the legal means to do so. It highlights once again that the post-2001 FIFA Transfer Regulations on unilateral contract termination may provide insufficient protections to ensure the respect of contracts by club, while continuing to deter players from resigning for ‘just cause’.

Either way it is further evidence that players are choosing not to terminate their contracts with clubs and move as free agents even when they have the legal means to do so.
Abuse
THE ABUSE OF PLAYERS

In this section we turn to the personal abuse of players rather than their contracts. This abuse may take psychological or physical forms.

We will focus on situations where players have been forced to train alone, and instances of discrimination, bullying, threats, and violence. One of the on-going themes in this section is that players who are non-nationals were more likely to be subjected to abuse than those who were nationals. Furthermore it can be assumed that the actual prevalence of the forms of abuse described in this section is higher than the reported results of the survey, as victims of such forms of abuse are often afraid of speaking openly about their experiences due to embarrassment, or fear of ridicule or repercussions.

TRAINING ALONE

The issue of training alone falls under the category of abuse of players for a number of reasons. The inability to practice in a team setting reduces the opportunity for that player to play in first-team matches (they will, for example, not be participating in tactical exercises) which will in turn have a potential longer-term impact on their ability to find high-level future employment and also (for the elite players) reduce opportunities for personal endorsements. Training alone can also have a negative psychological impact on a player who is excluded from the camaraderie of the team setting in what, after all, is a team game.

It will, of course, sometimes be necessary or expedient for a player to train alone rather than with their colleagues; a player recovering from injury may have special requirements or need to spend more time working on regaining fitness levels, and of course goalkeepers will regularly train on technique away from outfield players. However training alone is also used as a sanction to punish or stigmatise players, or to make their working conditions so poor that they feel pressurised to leave a club or acquiesce to a club request (e.g. to sign a new contract, ask for a transfer, or agree to a decrease in salary).

FIGURE 5.13: HAVE YOU OR YOUR TEAMMATES BEEN FORCED TO TRAIN ALONE FOR REASONS OTHER THAN INJURY?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>78.20%</td>
<td>NOT AWARE OF PRACTICE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.60%</td>
<td>NOT PERSONALLY BUT TEAMMATES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.90%</td>
<td>YES (CLUB WANTED TO END CONTRACT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.40%</td>
<td>YES (CLUB WANTED ME TO SIGN NEW CONTRACT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.90%</td>
<td>YES (CLUB WANTED ME TO AGREE TO TRANSFER)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is clear that training alone as a sanction for players is common. Over 22% of respondents were aware of it occurring, although only 6.2% reported having personally been victims. Of those who had personally been affected, the vast majority reported that it was because the club either wanted to end their contract or because they wanted them to transfer to another club.

Non-nationals were particularly at risk of being forced to train alone. Overall in our survey, 15% of all respondents were of a different nationality to the country in which they were playing football. However 32.5% of those reporting they had been forced to train alone were non-nationals, suggesting that being a foreigner doubled your chance of this type of abuse occurring.

Players in Africa were the most likely to be ordered to train alone; 7.6% of players in Africa reported being forced to train alone in order to end their contract which was more than double the percentage of their colleagues in Europe or the Americas. Players employed in the Americas were least affected by the phenomenon, with 87% reporting that they had never been forced to train alone and had never seen this happen to a teammate.

The relationship between being forced to train alone and the monthly salary of the player provided some evidence that clubs were using the tactic of forcing players to train alone to reduce wage bills (although not necessarily for the best-paid players). Figure 5.14 shows that players in the lower wage brackets were less likely to be forced to train alone and that players in the higher (but not the highest) wage brackets were more likely to be forced to train alone because the club either wanted them to transfer or because the club wanted them to terminate their contract.39

The relationship between being forced to train alone and the monthly salary of the player provided some evidence that clubs were using the tactic of forcing players to train alone to reduce wage bills [...]

FIGURE 5.14: A: % OF PLAYERS REPORTING TRAINING ALONE AND MONTHLY SALARY
One cause for this might be clubs that sign contracts speculating on revenue which ultimately does not materialize, and who then use pressure on players to decrease their wage bill.

Given that one symptom of a club struggling to service its wage bill is a failure to pay its players on time, this is potentially supported by a positive relation between those forced to train alone and those who suffer delays in payment. While overall, 59.7% of respondents said they were fully paid on time, this dropped to only 31.1% of those who had personally been forced to train alone. While overall 24.3% of respondents said they had suffered payment delays of 1-6 months, for those who had experienced training alone, this rocketed to 51%.

**FIGURE 5.15 PAYMENT DELAYS AND TRAINING ALONE**
Comparison with FIFPro Asia Survey and Eastern European Black Book

There were significant regional variations, with players in Africa (9.8%) being nearly twice as likely as those in the Americas (5.4%) or Europe (5.2%) to be forced to train alone. These compared favourably to the response of players in Asia responding to the 2014 FIFPro Asia survey. Here it was reported that 14.5% of players had personally been forced to train alone. It is impossible to tell from the two data sets whether the difference is mainly a geographical one or whether the situation is improving with time, although the latter seems less likely as there was only a sporting season between the Asian and Global surveys. The FIFPro Asia survey, however, produced similar results in terms of the reason for being forced to train alone; 48.7% reported it was because the club wanted to terminate the player’s contract.

The numbers of players being forced to train alone according to the Global Survey were also significantly lower than reported in the 2013 Black Book Report into Eastern Europe. The Black Book found that 15.6% of players had been forced to train alone and a country-by-country comparison found that in all but two countries, reports of being forced to train alone had dramatically reduced, usually by more than a half. Whether the increasing awareness of this problem following the Black Book’s publication is a reason for this decline is unknown, but the relatively consistent levels reported in this region make us confident about the veracity of the Global Report findings in this respect. As with both the FIFPro Asian survey and the Global Report, the Black Book reported that the club wishing to end the player’s contract was the main reason for forcing them to train alone.
VIOLENCE, THREATS, BULLYING AND DISCRIMINATION

Personal abuse of players can also be more direct, ranging from harassment and bullying, to discrimination, threats of violence, and even physical violence. This can come from other players (tackles, challenges, and injuries falling within normal ‘playing culture’ were excluded), coaches, club management, and fans (either on a match-day or at other times).

The data pointed to a working environment where bullying and harassment and threats of violence were not uncommon, but did not affect the majority of players. 16% reported being victims of threats of violence and 15% being the victims of bullying and harassment. 7.3% of respondents had been the victims of recognised discrimination (this could include discrimination on the grounds of race/nationality, religion, or sexuality).

The 15% of players who said they had experienced bullying or harassment was a notable increase from the 10.8% reporting the same in the 2014 FIFPro Asia Survey and the 10.2% from the 2013 Eastern European Black Book. For what is commonly seen as a ‘macho’ environment, this figure might seem low. It can be considered however that the thresholds of players of which experiences they considered worthwhile reporting is fairly high in comparison with the general population; football players are, after all, used to a working environment where verbal abuse is very common.

It may be that players are either not willing to admit they have been affected by mere ‘psychological’ violence or do not interpret it in this way. Astonishingly, more players reported having been victims of threats of violence (15.8%) but it was impossible to establish the extent to which players viewed these as separate or overlapping.

For what is commonly seen as a ‘macho’ environment, this figure might seem low. It can be considered however that the thresholds of players of which experiences they considered worthwhile reporting is fairly high in comparison with the general population.

FIG. 5.17 EXPERIENCES OF VIOLENCE, HARASSMENT AND DISCRIMINATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>% of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical Violence</td>
<td>9,50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats of Violence</td>
<td>15,80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bullying / Harassment</td>
<td>15,30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>7,50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% of respondents who have experienced abuse
Physical Violence against Players

9.6% of respondents reported being the victims of physical violence. This is marginally lower than the 11.7% reporting physical violence in the 2013 Eastern European Black Book and marginally higher than the 8% who reported the same in the 2014 FIFPro Asia report. Taken together it looks safe to say that around 10% of players worldwide are the victims of violence. This figure is high when compared with the data from the Fifth Eurofound Working Conditions Survey of 2010 which reported that 1.9% of respondents had experienced violence in the workplace across the EU and a further 5% had experienced threats of physical violence.41

This data would still suggest that footballers are nearly twice as likely to experience deliberate physical violence (outside of the playing culture) than the average worker across other sectors. When we look at the perpetrators of the violence, we can see that 50.9% was reported to be the result of attacks by football fans (whether they were fans of the same club or rival clubs was not specified). A similar breakdown was noted by the 2014 FIFPro Asian Report (58.1%) and the 2013 Eastern European Black Book (55.8%). To put the threat of match-day ‘hooliganism’ against players (34.6% of total violence) into context, the Global Survey indicates that 3.3% of players have been physically attacked by fans on a match-day.

Other sources of violence were players (25%), members of the management/coaching staff (12%), and other third parties (17%).

The Asian Survey identified 20.9% of violence being committed by management/coaching staff and the Black Book 21.6%. However, violence by players was not included in either the Asian or Black Book reports, making comparison impossible and meaning that the percentage for violence by other groups was almost certainly high.

Players were also asked whether they were aware of violence being perpetrated against a team-mate. Surprisingly, the numbers did not increase significantly. 12% of players were aware of violence against teammates. Players were less likely to be aware of violence by players or management/coaching staff on their teammates but interestingly more likely to be aware of violence committed by fans on a non-matchday. It is of course possible that some victims of violence by other players/club officials would also feel intimidated and fearful of admitting this in the survey: although the survey was designed to be anonymous, there is a risk that players influenced each other over certain questions when completing the questionnaire in a group setting (e.g. a changing room).

This data would still suggest that footballers are nearly twice as likely to experience deliberate physical violence (outside of the playing culture) than the average worker across other sectors.

---

**FIG. 5.18: THE PERPETRATORS OF PHYSICAL VIOLENCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Perpetrator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34.40%</td>
<td>Fans Matchday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.10%</td>
<td>Players</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.70%</td>
<td>Fans Non-Matchday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.90%</td>
<td>Management/Coach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.80%</td>
<td>Other 3rd Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Victims of Abuse: Younger Players

The survey questioned players about their experiences throughout their career rather than over a specific number of recent seasons which made it difficult to identify whether younger players were more likely to be the victims. Players under-24 made up 42% of respondents and 42.8% of those who reported violence but notably less for the other categories of abuse (figure 4.19). On the face of it this suggests that younger players were no more likely to be the victims of violence than more senior teammates. However the data here should be cumulative; if a player’s risk of being the victim of violence is constant, then the longer a player’s career, the greater the likelihood of them being a victim. If the risk was constant then we would expect younger players to report fewer incidents of violence than players at the end of their career. We consider it probable, therefore, that younger players are significantly more at risk than older players when it comes to violence. The other possibility, which we consider less likely, is that the football playing environment has changed so that players are more likely to experience abuse now than they were 10-15 years ago. When we break down the data from harassment, threats of violence and discrimination we also see increases in risk for younger players when it comes to many of the sub-categories.

We consider it probable, therefore, that younger players are significantly more at risk than older players when it comes to violence.
The Victims of Abuse: Non-Nationals

The data showed that being a non-national of the league in which the player was employed had a discernible impact on whether a player faced abuse. However, it was not the case that all forms of abuse increased for non-nationals. Non-nationals were far more likely to be the victims of discrimination (17.2%) and slightly more likely to be the victims of physical violence. Surprisingly, they were less likely to be the victims of either harassment/bullying or threats of violence.
Abuse Hotspots

There were a number of countries where players reported levels of abuse which were significantly above the global average. The outliers when it came to physical violence experienced by players were almost exclusively in Africa. For example players in Ghana reported more than ten-times more physical attacks by management/coaching staff than the global average. In South Africa and the Congo, violent attacks by other players were three-times the global average. Africa also featured heavily when it came to physical attacks by fans on a matchday.

**FIGURE 5.21 PHYSICAL VIOLENCE BY FANS ON A MATCHDAY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% of Players Attacked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>15.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>18.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>19.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>23.10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When it came to threats of violence, the geographic distribution of the ‘hotspots’ was more diverse with some developed European nations featuring highly.

**FIGURE 5.22 THREATS OF VIOLENCE BY FANS ON A MATCHDAY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% of Players Threatened</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>15.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>20.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>22.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>22.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>24.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>28.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>32.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>34.60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When it came to threats of violence on a non-matchday, players from Bolivia, Brazil, Congo and Poland reported three times the global average (5.9%) of incidents. But Italy was by far the highest, with almost a quarter of players having been threatened by fans away from the match (24.1%).

Players in the Congo and Scotland were five-times more likely to be threatened by another player than the global average of 4.2%, and players in the Congo and Kazakhstan were five-times more likely to be threatened by management or coaching staff, or third parties, than the global average (2.7%).

**FIGURE 5.23 BULLYING / HARASSMENT BY FANS ON A MATCHDAY**

![Bar chart showing harassment by fans on a matchday](chart.png)

Egypt and Brazil were also more than three-times over the global average when it came to bullying and harassment by fans on a non-matchday, although Ecuador reported this problem as the highest at 22%. Other hotspots for bullying and harassment were Congo (21% by other players, 19% by management/coaching staff) and Georgia (25% for the same categories). Players in Kazakhstan also reported bullying and harassment by management/coaching staff and third parties many times above the global average.

Finally, when it came to reports of discrimination the two hotspots were Ghana and Scotland. Players in Ghana reported significantly elevated levels of discrimination by fans, other players, coaching staff, and third parties. In Scotland, where we speculate that the issue of sectarianism may have played a major role, nearly a quarter of players reported experiencing discrimination by fans on a matchday (23% against the global average of 5%) and 10% on a non-matchday (against a global average of 2%).
Professional football players are exposed to constant risk of injury, and the high pressure in the working environment can have important implications for their health and well-being. In this light, rest and annual leave periods as well as medical support are crucial in ensuring the physical and mental well-being of players. The survey found that a significant proportion of players lacked access to appropriate rest and annual leave periods, highlighting problems regarding the match calendar and enforcement of labour rights. The chapter also considers player satisfaction with medical support and the geographical distribution of this.
OVERVIEW

DIFFERENT FORMS OF REST AND ANNUAL LEAVE ARE RECOGNISED AS BEING IMPORTANT FOR A WORKER’S PHYSICAL AND MENTAL WELL-BEING, AND LEGISLATION AT EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL LEVELS PROVIDES LABOUR ENTITLEMENTS TO DAILY AND WEEKLY REST PERIODS AS WELL AS A RIGHT TO ANNUAL LEAVE. THE SAME PRINCIPLES APPLY TO PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALLERS, PERHAPS TO AN EVEN GREATER EXTENT. BEING A PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALLER BRINGS WITH IT A CONSTANT RISK OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY, AND THE HIGHLY PRESSURED AND SCRUTINISED ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH PLAYERS OPERATE CAN LEAD TO OTHER NEGATIVE IMPACTS UPON THEIR PHYSICAL AND MENTAL WELL-BEING. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE NEED OF PLAYERS TO REST SHOULD BE GIVEN INCREASED ATTENTION AT BOTH POLICY AND PRACTICE LEVELS.

IF STRUCTURED PROPERLY, ADEQUATE REST AND RECUPERATION PERIODS CAN HAVE A POSITIVE IMPACT ON OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY FOR PLAYERS AS WELL AS IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR CLUB. RECENT RESEARCH FOUND THAT A RECUPERATION PERIOD OF TWO-DAYS BETWEEN MATCHES IS INSUFFICIENT AND THAT THE CHANCE OF A POSITIVE RESULT IN THE SECOND MATCH IS CONSIDERABLY REDUCED. A REST PERIOD OF THREE-DAYS, HOWEVER, DID NOT GIVE RISE TO ANY NOTICEABLE CHANGE IN THE TEAM’S CHANCES DURING THE SECOND MATCH.

As the legal and institutional framework in most countries, including in Africa, provides for weekly rest periods of at least one-day, the differences in the actual provision of weekly rest periods to football players possibly reflects the limited scope for enforcing these rights. Problems of enforcement may be compounded in cases where there is absence of trade union representation and/or where resources for the effective operation of enforcement authorities, such as Labour Inspectorates, have been reduced, the latter being particularly prominent in a number of countries following the recent economic crisis. We should also bear in mind that the survey was of FIFPro-affiliated players: players not represented by a union may be suffering even worse enforcement of their labour rights. Further analysis at national level confirms that the great majority of countries where respondents reported the lack of a full day without club obligations were in Africa. Countries were players did not have at least one full-day without club obligations included Congo (57%), Cameroon (48%), Gabon (45%) and Botswana (44%) (figure 6.2). However, a considerable percentage of players in Brazil (48%), Bolivia (33%) and Croatia (24.5%) were also deprived of at least one-day of weekly rest without club obligations. Besides reflecting problems of effective enforcement of labour entitlements, the higher rates of respondents with no access to weekly rest periods in certain, especially African, countries may also reflect the prevalence of labour market informality (see the findings in chapter 3 concerning the existence of a written contract of employment). At the other end, players in a number of European countries were less likely to report such problems (e.g. Scotland, FYROM, Georgia and Greece). In the same category, we found Tunisia (0.5%) and the USA (2%).

Aside from the fact that the availability of weekly rest periods may reflect regional and country specificities, it may also be dependent on the league where the footballers play. The analysis of the survey findings suggests that the proportion of players in higher leagues who were deprived of weekly rest periods was higher than those in lower leagues. 86% of players in first leagues received one full day without obligations to the club (figure 6.3). This can be contrasted with 90% and 93% of respondents in the second and third leagues respectively. The findings are a case for concern, as players in higher leagues may not recover completely and as such face higher risks in terms of both performance and player injury rates.

The risk of injuries in conjunction with the lack of appropriate medical support may have even further long-term implications for the players themselves, as these injuries may result in psychosocial and mental disorders, such as distress, depression, and anxiety.
If you are injured, then you are out. Nobody will ask how you are, nobody will call you. You only come back to the club when you are healthy.

Midfielder, Ghana
Health and Well-being

WEEKLY REST PERIOD

A one-day weekly rest is the minimum standard in the EU and in national legislation in many countries. At international level, the ILO Weekly Rest Convention of 1921 (No. 14) also provides for a consecutive 24-hour weekly rest period.

In order to assess the state of well-being of footballers, respondents were asked whether they received weekly rest periods of at least one day without club obligations. A significant percentage of respondents (12.5%) reported that they did not receive one full-day per week without obligations to club.

A regional breakdown suggests considerable differences in respect of the provision of weekly rest periods (figure 6.1). The lowest percentage of players with one full day without obligations to their club was in Africa: almost a third of respondents (29%) lacked access to weekly rest periods. This was followed by respondents in the Americas, where the percentage of players with no weekly rest period stood at 12%. In Europe, however, the rate was much lower at 6%.

As the legal and institutional framework in most countries, including in Africa, provides for weekly rest periods of at least one day, the differences in the actual provision of weekly rest periods to football players possibly reflects the limited scope for enforcing these rights.

**FIGURE 6.1 AVAILABILITY OF WEEKLY REST PERIODS PER REGION**

- **AMERICAS**
  - Yes: 87.60%
  - No: 12.40%

- **AFRICA**
  - Yes: 70.90%
  - No: 29.10%

- **EUROPE**
  - Yes: 93.80%
  - No: 6.20%
FIGURE 6.2: LACK OF AVAILABILITY OF WEEKLY REST PERIODS PER COUNTRY

5 WORSE COUNTRIES
- CONGO 57.4%
- CAMEROON 48.3%
- BRAZIL 47.5%
- GABON 44.5%
- BOTSWANA 44.3%

5 BEST COUNTRIES
- GEORGIA 0.9%
- RUSSIA 0.8%
- TUNISIA 0.5%
- FYROM 0%
- SCOTLAND 0%
As the legal and institutional framework in most countries, including in Africa, provides for weekly rest periods of at least one-day, the differences in the actual provision of weekly rest periods to football players possibly reflects the limited scope for enforcing these rights. Problems of enforcement may be compounded in cases where there is absence of trade union representation and/or where resources for the effective operation of enforcement authorities, such as Labour Inspectorates, have been reduced, the latter being particularly prominent in a number of countries following the recent economic crisis. We should also bear in mind that the survey was of FIFPro-affiliated players: players not represented by a union may be suffering even worse enforcement of their labour rights.

Further analysis at national level confirms that the great majority of countries where respondents reported the lack of a full day without club obligations were in Africa. Countries where players did not have at least one full-day without club obligations included Congo (57%), Cameroon (48%), Gabon (45%) and Botswana (44%) (figure 6.2). However, a considerable percentage of players in Brazil (48%), Bolivia (33%) and Croatia (24,5%) were also deprived of at least one-day of weekly rest without club obligations. Besides reflecting problems of effective enforcement of labour entitlements, the higher rates of respondents with no access to weekly rest periods in certain, especially African, countries may also reflect the prevalence of labour market informality (see the findings in chapter 3 concerning the existence of a written contract of employment). At the other end, players in a number of European countries were less likely to report such problems (e.g. Scotland, FYROM, Georgia and Greece). In the same category, we found Tunisia (0.5%) and the USA (2%).

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We should also bear in mind that the survey was of FIFPro-affiliated players: players not represented by a union may be suffering even worse enforcement of their labour rights.

The analysis of the survey findings suggests that the proportion of players in higher leagues who were deprived of weekly rest periods was higher than those in lower leagues.
Health and Well-being

ANNUAL LEAVE

A second recognised fundamental requirement in contemporary labour law is the right to paid annual leave.

The ILO Holidays with Pay Convention\textsuperscript{46} entitles workers to take three weeks’ paid leave each year. Legislation in many countries provides for a longer period of paid annual leave than this and the 1993 EU Directive on Working Time provides for four weeks of paid leave per year as a minimum European-wide standard. In the EU and Norway, workers are on average entitled to 25.3 days of paid leave per year, of which 21.9 days are guaranteed by law. In the rest of the world, there is significant divergence, with workers, for instance, in Chile being entitled to only 12 days of paid annual leave.\textsuperscript{47} The regulations on paid annual leave laid down in collective agreements in countries with a tradition of collective bargaining are more beneficial than statutory entitlements (e.g. in Portugal and Finland).

Given the recognised importance of annual leave for promoting well-being and also for assisting the recovery of football players following the end of the season, the survey asked respondents how many days of paid annual leave they were given during the last year.\textsuperscript{48} A regional breakdown confirms that the proportion of respondents in Europe who had access to longer periods of annual leave was significantly higher than that in other regions (figure 6.4). 27% of respondents in Europe reported that they received between 26 and 30 days of annual leave. In contrast, half of respondents in Americas and 48% of respondents in Africa received between 0-9 days of annual leave. While the findings are consistent with the differences in the annual leave entitlements provided by the legislation in different countries, they may also point in some cases to the problematic enforcement of the leave provisions.

A regional breakdown confirms that the proportion of respondents in Europe who had access to longer periods of annual leave was significantly higher than that in other regions.

FIG. 6.4 ANNUAL LEAVE PER REGION
![Working conditions in professional football](image-url)

**Figure 6.5 Percentage of players meeting the national minimum requirement for annual leave**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>93.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>86.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>84.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>76.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>68.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>65.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>54.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>50.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European continent average</td>
<td>44.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>41.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU members states average</td>
<td>37.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas continent average</td>
<td>29.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African continent average</td>
<td>27.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 Best Countries

1. USA 100%
2. Russia 100%
3. Tunisia 93.8%
4. Israel 86.9%
5. Norway 84.6%

5 Worst Countries

1. Bolivia 3.2%
2. Egypt 2.4%
3. Brazil 1%
4. Ghana 0.8%
5. Georgia 0%
A country breakdown of the results suggests significant variations. Figure 6.5 is based on a tabulation of the percentage of players, which meet the national (legal) minimum requirements for annual leave. Annual leave ranging between 26 and 30 days was provided in some European countries, including Austria and Finland. However, there was also evidence to suggest that compliance with the four-week annual leave rule set out by the 1993 EU Working Time Directive was not ensured in a number of EU Member States.

This included Bulgaria, where most respondents received between 10 and 15-days of annual leave but also Ireland where 85% of respondents reported that they received between 0 and 9 days of annual leave. It may be that the result in Ireland reflects the part-time nature of football in the country; in turn, part-time professionals are likely to be part-timers because their markets fail to provide sufficient financial support for full-time employment. In some EU countries (e.g. Czech Republic, France and Italy), the two most popular options were annual leave provisions of 21-25 and 26-30 days. Only in a small number of countries were players provided with leave of more than 30-days per year: Denmark and Malta were examples of this but also the Ivory Coast, Namibia, Russia and Slovenia. Interestingly, no significant differences were found between UEFA and EU countries.

On the other hand, players in countries in America such as Bolivia, Costa Rica and also Brazil were more likely to receive between 0 and 9 days of paid leave. Similar trends were observed in a number of countries in Africa. Once again, players in Cameroon reported particularly poor working conditions, with 64% of respondents there receiving between 0 and 9 days of annual leave. In Egypt the respective rate was even higher and stood at 93%. The overall message of the analysis is that national laws seem to be different and to be poorly applied. National football associations should pay particular attention to these findings, as the latter seem to suggest that despite recent improvements in the international match calendar, players can still be exposed to disadvantages, especially in Africa. The overall findings suggest that on all levels of professional football, harmonized standards of rest and recreation periods should help significantly to ensure the health and wellbeing of players. In this context, legal/institutional support for collective bargaining in the sector would contribute to ensuring better application of leave provisions.

The overall findings suggest that on all levels of professional football, harmonized standards of rest and recreation periods should help significantly to ensure the health and wellbeing of players. In this context, legal/institutional support for collective bargaining in the sector would contribute to ensuring better application of leave provisions.
A final issue to consider here concerns the extent to which the provision of annual leave is contingent on the way the player entered into a club contract. The findings suggests that the proportion of players who had entered into their contracts as free agents had benefited from fewer days of annual leave than the rest of the players’ groups (figure 6.6). This is consistent with the fact that it is generally players with poor employment opportunities that become free agents, increasing thus the risk of worse employment standards. The relative poor bargaining position of the average free agent can also be seen elsewhere in this report in terms of monthly salary (chapter 4.2).

Aside from the evidence of the weaker position of free agents, the findings also indicate that a greater proportion of players promoted from youth academies lacked access to higher levels of paid annual leave, albeit not at the levels of free agents. This confirms the anecdotal evidence that young players often ‘run’ harder than older players. The distribution of leave periods was more even in respect of respondents who had been transferred from a previous club for a fee or had their contracts renewed.

---

**FIGURE 6.6: ANNUAL PAID LEAVE AND MEANS OF ENTERING INTO A CONTRACT**

![Bar chart showing annual paid leave and means of entering into a contract](chart-image-url)

- **FREE AGENT**
- **YOUTH ACADEMY**
- **TRANSFERRED FROM CLUB**
- **RENEWED CONTRACT**

---

The findings suggests that the proportion of players who had entered into their contracts as free agents had benefited from fewer days of annual leave than the rest of the players’ groups.
Empirical evidence has confirmed that appropriate medical testing and the mandatory employment of medical physicians and physiotherapists at a club can lead to improved medical care and support of professional players and can empower the potential prevention of time-loss injuries. In this light, respondents were asked to rate how satisfied they were with the medical support (i.e. professionals and facilities) provided by their club (from 1 not satisfied to 5 very satisfied). The findings suggest that football players were generally quite satisfied with the provision of medical support (figure 6.7). 74% rated their medical support from "moderately satisfied" to "very satisfied". However, a sizable minority (26%) of players were unsatisfied, of which 12% stated they were not satisfied at all.

The findings show that the majority of clubs are providing support which players deem to be appropriate to their needs but that at around a quarter of clubs much better attention needs to be paid to providing adequate preventive and supportive measures to protect and empower the health and well-being of players. The provision of such support is crucial not only for the well-being and performance of players during their career, but also for their life post-football. Physically, there is a proven link between repeated short-term injury treatments (e.g. the once-prevalent knee cortisone injections) and long term disability. Psychologically, research on mental disorder in retired male professional footballers found a high prevalence of symptoms related to mental disorders among retired professional footballers. Importantly, the study established a relationship between symptoms of mental disorders and severe injuries, recent life events, and career dissatisfaction.

The findings show that the majority of clubs are providing support which players deem to be appropriate to their needs but that at around a quarter of clubs much better attention needs to be paid to providing adequate preventive and supportive measures to protect and empower the health and well-being of players.
FIGURE 6.8 PLAYERS’ SATISFACTION WITH MEDICAL SUPPORT

MEAN RESPONSE TO HEALTH SATISFACTION
Looking more closely at the findings regarding medical support, the average global figure on players’ satisfaction stood at 3.39 (figure 6.8). Greater levels of satisfaction with medical support were found mostly in European countries. These included, among others, Israel, Ireland, Russia and Finland, all of which had a mean of above 4. However, high rates of satisfaction were also reported by respondents in Paraguay (mean 4.88) and the USA (4.19). In Africa, the highest mean was reported in Zimbabwe (3.74). At the other end, countries where players reported lower rates of satisfaction included a number of African countries, including Morocco (mean 1.87), Gabon (2.18) and Ivory Coast (2.49). In respect of other regions, Bolivia had the lowest mean (2.34) among countries in the Americas and Malta (2.66) in Europe. An important qualification when interpreting these results is that individuals often adapt their expectations about what will happen in the future based on what has happened in the past. In the particular instance, it may mean that players may adjust their assessment on the basis of what they have experienced in the past, in terms of quality and adequacy of medical support. This is an issue that should be taken always into account when interpreting the results of such surveys.

Looking more closely at the findings regarding medical support, the average global figure on players’ satisfaction stood at 3.39 (figure 6.8). Greater levels of satisfaction with medical support were found mostly in European countries.
MATCH FIXING

Players were asked if they had been approached to fix a match and if they were aware of match-fixing in their league. 6.7% of players reported being approached, but the data showed the likelihood of an approach increased as a player’s career progressed, and in the course of a 15-year career 11% of players would be approached. Due to the sensitivity of the question, it is likely that the actual figure is higher than this. Lower-paid players and those who experienced payment delays were more likely to be approached and there were hotspots in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Central America.
IT IS CLEAR THAT THE NUMBER OF PLAYERS WHO ARE BEING APPROACHED TO FIX MATCHES, AS A PROPORTION OF THE PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALLER POPULATION, IS RELATIVELY LOW.

FIRST, IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT OUR FIGURES ARE FOR OVERALL APPROACHES THROUGHOUT A PLAYER’S CAREER RATHER THAN FOR A SINGLE SEASON. SECONDLY, WE MUST REMEMBER THAT THESE FIGURES RELATE TO APPROACHES TO FIX MATCHES, RATHER THAN MATCHES THAT WERE FIXED. THERE IS NOTHING FROM OUR DATA TO SUGGEST THAT MATCH-FIXING IS AN ENDEMIC PROBLEM IN WORLD FOOTBALL.

However, there are a number of caveats to this. First, it is likely that many players who were approached would not want to admit this even in an anonymous survey. This is also true in terms of being aware of match-fixing given the current regulations placing players under a duty to report such activity. We can also assume that any players who agreed to fix a match are very unlikely to admit this in a survey. Secondly, players who admitted being approached may have been approached regularly – the data shows us number of players, not number of approaches. Thirdly, the 6.7% figure is an average across all respondents of all age-ranges. The longer a player’s career lasts, the more exposed he will become to an approach. The chance of a player being approached to fix a match in the course of their career was reported to be much higher by respondents over 33 years of age, at 10.7%.

**FIGURE 7.1 MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES AND AWARENESS: OVERALL AND BY REGION**

**HAVE YOU EVER BEEN APPROACHED TO CONSIDER FIXING A MATCH?**

- **7.20%**
- **5.70%**
- **8.30%**

**ARE YOU AWARE OF ANY MATCH FIXING THAT TOOK PLACE IN YOUR LEAGUE?**

- **7.20%**
- **9.80%**
- **10.10%**

**OF WORLDWIDE PLAYERS HAVE BEEN APPROACHED TO CONSIDER FIXING A MATCH**

**OF WORLDWIDE PLAYERS AWARE OF ANY MATCH FIXING THAT TOOK PLACE IN THEIR LEAGUE**

**9.3%**
“My teammate received messages from the same woman as me on Facebook. I think it was the mafia. They want to control you.”

Goalkeeper, Greece
Match-Fixing

FACTORS INFLUENCING APPROACHES

The major factors relating to whether a player reported being approached to fix a match were age, income, delay in payment of wages, and where the respondent played their football.

MATCH FIXING APPROACHES
BY REGION AND COUNTRY

There was a discrepancy between the answers given by respondents depending on where they played their football. Players in Africa were more likely to have been approached (8.3%), compared with 7.2% in the Americas and 6.1% in Europe. However, the country-by-country breakdown illustrated that the differences between countries was greater than those between regions. A number of African countries reported relatively low numbers of approaches, whereas three of the five countries reporting the biggest problems were in the UEFA zone. Further, as we will see later, there is a positive relation between low salaries and approaches, which may explain why players in Africa reported a higher number of approaches.

The hotspots for match-fixing attempts, where over 15% of players reported approaches, are noted in Figure 7.2:

At the other end of the scale no players from Romania reported being approached, from a large sample of 511 respondents. Given the recent reports of match-fixing in this country, we do not consider this data to be reliable and reiterate again that the survey’s findings relating to personal match-fixing approaches are likely to be significantly lower than the reality (although they may be much higher than the number of matches actually fixed of course).

We had even greater concerns about the reliability of the “awareness of match-fixing” figures, as they refer to actual fixed matches (rather than approaches) and may be based on media or changing-room gossip and rumour. In some cases the figures on awareness of match-fixing were much higher than the number of reported approaches. Notably Austria (38%), FYROM (20.3%) Namibia (20.4%), and Sweden (20%) all reported high awareness of matches being fixed but rated low in terms of actual approaches. For other countries, the figures for awareness were much lower, possibly indicating the low likelihood of a match-fixing approach actually leading to a match being manipulated.

FIGURE 7.2 MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES AND AWARENESS: OVERALL AND BY REGION

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<td>8 GEORGIA</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
FIGURE 7.3 MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES BY COUNTRY
MATCH FIXING APPROACHES BY AGE

There was no age when footballers were particularly at risk of being approached to fix a match. The data supported this assumption and, despite our fears of under-reporting, made us confident that our findings here are valuable. 10.7% of players over 33 years of age reported that they had been approached compared to just 5.4% of those in the 18-23 age group. 4.8% of under-18s reported approaches which could indicate that match-fixers are also interested in targeting youth tournaments but this amounted to only 16 responses so it is impossible to make a strong case for this argument based on our data.

As expected, the longer a player is employed in professional football, the greater the chance that he will receive an approach to fix a match.

Figure 7.4 & 7.5 MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES BY AGE RANGE

11% — THE LIKELIHOOD OF BEING APPROACHED AT LEAST ONCE DURING THE COURSE OF YOUR CAREER TO FIX A MATCH
MATCH FIXING APPROACHES BY SALARY

Earners of sub-$300 per month bucked this trend slightly, which could be explained by their relative lack of ability to influence matches or the relatively low value in terms of betting of the matches they participate in. A match-fixer will be looking for players who are at least likely to be in the starting XI of the team on the betting markets. Data from players earning $30,000 and above is less explicable but it should be noted that the number of respondents in this category was significantly lower than in the sub-$30,000 salary categories and so may not be representative of the wider picture.

As might be expected, the lesser the salary a player is earning, the more likely it is that they will be approached to fix matches (because match-fixers will be expecting a less well-off player to be more inclined to accept their offer).
MATCH FIXING APPROACHES AND DELAY IN SALARY PAYMENT

The 2013 Black Book report on player conditions in Eastern Europe identified a relationship between those experiencing delays in the payment of their wages and reporting being approached to fix a match; if you received a delay in payment, you were more likely to also be approached to fix a match. This supported FIFPro’s hypothesis that players who received delayed payment were more likely to be targeted by match-fixers (who would assume they were more likely to be tempted by financial rewards from elsewhere). Our Global Survey showed a similar trend.

So, while 40% of respondents overall had received a delay in payment, this rose to 51.5% of those respondents who had been approached to fix a match. The results also suggested that the longer the delay in payment, the more likely it was that an approach would be made. While only 2.5% of respondents overall claimed they had been the victims of a delayed payment of over 6-months, this increased to 3.9% for those who had been approached to fix a match.

It is impossible to be certain about the cause-and-effect relationship here, but the survey provides supporting evidence for the argument that those players who receive delayed payments are more likely to be approached to fix matches, and that those players who are the victims of long payment delays are even more likely to be targeted.

COMPARISON WITH THE 2013 BLACK BOOK REPORT AND 2014 FIFPRO ASIA SURVEY

Conducting a comparison of the threat of match-fixing over time is difficult. This is the first Global Player Survey and so a global comparison is not possible. The 2014 FIFPro Asian survey found that 6.8% of players admitted to having been approached to fix matches, and 17.5% said they were aware of match-fixing occurring in their league. The approach figure was remarkably similar to that from the Global Survey (6.7%) although the Global Survey awareness figure was significantly lower (9.3%). It should, however, be noted that being “aware” of match-fixing in your league could be little more than media reports, rumours, or changing room gossip.

The 2012 FIFPro Black Book survey of players in Eastern Europe found that 11.9% of respondents admitted to having been approached to fix a match and 23.6% stated that they were aware match-fixing has taken place in their league. This compared to 6.7% (approaches) and 8.9% (awareness) in the Global Survey for the same region. This suggests a significant drop in match-fixing approaches in Eastern Europe since 2012 or a lower share of players being ready to report such approaches for the reasons discussed above.

However when the figures were broken down on a country-by-country basis the situation looks more confused with three countries reporting increases and some discrepancies and outlying results which lead us to be suspicious of the veracity of some of the data. The comparison should also be viewed with the data on approach by age set out in Section 6.2.2. This data appears to show that levels of match-fixing approaches globally have remained relatively stable throughout the past 15-20 years. Given the discrepancies and methodological concerns, conclusions at this stage must be tentative; at best we can conclude that despite the attempts of regulators and law-enforcement bodies, match-fixing approaches remain an entrenched problem in both Eastern Europe and globally, albeit one affecting only a small minority of players.
FIGURE 7.8 MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES: BLACK BOOK AND GLOBAL SURVEY COMPARISON

I HAVE BEEN APPROACHED TO FIX A MATCH: 2013 BLACK BOOK V 2016 GLOBAL SURVEY

- **Bulgaria**: 13.20% (2013), 11.10% (2016)
- **Croatia**: 5.20% (2013), 6.30% (2016)
- **Czech Republic**: 9.70% (2013), 9.80% (2016)
- **Greece**: 30.30% (2013), 3.50% (2016)
- **Hungary**: 1.90% (2013), 2.00% (2016)
- **Kazakhstan**: 34.30% (2013), 25.30% (2016)
- **Montenegro**: 0% (2013), 4.10% (2016)
- **Poland**: 6.20% (2013), 2.30% (2016)
- **Russia**: 10.20% (2013), 1.70% (2016)
- **Serbia**: 5.30% (2013), 6.00% (2016)
- **Slovenia**: 2.70% (2013), 5.70% (2016)
- **Ukraine**: 7.60% (2013), 7.10% (2016)

Red bars represent 2012 data, orange bars represent 2016 data.
METHODOLOGY
RESEARCH PURPOSE

The 2013 Black Book report on player conditions in Eastern Europe identified a relationship between those experiencing delays in the payment of their wages and reporting being approached to fix a match; if you received a delay in payment, you were more likely to also be approached to fix a match. This supported FIFPro’s hypothesis that players who received delayed payment were more likely to be targeted by match-fixers (who would assume they were more likely to be tempted by financial rewards from elsewhere). Our Global Survey showed a similar trend.

So, while 40% of respondents overall had received a delay in payment, this rose to 51.5% of those respondents who had been approached to fix a match. The results also suggested that the longer the delay in payment, the more likely it was that an approach would be made. While only 2.5% of respondents overall claimed they had been the victims of a delayed payment of over 6-months, this increased to 3.9% for those who had been approached to fix a match.

It is impossible to be certain about the cause-and-effect relationship here, but the survey provides supporting evidence for the argument that those players who receive delayed payments are more likely to be approached to fix matches, and that those players who are the victims of long payment delays are even more likely to be targeted.

The purpose of the project was to gain the most extensive insight into the labour conditions and experiences of professional football players globally. The definition of “professional” here means that we were surveying full-time employees and those operating under a civil law contract but with formal obligations to their club; we also included here players working part-time who are sometimes referred to as being “semi-professional”. We excluded amateur players and those paid on an informal match-by-match basis and who had no obligation to play for a particular club. FIFPro wanted…. When interpreting the results, it is also important to remember that the survey was of FIFPro-affiliated players: players not represented by a union may be exposed to worse working conditions and may have more limited recourse to the effective enforcement of their labour rights. We are very grateful for the time and input provided by FIFPro and the national unions regarding the design and dissemination of the survey as well as to the players who kindly agreed to participate in the survey.

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The final questionnaire was a collaborative effort between FIFPro and Drs Koukiadaki and Pearson. The strategic decision was made to ensure the greatest number of responses possible and with this in mind the questionnaire was limited to 23 questions which would be relevant across all of the countries participating. Inevitably this meant a number of questions that either FIFPro or the academics wanted in the survey being excluded, especially questions on sensitive topics that it was feared might discourage potential respondents. Potentially sensitive questions which were included were drafted to encourage responses although in some cases this limited the ways in which they could be analysed or compared to previous studies (e.g. questions requesting exact salary and whether a player had participated in match-fixing were avoided). Because the questionnaire would need to be translated into different languages, responses were almost exclusively limited to “tick boxes”. Where possible, questions were written to allow comparison with the Black Book and Asia Surveys and other labour conditions surveys carried out by organisations such as the ILO, OECD, and Eurofound. A complete copy of the survey can be found in Chapter 10. The questionnaire is focused on six subfields: Contracts, Payment (remuneration), Training Alone, Health, Safety and Well-being, Violence and Match Fixing. There are 23 questions, 21 closed-ended and 2 partial open-ended questions.

RESEARCH INSTITUTION AND TEAM

The research was commissioned by FIFPro, the international federation of professional football players, who approached the University of Manchester in late 2015 to assist in the construction and analysis of a questionnaire. The University of Manchester, is the largest single-site University in the UK and has origins going back to 1824. It is part of the prestigious Russell Group of Universities and in 2016 it was ranked in the top-30 higher-education institutions in the world (2016 QS University Global Rankings).

The academic team consisted of Dr Aristea Koukiadaki, a senior lecturer at the School of Law with expertise in Labour Law and Industrial Relations and Dr Geoff Pearson, also a senior lecturer at the School of Law and previously Director of the MBA (Football Industries) programme. Aristea has conducted comparative research in working conditions and collective labour rights and published her work in (amongst others) the Industrial Law Journal and the European Journal of Industrial Relations. Geoff has previously published on the football player market in the European Law Journal and European Law Review and worked with the European Commission analysing the legality of the UEFA Home-Grown Player Rule. To assist with analysis of the data, Niall Coogan from the Manchester Business School was brought on to the team. Data inputting assistance came from Dr Jacqueline Austin and Robyn Jelley (Manchester Business School), and Rishabh Misra (MBA Football Industries candidate, University of Liverpool).
Players unions from 66 countries were approached to participate in the survey. Players based in Asia were not approached as they had completed a similar survey in 2014 for FIFPro, some results of which are included in this report. However the Asia survey results are not subsumed into the Global Survey data as most of the questions are not directly comparable. Players from Israel and Kazakhstan (and potentially Asian-Russia) were included as they fall under the auspices of the European governing body, UEFA. In our analysis they are included as Europe, despite their geographical location in Asia.

The questionnaire was then translated into the national languages of all the participating countries. Players’ unions from 55 countries in Africa, America, and Europe distributed paper copies of questionnaires to union representatives of clubs participating in the national league. Representatives were provided with written guidance on how to explain the questions to players, and a glossary of terms. Questionnaires were then completed by players anonymously. In some cases, where players were illiterate, representatives filled in surveys for respondents. The results of these were checked in detail by the research team to guard against potential manipulation. Data collection took place in May and June 2016.

Questionnaires were returned to FIFPro and scanned into pdf form before being sent to the University of Manchester for data entry. The largest number of questionnaires from one country was Cameroon (712), and the lowest included was Slovenia (95). Collected data was manually entered into SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) by a research team trained in the use of the software. Of the 55 countries who returned surveys, only one (Spain) was excluded as the number of returns was too low to be representative of different clubs or leagues. Surveys from Belgium were also excluded as these arrived too late to be inputted. The final number of returns was 13,846, which was more than was originally anticipated. This accounts for 21% of all FIFPro registered players. We should note that not all player unions or professional players are affiliated to FIFPro (although candidate and observer countries were included in the survey).

All responses were inputted, and questionnaires missing answers to some questions were not excluded (unless this omitted demographic data necessary to ensure reliability of data). For some questions, we noted a blanket ‘null-response’ across a small number of countries. Here we were concerned about potential cultural pressures affecting the ability of players to answer the questions truthfully. As a result of our concerns about the veracity of the blanket null-responses to these questions, the data was excluded from the overall analysis of the relevant questions.

SPSS software was used to perform the statistical analysis and the research team looked to, (a) describe the current state of labour conditions for professional footballers, (b) identify trends over time in comparison with earlier FIFPro surveys, and (c) look for relationships in the data which may explain some of the findings. Data analysis consisted of examining frequencies across all themes, analysing the data in order to provide information about the distribution of variables through descriptive statistics, and conducting cross-tabulation analysis to show the relationship between two or more categorical variables.

The final report was written for FIFPro by Dr Aristea Koukiadaki and Dr Geoff Pearson in August-October 2016, with statistical data analysis support from Niall Coogan.

ETHICS AND ANONYMITY

Given that some of the questions were sensitive, the questionnaire was anonymous. Players were not asked their name or the name of their team, but instead to merely put the country in which they were playing, the league in which they played, and whether they were a national of that country. Anonymity was aimed for in order to encourage players to answer truthfully about issues such as abuse and match-fixing. It is common practice in the social sciences to protect the anonymity of research participants answering questions which could have adverse effects for them if they were identified.
LIMITATIONS

Sampling

FIFPro were keen to give voice to as many of their members as possible and as such the survey sought to gather the maximum number of responses as possible at country and league levels. Spain was excluded because it was not possible to reach there the acceptable level of responses or guarantee anonymity of players. All other responses from the different countries and leagues were inputted. A response from the Belgian Football Players Union unfortunately arrived too late to be included.

Missing Participants

Unfortunately a small number of national unions did not participate in the study or return sufficient surveys to be included. These included the three biggest football markets in the world: England and Wales, Germany, and Spain. A number of other important countries in terms of profile in the football industry and number of professional players are also missing, including Argentina, Mexico, the Netherlands, and Portugal. The inclusion of these nations would of course have improved the quality and veracity of the data and analysis. As noted above, the survey also did not include countries from the Asian Football Confederation although comparison– where possible – was made with the 2014 FIFPro Asia Survey.

Missing Data

As the questionnaire was administered by hand, respondents were able to pass over questions they did not wish to answer, or did not have information for. Some questions went unanswered on a national basis and in these instances the data does not appear in the comparative graphs. Specifically, blanket-null responses to some questions from players in Russia, Tunisia, and Ukraine were excluded, although answers to different questions from players in these countries were still included in our analysis. Data pertaining to nationality from players in Morocco was also excluded after concerns were raised about its reliability. Finally, around 100 questionnaires from Scotland were inputted late meaning that they could not be included into the final regional or global figures (with the exception of chapter 7 where they were included). Their absence will have little discernible effect on the figures in other chapters. All figures pertaining to Scotland on a country-by-country basis were updated to include all returns with the exception of Figures 4.4, 4.7 and 6.5.

Adverse Influence and Data Reliability

Although the survey was designed to be anonymous, and those inputting the data and carrying out the analysis knew neither the players nor clubs who had completed questionnaires, there is a risk that respondents could be adversely influenced by other players or club management individuals present at the time they completed the questionnaire. In order to gain the highest number of responses, paper questionnaires were distributed and collected by local player union representatives. Many questionnaires were filled out in a group setting (e.g. a changing room) and in some cases illiterate players were assisted in completing the survey by their teammates. There is therefore a danger that for sensitive questions in particular (e.g. admitting match-fixing approaches or reporting abuse by other players or club management), players may not be willing to admit they have experienced this. This is a serious methodological problem which compounds the methodological issues that generally attach themselves to survey research on sensitive topics in comparison to, for example, longitudinal observational studies.

Analysis of Trends over Time

Given that this is the first Global Survey, it was impossible in most cases to comment on trends and changes over time. The survey is very much a snapshot of the life of a professional footballer in 2016. Some comparison over time can be made in terms of the professional football in Eastern Europe as a result of the 2013 Black Book but even here some of the questions in our survey needed to be drafted slightly differently to improve the quality of the data.

Gender Limitation

This survey is only of the experience of male professional footballers. We are of course aware of the increasing number of female professional players and the overall development of the women’s game internationally. At the current time, however, the labour market for male and female players is fundamentally different. Although there will of course be shared experiences and concerns, many different problems are faced by male and female professional players and a separate survey of the women’s game is needed.
### Participating Countries and Number of Questionnaires Returned

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ANNEX


MANCHESTER 1824
The University of Manchester
DEFINITIONS

Training alone
The instruction of the club to a player to train separately from the squad.

Harassment
‘A person (A) subjects another person (B) to harassment where, on the grounds of (insert social identity basis), A engages in unwanted conduct which has the purpose or effect of (i) violating B’s dignity or (ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B. ‘The conduct shall be regarded as having this effect only if, having regard to all the circumstances and in particular the alleged victim’s perception, it should be reasonably considered as having that effect’.

Discrimination
Discrimination is defined as “less favourable treatment” of player based on one or more of: gender, age, race, nationality, religion or belief, sexuality.

Bullying
Unwanted conduct and including either harassment or bullying as: ‘Where one person or persons engage in unwanted conduct in relation to another person which has the purpose or effect of violating that person’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for that person’ The conduct shall be regarded as having this effect only if, having regard to all the circumstances and in particular the alleged victim’s perception, it should be reasonably considered as having that effect’.

Match-fixing
Dishonest activity with the intention of manipulating a match, usually for financial gain (most often through gambling). This includes influencing the result of the match and also less significant match-events (e.g. the timing or number of bookings, red cards, throw-ins etc.).

Labour contract
The relationship between a club and a player is a labour contract governed by national labour law, national FA and FIFA regulations.

Civil contract
A contract between a club and a player that is not a labour contract. In many occasions such contract is additional to a labour contract but lacks the protection of such contract. Most civil contracts are not registered with the FA.

Paid by addendum/annex
The remuneration of a player should be mentioned in the labour contract that is registered with the FA. The payments agreed upon by addendum or annex is not always registered and will be difficult to prove when there is no registration of this annex.
The analysis in this section excluded Morocco due to issues related to data reliability.


European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound). European Quality of Life Survey 2012 (EULFS, 2012). Interestingly, the reduced life satisfaction of those with only primary education [compared with secondary] disappears after controlling for income.

Due to data reliability issues, data on Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan was excluded from the analysis here.

In addition, we suspected problems in respect of the interpretation of the terminology used in the questionnaire responses in some countries. As a result, data from Russia and Ukraine was excluded from the analysis here.


World Bank education statistics database.

Eurostat. Vocational Education and Training Statistics. A 2013 study on the working conditions of professional sports players also identified that many players took part in some form of education or study while working as a professional sports player. Even so, many were not aware of the educational opportunities they could take advantage of, and others find that their employers are unwilling to help them take these opportunities (Eui-Eurovision Sport Pro, An Analysis of the Working Conditions of Professional Players of Basketball, Hockey, Handball and Rugby across a Number of European Member States (Eui-Eurovision Sport Pro, 2013). A 2013 study on the working conditions of professional sports players also identified that many players took part in some form of education or study while working as a professional sports player. Even so, many were not aware of the educational opportunities they could take advantage of, and others find that their employers are unwilling to help them take these opportunities (Eui-Eurovision Sport Pro, An Analysis of the Working Conditions of Professional Players of Basketball, Hockey, Handball and Rugby across a Number of European Member States (Eui-Eurovision Sport Pro, 2013).

Informal employment refers here to jobs that generally lack basic social or legal protection or employment benefits, irrespective of whether they are performed inside or outside the informal sector. In addition to informal sector employment, it also includes informal employment in formal enterprises, employers and own-account workers, contributing unpaid family workers, own-account workers producing goods exclusively for their own household’s consumption, and members of informal productive cooperatives (see ILO, World of Work Report 2014. Developing with Jobs (ILO, 2014).

The findings here concerning the lack of contract are consistent with previous studies of other professional sports in Europe; Uni-Europa Sport-Pro, An Analysis of the Working Conditions of Professional Players of Basketball, Hockey, Handball and Rugby across a Number of European Member States (Eui-Eurovision Sport Pro, 2013).

In the European Union, a Directive 91/533/EEC, which aims to provide employers with improved protection, to avoid uncertainty and insecurity about the terms of the employment relationship and to ensure greater transparency in the labour market, establishes the employer’s obligation to inform employees of the conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship. Under the Directive, every employer must be provided with a document containing information on the essential elements of his contract or employment relationship. Although the Directive does not oblige the employer to provide a copy of the contract as such, it may have promoted indirectly the provision of a contract copy as a means of compliance and this may have explained the differences in the rates of players with and without copies of contracts between EU and LEA countries.

The analysis does not include those that answered in Q5 that they did not have a written contract in place.


More recently, there is some evidence of states trying to limit the extent such payments are protected against taxation. See, for instance, the case of France, where the government terminated the system of ‘Collective Image Rights’ considering that this tax (sopporté) could not exist while the country was heavily indebted and OECD O. The Economic and Legal Aspects of Transfers of Players, Study carried out for the European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment and Culture, KEA European Affairs, 2011.3.

Article 8 of the agreement on image rights stipulates that the club and the player have to agree how the player’s image rights as part of the whole squad.


KEA/OECS terminology.

FIFA TMS Monthly Highlights August 2016

FIFA Global Transfer Market Report 2016, p.3. This data was drawn from players engaged in international transfers who were on average receive higher wages than players who transferred not in such a way.

We must however remember the average wages in other sectors may still be much lower than what a footballer earns. The national daily minimum wage in Ghana stands at GHS4, just over $2.

Island, which performs very well on the OECD measures of mean monthly income ($4,843; Source: OECD database, 2016), had 42.3% of respondents earning $600 or under. Similarly in Ireland (OECD measure annual mean of 2016), 16.4% of players earned $600 or under.

Richard Dubois states that the average career length of professional footballers in France is 6-7 years (Le Marche du Travail des Footballeurs Professionnels: Un Miroir Aux Akhamelems” (CIE no.122, 2016). This two-year more than Goetland and Wilson suggest, 2004). 1994: "Five adidas bargain and exchange transitions in professional football players", in Flack, B., Paterson, G., and Price, J. ‘Career duration in a competitive environment. The labor market for soccer for Players in Germany’ 2007 Eastern Economic Journal, Vol 33, Issue 3. 343-347. In 2013 it was repeated that the average length of a professional footballer’s career in the UK was eight years but the methodology for reaching this figure was not disclosed (The Guardian, 19 March 2016).
COUNTRY REPORTS

The report covers the member markets of player unions in Africa, the Americas and Europe: Austria, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, FYROM (Macedonia), Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malta, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Scotland, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.
Country Reports

BOTSWANA

Players nationality

91% Botswanan

292 Players surveyed

As in other African nations, players in Botswana are often left to recover from injury without medical or financial assistance. Half of the players surveyed were not satisfied with medical support from their clubs. Forty percent do not have a copy of their contract, leaving them unprotected when things go wrong. The players union said it recently helped draw up a new standard contract and club licensing system with football authorities that is “turning around” the working conditions of its members.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +267 72 783 233
E-mail: unionfootballers@gmail.com

CONTRACT DATA

29 MONTHS
Average contract length

40% No copy of contract
3% Self-employed (civil law contract)
5% Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

2% Forced to train alone during career
17% Pressured by club to renew current contract
24% Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.
### Pay Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remuneration/US dollars/month</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 8,000</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,001 to 15,000</td>
<td>19,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,001 to 30,000</td>
<td>9,2</td>
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<td>8,1</td>
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<td>40,001 to 60,000</td>
<td>4,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60,001 to 80,000</td>
<td>2,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80,001 to 100,000</td>
<td>0,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 100,000</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150,000 to 200,000</td>
<td>0,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200,000 to 300,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>300,000 to 600,000</td>
<td>0,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600,000+</td>
<td>54,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Late payment (last 2 seasons):** 41%

### Income

- **Number of respondents:** 283

### Health, Well-Being and Outlook

- **Less than 10 days paid vacation:** 52%
- **Unsatisfied with medical support:** 50%
- **Insecure about employment as footballer:** 29%
- **Vocational training or university degree:** 39%

### Violence and Harassment

- **Victim of violence by fans:** 12%
- **Threatened by fans:** 11%
- **Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players):** 16%

### Match-Fixing Approaches

- **Approached by match fixers:** 6%

---

**Country Reports**
Players in Cameroon work hard for little or no money. Almost half of players do not have a day off.

David Low, a Singaporean who played in the first division for several months in 2015 and 2016, said he trained every day from 6am to 8am apart from on match days. “Players in Cameroon are used to hardship,” Low said. Only 25% of players had a copy of their contract and typically, Low said, they get paid only one month in six.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +237 94 852 621
E-mail: info.synafoc@yahoo.fr
Website: www.afcamerounais.org
**PAY DATA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>08</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>60</th>
<th>601</th>
<th>1.001</th>
<th>2.001</th>
<th>4.001</th>
<th>8.001</th>
<th>15.001</th>
<th>30.001</th>
<th>60.001</th>
<th>Above</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USS</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>2.000</td>
<td>4.000</td>
<td>8.000</td>
<td>15.000</td>
<td>30.000</td>
<td>60.000</td>
<td>100.000</td>
<td>100.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INCOME**

Number of respondents (372)

**HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK**

- **64%** Less than 10 days paid vacation
- **49%** Unsatisfied with medical support
- **45%** Insecure about employment as footballer
- **22%** Vocational training or university degree

**VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT**

- **12%** Victim of violence by fans
- **23%** Threated by fans
- **24%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**

- **7%** Approached by match fixers
Country Reports

DR CONGO

Players
nationality

94%
Congo��se

130 Players
surveyed

Congo is one of most dangerous places in the world to be a footballer with almost one in four players the victim of fan violence and 39 percent threatened by supporters.

Working conditions are precarious -- 89 percent of players have no written contract. Club bosses have too much autonomy because many have close ties with government, the union said. Another concern: 31 percent of players have been approached about fixing matches.

CONTRACT DATA

N/A
Average contract length

85% No copy of contract

44% Self-employed (civil law contract)

17% Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

6% Forced to train alone during career

21% Pressured by club to renew current contract

24% Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

*pressed by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +243 15 129 949
E-mail: ufcinfo_rdc@yahoo.fr
Website: www.ufcongo.org
**PAY DATA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26%</td>
<td>Late payment (last 2 seasons)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INCOME**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>601$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60.001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100.001$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>73%</td>
<td>Less than 10 days paid vacation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52%</td>
<td>Unsatisfied with medical support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45%</td>
<td>Insecure about employment as footballer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25%</td>
<td>Victim of violence by fans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39%</td>
<td>Threatened by fans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49%</td>
<td>Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31%</td>
<td>Approached by match fixers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**VOCATIONAL TRAINING**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35%</td>
<td>Vocational training or university degree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Country Reports

EGYPT

Players nationality

95%

Egyptian

Players surveyed

72

Players in Egypt’s first division mostly receive satisfactory conditions but standards deteriorate in the second division, according to their union. Almost half (48%) said they were not satisfied with the medical support their club provides. The union said it has to pay the fees for surgery for footballers at smaller clubs. It is also educating players about the risk of match fixing. Ten percent have been approached to manipulate games.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +20 23 303 3833
E-mail: info@epfaegypt.com
Website: www.epfaegypt.com

CONTRACT DATA

N/A

Average contract length

25%

No copy of contract

3%

Self-employed (civil law contract)

0%

Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

6%

Forced to train alone during career

N/A

Pressured by club to renew current contract

N/A

Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

*Pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.
**PAY DATA**

67% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**
Number of respondents (68)

- $0 - $3000
- $301 - $6000
- $601 - $8000
- $801 - $10000
- $10001 - $20000
- $20001 - $30000
- $30001 - $40000
- $40001 - $50000
- $50001 - $60000
- $60001 - $80000
- $80001 - $100000
- $100001 - $120000
- $120001 - $150000
- $150001 - $200000
- $200001 - $250000
- $250001 - $300000
- $300001 - $350000
- $350001 - $400000
- $400001 - $450000
- $450001 - $500000
- $500001 - $550000
- $550001 - $600000
- $600001 - $650000
- $650001 - $700000
- $700001 - $750000
- $750001 - $800000
- $800001 - $850000
- $850001 - $900000
- $900001 - $950000
- $950001 - $1000000

**VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT**

- 3% Victim of violence by fans
- 3% Threatened by fans
- 69% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

**HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK**

- 93% Less than 10 days paid vacation
- 48% Unsatisfied with medical support
- 27% Insecure about employment as footballer

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**

- 92% Vocational training or university degree
- 10% Approached by match fixers
Gabon’s football league has the highest incidence of delayed pay in the world. “Players endure precarious and undignified conditions,” said the national player union, which wants a standard contract fixing minimum requirements. 68% of players said they felt insecure at their club, 66% were unsatisfied with medical support and 62% do not have a copy of their contract.
PAY DATA

96% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

INCOME
Number of respondents (140)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>0$ 300$</th>
<th>301$ 600$</th>
<th>601$ 1.000$</th>
<th>1.001$ 2.000$</th>
<th>2.001$ 4.000$</th>
<th>4.001$ 8.000$</th>
<th>8.001$ 15.000$</th>
<th>15.001$ 30.000$</th>
<th>30.001$ 60.000$</th>
<th>60.001$ 100.000$</th>
<th>Above 100.000$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

83% Less than 10 days paid vacation
49% Unsatisfied with medical support
66% Insecure about employment as footballer
20% Vocational training or university degree

VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

16% Victim of violence by fans
14% Threatened by fans
14% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

1% Approached by match fixers
Country Reports

GHANA

Players nationality

96%
Ghanaian

246 Players surveyed

Young players in Ghana, as in countries across Africa, yearn to play in Europe to earn more money.

“I will do whatever I need to do to go,” one 21-year-old player, who earns $100 a month in the first division, said. He said he recently had to pay $300 from his own pocket for medical fees to treat an injury. Only 3 percent of players are aged over 29. However, even though careers are short, most players (77%) said they felt secure in the profession.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +233 27 102 2196
E-mail: info@pfag.com.gh
Website: www.pfag.com.gh

CONTRACT DATA

28 MONTHS
Average contract length

12%
No copy of contract

7%
Self-employed (civil law contract)

3%
Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

1%
Forced to train alone during career

N/A
Pressured by club to renew current contract

30%
Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected
### Pay Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Late payment (last 2 seasons)</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of respondents (230)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0-3000</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$301-600</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>$601-1000</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
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<td>$1001-2000</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>$2001-4000</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4001-8000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$8001-15000</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15001-30000</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30001-60000</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$60001-100000</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 100000</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Net remuneration/month/US dollars

### Health, Well-being and Outlook

- Less than 10 days paid vacation: 98%
- Unsatisfied with medical support: 16%
- Insecure about employment as footballer: 3%
- Vocational training or university degree: 12%

### Violence and Harassment

- Victim of violence by fans: 12%
- Threatened by fans: 18%
- Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players): 12%

### Match-Fixing Approaches

- Approached by match fixers: 6%
 Clubs in the Ivory Coast are perennially short on money and footballers are only paid occasionally, and at the whim of club directors, according to the national players union. Sixty-seven percent do not have a copy of their own contract and 55 percent feel insecure in their profession. The working conditions of players would be improved if there was a licensing system for clubs, the union said.

**LOCAL UNION CONTACT**

Phone: +225 22 416 945  
E-mail: contactafi@yahoo.fr  
Website:  
www.association-footballeurs-ivoiriens.org
PAY DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>31%</th>
<th>Late payment (last 2 seasons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>75.0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INCOME
Number of respondents (156)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>30.001</th>
<th>60.000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60.001</td>
<td>100.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threatened by fans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Victim of violence by fans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Unsatisfied with medical support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>52%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Generally no day off per week

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>11%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Late payment (last 2 seasons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>31%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Number of respondents (156)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0,6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Insecure about employment as footballer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>55%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Approach by match fixers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Vocational training or university degree

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Approach by match fixers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Vocational training or university degree

| 8% |
Kenyan clubs often don’t respect contracts, firing players without compensation, according to Sammy (not his real name) who plays for first-division Gor Mahia. “They just tell you to leave,” Sammy said. “They know they can get away with it.” In a rare victory, the Kenyan players union in June 2016 helped eight players win compensation for unjust dismissal. One in five players have been attacked on match days and Sammy said his club’s own fans throw stones at them if they play badly.

Players

nationality

80%

Kenyan

Players surveyed

152

Country Reports

KENYA

CONTRACT DATA

19 MONTHS
Average contract length

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YEAR 1</th>
<th>YEAR 2</th>
<th>YEAR 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☑️</td>
<td>☑️</td>
<td>☑️</td>
<td>☑️</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 26% No copy of contract
- 3% Self-employed (civil law contract)
- 6% Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

- 2% Forced to train alone during career
- N/A Pressured by club to renew current contract
- 0% Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

*Pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.
**PAY DATA**

**43%** Late payment (last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**

Number of respondents (117)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
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<th>30$</th>
<th>60$</th>
<th>90$</th>
<th>120$</th>
<th>150$</th>
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<th>210$</th>
<th>240$</th>
<th>270$</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>601$</td>
<td>1.000$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK**

- **39%** Less than 10 days paid vacation
- **56%** Unsatisfied with medical support
- **37%** Insecure about employment as footballer
- **23%** Vocational training or university degree

**VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT**

- **20%** Victim of violence by fans
- **18%** Threatened by fans
- **13%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**

- **2%** Approached by match fixers
Country Reports

MOROCCO

Players
nationality

N/A
Moroccan

289 Players surveyed

Players in Morocco enjoy reasonable conditions, according to their union, and report less incidence of violence and harassment than in most other African countries. Three percent said they were the victim of fan attacks on match days, and two percent experienced bullying or harassment by management. However, they are regularly promised signing-on fees they don’t receive. Only 16 percent said their pay arrived on time the last two years.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +212 52 236 9240
Website: www.association-marocaine-footballeurs.org

MOROCCO

Players
nationality

N/A
Moroccan

289 Players surveyed

Players in Morocco enjoy reasonable conditions, according to their union, and report less incidence of violence and harassment than in most other African countries. Three percent said they were the victim of fan attacks on match days, and two percent experienced bullying or harassment by management. However, they are regularly promised signing-on fees they don’t receive. Only 16 percent said their pay arrived on time the last two years.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +212 52 236 9240
Website: www.association-marocaine-footballeurs.org

CONTRACT DATA

28 MONTHS
Average contract length

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>No copy of contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Self-employed (civil law contract)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Secondary contract (other reasons)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Forced to train alone during career</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Pressured by club to renew current contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.
### PAY DATA

#### 84%
Late payment (last 2 seasons)

#### INCOME
Number of respondents (N/A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0-$5,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5,001-$10,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,001-$15,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,001-$20,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20,001-$25,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25,001-$30,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

| 8% | Less than 10 days paid vacation |
| 70% | Unsatisfied with medical support |
| 9% | Insecure about employment as footballer |

### VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

| 4% | Victim of violence by fans |
| 5% | Threatened by fans |
| 8% | Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players) |

### MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

| 4% | Approached by match fixers |

### MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

| 45% | Vocational training or university degree |

Vocational training or university degree
Sixty-three percent of players do not have a copy of their own contract and according to the national players union some have had their contracts altered by clubs without their consent. Only the top four clubs offer decent salaries. Players at other teams do not earn enough to live on, leaving them more vulnerable to match-fixing bribes, the union said. Twelve percent have been approached to fix matches.

**Country Reports**

**NAMIBIA**

Players

- **nationality**: 93% Namibian
- **surveyed**: 209 players

**CONTRACT DATA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR 1</th>
<th>YEAR 2</th>
<th>YEAR 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Average contract length**: N/A
- **No copy of contract**: 63%
- **Self-employed (civil law contract)**: 4%
- **Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)**: 6%

**EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE**

- **Forced to train alone during career**: 3%
- **Pressured by club to renew current contract**: 12%
- **Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)**: 39%

**LOCAL UNION CONTACT**

Phone: +264 61 212 643
E-mail: nafpunion@gmail.com

* *pressed by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.
### PAY DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Late payment (last 2 seasons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>54%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30$ - 60$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>601$ - 1,000$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,001$ - 2,000$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,001$ - 4,000$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,001$ - 8,000$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,001$ - 15,000$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,001$ - 30,000$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,001$ - 60,000$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 60,000$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### INCOME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of respondents (170)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0$ - 30$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30$ - 60$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>601$ - 1,000$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,001$ - 2,000$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,001$ - 4,000$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,001$ - 8,000$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,001$ - 15,000$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,001$ - 30,000$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,001$ - 60,000$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 60,000$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>58%</td>
<td>Less than 10 days paid vacation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Unsatisfied with medical support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28%</td>
<td>Insecure about employment as footballer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31%</td>
<td>Generally no day off per week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13%</td>
<td>Vocational training or university degree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8%</td>
<td>Victim of violence by fans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12%</td>
<td>Threatened by fans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23%</td>
<td>Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12%</td>
<td>Approached by match fixers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Country Reports

SOUTH AFRICA

Players
nationality

89%
South African

265 Players
surveyed

South Africa’s league has one of the lowest rate of salary defaults on the continent.

“Mostly, there is no stress,” Peter (not his real name), who plays for second-division Santos, said. “We are covered by an insurance scheme if we get injured.” However, 28 players of 265 surveyed said they had been forced to train alone as a way of pressuring them to leave or sign a new deal. “I have seen a club try to make a player’s working environment unpleasant,” Peter said.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

SAFPU

Phone: +27 11 339 1906
E-mail: safpu@safpu.org
Website: www.safpu.org

CONTRACT DATA

Average contract length

25 MONTHS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR 1</th>
<th>YEAR 2</th>
<th>YEAR 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☒ ☒ ☒</td>
<td>☒ ☒ ☒</td>
<td>☐ ☐ ☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19% No copy of contract
1% Self-employed (civil law contract)
17% Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

12% Forced to train alone during career
4% Pressured by club to renew current contract
45% Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

*pressed by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

Players
surveyed

SOUTH AFRICA

Players
nationality

89%
South African

265 Players
surveyed

South Africa’s league has one of the lowest rate of salary defaults on the continent.

“Mostly, there is no stress,” Peter (not his real name), who plays for second-division Santos, said. “We are covered by an insurance scheme if we get injured.” However, 28 players of 265 surveyed said they had been forced to train alone as a way of pressuring them to leave or sign a new deal. “I have seen a club try to make a player’s working environment unpleasant,” Peter said.
PAY DATA

25% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

INCOME
Number of respondents (195)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>0$</th>
<th>30$</th>
<th>60$</th>
<th>80$</th>
<th>100$</th>
<th>200$</th>
<th>400$</th>
<th>600$</th>
<th>800$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

38% Less than 10 days paid vacation

39% Unsatisfied with medical support

22% Insecure about employment as footballer

9% Vocational training or university degree

VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

16% Threatened by fans

14% Victim of violence by fans

29% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

7% Approached by match fixers
Country Reports

TUNISIA

Players surveyed

198

Players nationality

88%

Tunisian

Tunisian football has been hit by a dramatic slowdown after terrorism attacks in the country in 2015. Several clubs owned by businessmen in the ailing tourism industry are not paying footballers on time, according to the players union. Ninety-four percent of players have had pay delays the last two years, the second-highest amount in Africa. Fifty-five percent don’t have social security cover and 67 percent feel moderately insecure at their current club.

32 MONTHS

Average contract length

- 0% No copy of contract
- 56% Self-employed (civil law contract)
- 0% Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

- 3% Forced to train alone during career
- 3% Pressured by club to renew current contract
- 3% Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected
PAY DATA

94% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0$ - 300$</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301$ - 600$</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>601$ - 1,000$</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,001$ - 2,000$</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,001$ - 4,000$</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,001$ - 8,000$</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,001$ - 15,000$</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,001$ - 30,000$</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,001$ - 60,000$</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60,001$ - Above 100,000$</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000$ - Above 100,000$</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

6% Less than 10 days paid vacation

38% Unsatisfied with medical support

11% Insecure about employment as footballer

56% Vocational training or university degree

INCOME

Number of respondents (196)

VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

N/A Victim of violence by fans

N/A Threatened by fans

N/A Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

1% Approached by match fixers

34.7
25.5
19.4
8.7
0
Players
nationality
97%
Zimbabwean

Country Reports
ZIMBABWE

340 Players surveyed

While most players in Zimbabwe receive their salary on time, some go months and even years without receiving pay. Joseph (not his real name) who plays for a first-division club said he did not receive a promised $15,000 signing-on fee and is owed two months of salary payments and bonuses. “We cannot keep on playing for nothing,” Joseph said. Non-payment can increase the risk of footballers accepting bribes. Nineteen percent said they have been approached to manipulate the results of games.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +263 11 512 381
E-mail: desmaringwa@yahoo.com
Website: www.fuz.co.zw

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LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +263 11 512 381
E-mail: desmaringwa@yahoo.com
Website: www.fuz.co.zw
**PAY DATA**

- **37%** Late payment (last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**

Number of respondents (306)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>0$ to 300$</th>
<th>301$ to 600$</th>
<th>601$ to 1,000$</th>
<th>1,001$ to 2,000$</th>
<th>2,001$ to 4,000$</th>
<th>4,001$ to 8,000$</th>
<th>8,001$ to 15,000$</th>
<th>15,001$ to 30,000$</th>
<th>30,001$ to 60,000$</th>
<th>60,001$ to 100,000$</th>
<th>Above 100,000$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK**

- **46%** Less than 10 days paid vacation
- **17%** Unsatisfied with medical support
- **20%** Insecure about employment as footballer
- **24%** Vocational training or university degree

**VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT**

- **17%** Victim of violence by fans
- **29%** Threatened by fans
- **17%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**

- **19%** Approached by match fixers
Country Reports

BOLIVIA

Players
nationality

85%
Bolivian

307
Players
surveyed

Bolivian clubs have the worst record in the Americas for paying players on time. Bolivian football federation rules are partly to blame: clubs are not required to honour the unpaid wages of players until halfway through the following season, according to David Paniagua, general secretary of the national players union. A club licensing system scheduled to come into effect in 2017 should slowly improve conditions.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +591 33 397 208
E-mail: info@fabolivia.com
Website: www.fabolivia.com

CONTRACT DATA

22 MONTHS
Average contract length

38%
No copy of contract

3%
Self-employed (civil law contract)

0%
Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

10%
Forced to train alone during career

2%
Pressured by club to renew current contract

11%
Restricted freedom of movement*
(in transfer with fee)

*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected
COUNTRY REPORTS

Net remuneration/month/US dollars

- 30.001
- 60.000
- 60.001
- 1000.000
- Above
- 15.001
- 30.000
- 8.001
- 15.000
- 4.001
- 8.000
- 2.001
- 4.000
- 1.001
- 2.000
- 601
- 1.000
- 301
- 600
- 0
- 300
- 0

Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

- Threatened by fans
- Victim of violence by fans
- Unsatisfied with medical support
- Generally no day off per week
- Insecure about employment as footballer
- Vocational training or university degree

PAY DATA

- 95% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

INCOME

Number of respondents (297)

- 13.1
- 6.7
- 14.5
- 17.5
- 30.3
- 12.5
- 4.4
- 0.7
- 0.0
- 0.3
- 0.0

Net remuneration/month/US dollars

- Below
- 300
- 600
- 1,000
- 2,000
- 4,000
- 8,000
- 15,000
- 30,000
- 60,000
- 100,000

HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

- 88% Less than 10 days paid vacation
- 56% Unsatisfied with medical support
- 33% Insecure about employment as footballer
- 25% Vocational training or university degree

VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

- 4% Victim of violence by fans
- 31% Threatened by fans
- 34% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

- 17% Approached by match fixers

PAY DATA

- 95% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

INCOME

Number of respondents (297)

- 13.1
- 6.7
- 14.5
- 17.5
- 30.3
- 12.5
- 4.4
- 0.7
- 0.0
- 0.3
- 0.0

Net remuneration/month/US dollars

- Below
- 300
- 600
- 1,000
- 2,000
- 4,000
- 8,000
- 15,000
- 30,000
- 60,000
- 100,000

HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

- 88% Less than 10 days paid vacation
- 56% Unsatisfied with medical support
- 33% Insecure about employment as footballer
- 25% Vocational training or university degree

VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

- 4% Victim of violence by fans
- 31% Threatened by fans
- 34% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

- 17% Approached by match fixers
Many Brazilian players surveyed need to take second jobs because they cannot survive on money from football, including 23-year-old Geovani Cortes Gomes who sells hamburgers on a street stall in a suburb of Rio de Janeiro. He plays for just four months of the year in the state championship. Gomes said his $620 a month football salary arrives three months late. “So we wait and wait and continue training,” Gomes said. “What can we do?”

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +55 21 986 682233  
E-mail: fenapaf@gmail.com  
Website: www.fenapaf.org.br
**PAY DATA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INCOME**

Number of respondents (92)

- **52%** Late payment (last 2 seasons)
- **31%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)
- **44%** Unsatisfied with medical support
- **48%** Generally no day off per week
- **71%** Less than 10 days paid vacation
- **14%** Insecure about employment as footballer
- **7%** Vocational training or university degree

**HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK**

- **6%** Victim of violence by fans
- **29%** Threatened by fans
- **31%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)
- **44%** Unsatisfied with medical support
- **14%** Insecure about employment as footballer
- **71%** Less than 10 days paid vacation
- **48%** Generally no day off per week
- **7%** Vocational training or university degree

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**

- **2%** Approached by match fixers
Country Reports

COSTA RICA

Players nationality
94%
Costa Rican

327 Players surveyed

Costa Rica’s league is enjoying a fillip after the national team reached the 2014 World Cup quarterfinal, according to Allan Miranda, a defender for Club Herediano.

It is the only championship in Central America in which players contracts have guaranteed minimum standards. However, it’s not all good news: one 21-year-old player for first-division Municipal Liberia said he is often paid late and earns less than former schoolmates who work as tourist guides.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +506 22 413 206
E-mail: info@asojupro.com
Website: www.asojupro.com

CONTRACT DATA

15 MONTHS
Average contract length

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>55%</td>
<td>No copy of contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Self-employed (civil law contract)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14%</td>
<td>Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Forced to train alone during career</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Pressured by club to renew current contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%</td>
<td>Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.
**PAY DATA**

44% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**

Number of respondents (265)

- 0$ 300$ 301$ 600$ 601$ 1.000$ 1.001$ 2.000$ 2.001$ 4.000$ 4.001$ 8.000$ 8.001$ 15.000$ 15.001$ 30.000$ 30.001$ 60.000$ 60.001$ 100.000$ Above

Net remuneration/month/US dollars

40.8

15.1
18.1
16.6
5.3
2.6
0.0
1.1
0.4
0.0
0.0

**HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK**

- 72% Less than 10 days paid vacation
- 35% Unsatisfied with medical support
- 16% Insecure about employment as footballer

- 33% Vocational training or university degree

**VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT**

- 8% Victim of violence by fans
- 13% Threatened by fans
- 20% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**

- 4% Approached by match fixers

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**
Players
nationality
90%
Ecuadorian

Ecuador’s football league is suffering the effects of a faltering national economy. Javier (not his real name) who plays for Centro Deportivo Olmedo said wages have halved in the last couple of years and it is common for club payments to be two months overdue. Some 12% of the 180 players surveyed have been attacked by fans during their career. “When the team is doing badly fans sometimes punch and kick us when we are leaving the stadium,” Javier said.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +593 42 693 796
E-mail: afecuador@hotmail.com
Website: www.afe.com.ec
PAY DATA

**45%** Late payment (last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**
Number of respondents (168)

Net remuneration/month/US dollars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0 - $300</td>
<td>9,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$301 - $600</td>
<td>14,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$601 - $1,000</td>
<td>14,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,001 - $2,000</td>
<td>19,0</td>
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<tr>
<td>$2,001 - $4,000</td>
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</tr>
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<td>$4,001 - $8,000</td>
<td>11,9</td>
</tr>
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<td>$8,001 - $15,000</td>
<td>1,8</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
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<td>$60,001 - $100,000</td>
<td>1,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above $100,000</td>
<td>1,8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK**

**56%** Less than 10 days paid vacation

**19%** Unsatisfied with medical support

**7%** Insecure about employment as footballer

**26%** Vocational training or university degree

**VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT**

**14%** Victim of violence by fans

**21%** Threatened by fans

**48%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**

**17%** Approached by match fixers
Guatemalan players tend to have minimal legal protection
Some 56% of footballers surveyed said they did not even have a copy of their own employment agreement with their club. Players get little or no paid holiday and do not get paid for preseason training which lasts 30 days according to the national players union. “It’s frustrating knowing that you are working for free,” said Tomás (not his real name).

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +502 23 380 220
E-mail: afg.guate@gmail.com
Website: http://www.afg.com.gt

Players nationality

90%
Guatemalan

Players surveyed

308

CONTRACT DATA

12 MONTHS
Average contract length

56% No copy of contract

4% Self-employed (civil law contract)

12% Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

3% Forced to train alone during career

0% Pressured by club to renew current contract

8% Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

* Pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.
COUNTRY REPORTS

**PAY DATA**

- **31%** Late payment (last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**

Number of respondents (300)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>0$</th>
<th>30$</th>
<th>60$</th>
<th>1,000$</th>
<th>2,000$</th>
<th>4,000$</th>
<th>8,000$</th>
<th>15,000$</th>
<th>30,000$</th>
<th>60,000$</th>
<th>Above 100,000$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>17,0</td>
<td>19,7</td>
<td>17,7</td>
<td>21,0</td>
<td>15,7</td>
<td>7,3</td>
<td>1,7</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK**

- **71%** Less than 10 days paid vacation
- **28%** Unsatisfied with medical support
- **16%** Insecure about employment as footballer

**VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT**

- **19%** Victim of violence by fans
- **24%** Threatened by fans
- **25%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**

- **72%** Vocational training or university degree
- **4%** Approached by match fixers
Players in the Paraguayan league had the lowest rates of salary non-payments in South America, the survey found. However, clubs can be up to 60 days late with salaries under national football regulations and therefore players may not consider payments within this period as an infraction, according to the national players union. Footballers tend to have long contracts but clubs can break contracts unilaterally after each season.

**LOCAL UNION CONTACT**

Phone: +595 97 122 0276

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**CONTRACT DATA**

- **Average contract length**: 42 MONTHS
- **No copy of contract**: 25%
- **Self-employed (civil law contract)**: 1%
- **Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)**: 1%

---

**EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE**

- **Forced to train alone during career**: 2%
- **Pressured by club to renew current contract**: 2%
- **Restricted freedom of movement** *(in transfer with fee)*: 8%

*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.
**PAY DATA**

**10%** Late payment (last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**
Number of respondents (196)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>0$</th>
<th>30$</th>
<th>60$</th>
<th>100$</th>
<th>200$</th>
<th>400$</th>
<th>800$</th>
<th>1500$</th>
<th>3000$</th>
<th>6000$</th>
<th>10000$</th>
<th>15000$</th>
<th>20000$</th>
<th>30000$</th>
<th>60000$</th>
<th>100000$</th>
<th>Above 100000$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK**

**90%** Less than 10 days paid vacation

**0%** Unsatisfied with medical support

**5%** Insecure about employment as footballer

**VOCATIONAL TRAINING OR UNIVERSITY DEGREE**

**7%**

**VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT**

**N/A** Victim of violence by fans

**11%** Threatened by fans

**N/A** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**

**7%** Approached by match fixers
Country Reports

PERU

Footballers in Peru worry about when their pay will arrive, according to Iván (not his real name) who plays for Defensor La Bocana.
“We’ve always got it in our heads: when are we going to get paid?” Iván, who has two children, said. Clubs often wait to pay wages until just before the two-month deadline after which they will be docked points. The national player union provides vital support, another player said. “Without them, every club would do what they want,” he said.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +51 14 460 600
E-mail: frevilla@safap.org
Website: www.safap.org

CONTRACT DATA

87% Peruvian

Players nationality

14 MONTHS

Average contract length

46% No copy of contract

2% Self-employed (civil law contract)

14% Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

8% Forced to train alone during career

0% Pressured by club to renew current contract

28% Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

*pressed by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.
PAY DATA

32% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

INCOME
Number of respondents (232)

HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

63% Less than 10 days paid vacation

31% Unsatisfied with medical support

13% Insecure about employment as footballer

VOCATION TRAINING

28% Vocational training or university degree

VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

8% Victim of violence by fans

13% Threatened by fans

21% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

9% Approached by match fixers
Players at a few elite clubs receive better treatment but smaller clubs often do not have their own doctor or physiotherapist so when a player gets injured he has to hitch a lift to the hospital.

For rehabilitation, most injured players have to travel to the national player union clinic in Montevideo. Late salary payments are commonplace. “Last season I received one month’s wages out of six,” goalkeeper Germán (not his real name) said. “I had to spend my savings.”

**LOCAL UNION CONTACT**

Phone: +598 27 072 008
E-mail: info@mutual.com.uy
Website: www.mutual.com.uy
PAY DATA

55% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

INCOME
Number of respondents (302)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USD 0 - 300</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD 301 - 600</td>
<td>17.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD 601 - 1,000</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD 1,001 - 2,000</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD 2,001 - 4,000</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD 4,001 - 8,000</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD 8,001 - 15,000</td>
<td>10.3</td>
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<td>USD 15,001 - 30,000</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD 30,001 - 60,000</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD 60,001 - 100,000</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 100,000</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

32% Less than 10 days paid vacation
26% Unsatisfied with medical support
15% Insecure about employment as footballer

6% Generally no day off per week

VOCATIONAL TRAINING OR UNIVERSITY DEGREE 11%

VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

2% Victim of violence by fans
13% Threatened by fans
11% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

4% Approached by match fixers
Country Reports

USA

Players

Players

Players

Players

nationality

nationality

nationality

nationality

59%

59%

59%

59%

American

American

American

American

382

382

382

382

Players

Players

Players

Players

surveyed

surveyed

surveyed

surveyed

Major League Soccer players enjoy higher pay and more legal protection than most footballers.

“We get paid directly by the MLS and that makes us a lot more stable,” said Tim (not his real name) who plays for Colorado Rapids. Of nine percent of players paid late the last two seasons, almost half said the delay was at a previous club in another country. MLS holds considerable power: players can only become free agents at age 28, having played eight years in the league.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +1 30 165 73535
E-mail: info@mlsplayers.org
Website: www.mlsplayers.org

CONTRACT DATA

30 MONTHS

Average contract length

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR 1</th>
<th>YEAR 2</th>
<th>YEAR 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☒ ☒ ☒</td>
<td>☒ ☒ ☒</td>
<td>☒ ☒ ☒</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1% No copy of contract
0% Self-employed (civil law contract)
3% Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

3% Forced to train alone during career
1% Pressured by club to renew current contract
20% Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

*Pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.
163

PAY DATA

9% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

INCOME
Number of respondents (357)

HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

3% Less than 10 days paid vacation
5% Unsatisfied with medical support
7% Insecure about employment as footballer

42% Vocational training or university degree

VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

2% Victim of violence by fans
11% Threatened by fans
15% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

1% Approached by match fixers

NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS

0.3
301
600
9,000
10,000

Net remuneration/month/US dollars

0.6
301
600
9,000
10,000

0.3
301
600
9,000
10,000

4,5
1,4
2,8

VOCATIONAL TRAINING

0.3
301
600
9,000
10,000

5% Unsatisfied with medical support
7% Insecure about employment as footballer

42% Vocational training or university degree

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

1% Approached by match fixers

COUNTRY REPORTS

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES
Because of hyperinflation and scarcity of food in shops, footballers struggle to make ends meet like most Venezuelans. “It’s difficult to live, at the end of the month you are short of money,” said 30-year-old José (not his real name), who has three young children. His $200-a-month salary barely covers the cost of a well-balanced diet. He prefers to sign short contracts because – with annual inflation at about 500% - “after six months your wages are not worth as much.”

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +58 21 276 12168
E-mail: aufpvenezuela@gmail.com
Website: www.aufpvenezuela.com.ve
**PAY DATA**

- 37% Late payment (last 2 seasons)
- 71.2

**INCOME**

Number of respondents (285)

**NET REMUNERATION/MONTH/US DOLLARS**

- $0-$300
- $301-$600
- $601-$1,000
- $1,001-$2,000
- $2,001-$4,000
- $4,001-$8,000
- $8,001-$15,000
- $15,001-$30,000
- $30,001-$60,000
- $60,001-$100,000
- Above $100,000

**HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK**

- 52% Less than 10 days paid vacation
- 26% Unsatisfied with medical support
- 12% Insecure about employment as footballer
- 28% Vocational training or university degree

**VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT**

- 12% Victim of violence by fans
- 15% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)
- 15% Threatened by fans

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**

- 10% Approached by match fixers
Players in Austria have solid conditions protected by national employment law and a standard contract for footballers.

There is no danger players won’t get paid,” the union said. The standard contract prohibits clubs from excluding players from the first team squad, a tactic used to pressure them to leave. At the start of the 2016-17 season, the union helped two players at St. Polten win a court case that allowed them to return to the first team.

**Country Reports**

**AUSTRIA**

- **Players nationality**: 90% Austrian
- **Players surveyed**: 149

**LOCAL UNION CONTACT**

Phone: +43 13 131 683805
E-mail: office@vdf.at
Website: www.vdf.at

---

**2016 Football Employment Report**

**BEHIND THE FLOODLIGHTS**

Pressured by club to renew current contract

Restricted freedom of movement*

(transfer with fee)

Forced to train alone during career

No copy of contract

Self-employed (civil law contract)

Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

**Average contract length**

- **25 MONTHS**

**EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE**

- **2%** Forced to train alone during career
- **2%** Pressured by club to renew current contract
- **6%** Restricted freedom of movement*

*(transfer with fee)*

---

**CONTRACT DATA**

**Players nationality**

- **90%** Austrian

**Players surveyed**

- **149**

---

**CONTRACT DATA**

**25 MONTHS**

Average contract length

- **1%** No copy of contract
- **1%** Self-employed (civil law contract)
- **1%** Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

---

**EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE**

- **2%** Forced to train alone during career
- **2%** Pressured by club to renew current contract
- **6%** Restricted freedom of movement*

*(transfer with fee)*

---

**LOCAL UNION CONTACT**

**Austrian football players have solid conditions protected by national employment law and a standard contract for footballers.**

```
Players in Austria have solid conditions protected by national employment law and a standard contract for footballers.

There is no danger players won’t get paid,” the union said. The standard contract prohibits clubs from excluding players from the first team squad, a tactic used to pressure them to leave. At the start of the 2016-17 season, the union helped two players at St. Polten win a court case that allowed them to return to the first team.

**Country Reports**

**AUSTRIA**

- **Players nationality**: 90% Austrian
- **Players surveyed**: 149

**LOCAL UNION CONTACT**

Phone: +43 13 131 683805
E-mail: office@vdf.at
Website: www.vdf.at
```

---

**CONTRACT DATA**

**25 MONTHS**

Average contract length

- **1%** No copy of contract
- **1%** Self-employed (civil law contract)
- **1%** Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

---

**EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE**

- **2%** Forced to train alone during career
- **2%** Pressured by club to renew current contract
- **6%** Restricted freedom of movement*

*(transfer with fee)*

---

**LOCAL UNION CONTACT**

**Austrian football players have solid conditions protected by national employment law and a standard contract for footballers.**

```
Players in Austria have solid conditions protected by national employment law and a standard contract for footballers.

There is no danger players won’t get paid,” the union said. The standard contract prohibits clubs from excluding players from the first team squad, a tactic used to pressure them to leave. At the start of the 2016-17 season, the union helped two players at St. Polten win a court case that allowed them to return to the first team.

**Country Reports**

**AUSTRIA**

- **Players nationality**: 90% Austrian
- **Players surveyed**: 149

**LOCAL UNION CONTACT**

Phone: +43 13 131 683805
E-mail: office@vdf.at
Website: www.vdf.at
```

---

**CONTRACT DATA**

**25 MONTHS**

Average contract length

- **1%** No copy of contract
- **1%** Self-employed (civil law contract)
- **1%** Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

---

**EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE**

- **2%** Forced to train alone during career
- **2%** Pressured by club to renew current contract
- **6%** Restricted freedom of movement*

*(transfer with fee)*
### PAY DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0$ - 300$</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301$ - 600$</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>601$ - 1.000$</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.001$ - 2.000$</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.001$ - 4.000$</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.001$ - 8.000$</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.001$ - 15.000$</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.001$ - 30.000$</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.001$ - 60.000$</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60.001$ - 100.000$</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- Late payment (last 2 seasons): 9%
- Number of respondents (119)

### COUNTRY REPORTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bullying or harassment (by fans, club staff or players)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threatened by fans</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims of violence</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

- Less than 10 days paid vacation: 14%
- Unsatisfied with medical support: 23%
- Insecure about employment as footballer: 15%
- Generally no day off per week: 8%
- Vocational training or university degree: 18%

### VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

- Threatened by fans: 1%
- Victim of violence by fans: 1%
- Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players): 6%

### MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

- Approached by match fixers: 1%
Country Reports

BULGARIA

Players

nationality

89%

Bulgarian

408 Players surveyed

Clubs in Bulgaria’s league are relatively efficient at paying on time.

The national players union said state legislation means employees can leave a club if their pay is one month late. In most other countries, in line with FIFA rules, footballers have to wait for 3 months without pay. Clubs can also be docked points for being behind with salary payments.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +359 29 806 506
E-mail: office@abf-bg.org
Website: www.abf-bg.org

CONTRACT DATA

18 MONTHS

Average contract length

8% No copy of contract
1% Self-employed (civil law contract)
17% Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

6% Forced to train alone during career
4% Pressured by club to renew current contract
10% Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.
**COUNTRY REPORTS**

**Net remuneration/month/US dollars**

- $30.001
- $60.000
- $60.001
- $100.000
- Above $100.000

- $15.001
- $30.000
- $8.001
- $15.000
- $4.001
- $8.000
- $2.001
- $4.000
- $1.001
- $2.000
- $601
- $1.000
- $301
- $600
- $0

**Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)**

- Threatened by fans
- Victim of violence by fans
- Unsatisfied with medical support
- Generally no day off per week
- Insecure about employment as footballer
- Less than 10 days paid vacation

**Pay Data**

- Late payment (last 2 seasons)
  - 22%

**Income**

Number of respondents (269)

**Health, Well-being and Outlook**

- Less than 10 days paid vacation
  - 19%
- Unsatisfied with medical support
  - 22%
- Insecure about employment as footballer
  - 20%
- Vocational training or university degree
  - 31%

**Violence and Harassment**

- Victim of violence by fans
  - 5%
- Threatened by fans
  - 8%
- Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)
  - 4%

**Match-Fixing Approaches**

- Approached by match fixers
  - 11%
Country Reports

CROATIA

Players nationality

87% Croatian

184 Players surveyed

Most footballers in Croatia are on self-employed contracts because, according to the national players union, it means clubs do not have to pay social security tax.

While most clubs “do their best for players,” a few do not treat players fairly, the union said. Andrej (not his real name) has not been paid for four months because his team expects him to move when he recovers from injury. “I could go to the president and complain but he is not rational,” Andrej said.

CONTRACT DATA

29 MONTHS
Average contract length

3% No copy of contract
94% Self-employed (civil law contract)
3% Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

1% Forced to train alone during career

N/A Pressured by club to renew current contract

44% Restricted freedom of movement*
(in transfer with fee)

*pressed by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.
**PAY DATA**

49% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**

Number of respondents (152)

- **Net remuneration/month/US dollars**
  - 5.3 $0 to 300$
  - 8.6 $301 to 600$
  - 9.2 $601 to 1,000$
  - 16.4 $1,001 to 2,000$
  - 20.4 $2,001 to 4,000$
  - 28.3 $4,001 to 8,000$
  - 5.9 $8,001 to 15,000$
  - 4.6 $15,001 to 30,000$
  - 0.7 $30,001 to 60,000$
  - 0.0 $60,001 to 100,000$
  - 0.0 Above 100,000

**HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK**

- 50% Less than 10 days paid vacation
- 13% Unsatisfied with medical support
- 8% Insecure about employment as footballer
- 10% Vocational training or university degree

**VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT**

- 4% Victim of violence by fans
- 5% Threatened by fans
- 14% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**

- 6% Approached by match fixers
Country Reports

**CYPRUS**

Players nationality

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>235</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.*

**EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Forced to train alone during career</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14%</td>
<td>Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13%</td>
<td>Pressured by club to renew current contract</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONTRACT DATA**

- Average contract length
  - **18 MONTHS**
  - **17%** No copy of contract
  - **3%** Self-employed (civil law contract)
  - **49%** Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

**LOCAL UNION CONTACT**

Phone: +357 22 466 508
E-mail: info@pasp.org.cy
Website: www.pasp.org.cy

Cyprus is starting to tackle delayed pay, docking clubs points for falling behind.

However, clubs can still delay pay by giving players second contracts they don’t disclose to the federation. Almost half of those surveyed said they have a second contract. Another widespread issue is the threat of match-fixing: nineteen percent received offers to manipulate matches. The union is asking the government to do more to investigate criminal gangs offering bribes to players.
PAY DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>65%</td>
<td>Late payment (last 2 seasons)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INCOME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0-$3000</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$31-$6000</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$61-$10000</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10001-$20000</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20001-$40000</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$40001-$80000</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$80001-$150000</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$150001-$300000</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$300001-$600000</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$600001-$1000000</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above $1000000</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>55%</td>
<td>Less than 10 days paid vacation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27%</td>
<td>Unsatisfied with medical support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13%</td>
<td>Insecure about employment as footballer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21%</td>
<td>Vocational training or university degree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Victim of violence by fans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15%</td>
<td>Threatened by fans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12%</td>
<td>Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19%</td>
<td>Approached by match fixers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COUNTRY REPORTS
Country Reports

**CZECH REPUBLIC**

Players nationality

81% Czech

234 Players surveyed

Some 93% of players in the Czech Republic have self-employed contracts and do not have the same employment rights, holiday pay and pension contributions as regular workers.

While players at the biggest clubs have good working conditions, others do not, according to the national players union. "Clubs speculate they will earn more than they actually do and make promises they cannot keep," the union said. The union is lobbying the government to make employment contracts compulsory.

**LOCAL UNION CONTACT**

Phone: +420 60 418 1487
E-mail: info@cafh.cz
Website: www.cafh.cz

---

**CONTRACT DATA**

23 MONTHS

Average contract length

- 2% No copy of contract
- 93% Self-employed (civil law contract)
- 1% Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

**EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE**

- 3% Forced to train alone during career
- 1% Pressured by club to renew current contract
- 65% Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

*pressed by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected
### PAY DATA

- **33%** Late payment (last 2 seasons)

### AVERAGE INCOME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>0$ - 300$</th>
<th>301$ - 600$</th>
<th>601$ - 1.000$</th>
<th>1.001$ - 2.000$</th>
<th>2.001$ - 4.000$</th>
<th>4.001$ - 8.000$</th>
<th>8.001$ - 15.000$</th>
<th>15.001$ - 30.000$</th>
<th>30.001$ - 60.000$</th>
<th>Above 60.000$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of respondents (207)</td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>5,3</td>
<td>25,1</td>
<td>34,3</td>
<td>19,8</td>
<td>8,2</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

- **9%** Less than 10 days paid vacation
- **31%** Unsatisfied with medical support
- **21%** Insecure about employment as footballer
- **11%** Vocational training or university degree

### VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

- **12%** Victim of violence by fans
- **9%** Threatened by fans
- **6%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

### MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

- **10%** Approached by match fixers
Country Reports

DENMARK

Players
nationality

78%
Danish

Ninety-six percent of players in Denmark said they felt at least modestly secure in their profession.

“You take the security for granted but it is really good,” Magnus (not his real name) said. “Players I know who went to Turkey and Russia are talking about wages coming in late or not at all. We don’t have those problems.” For disputes over minor issues such as holiday pay the union always “comes through” for us, Magnus said.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +45 33 121 128
E-mail: mail@spillerforeningen.dk
Website: www.spillerforeningen.dk

CONTRACT DATA

28 MONTHS
Average contract length

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR 1</th>
<th>YEAR 2</th>
<th>YEAR 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>🔝🔹🔹🔹</td>
<td>🔝🔹🔹🔹</td>
<td>🔝🔹🔹🔹</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 0% | No copy of contract |
| 1% | Self-employed (civil law contract) |
| 3% | Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons) |

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

| 2% | Forced to train alone during career |
| 0% | Pressed by club to renew current contract |
| 43% | Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee) |

*pressed by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected
PAY DATA

9% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

INCOME

Number of respondents (297)

Net remuneration/month/US dollars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0 - $300</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$301 - $600</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$601 - $1,000</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,001 - $2,000</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2,001 - $4,000</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4,001 - $8,000</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$8,001 - $15,000</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,001 - $30,000</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30,001 - $60,000</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$60,001 - $100,000</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above $100,000</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

8% Less than 10 days paid vacation

12% Unsatisfied with medical support

4% Insecure about employment as footballer

17% Vocational training or university degree

VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

2% Victim of violence by fans

10% Threatened by fans

19% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

3% Approached by match fixers
**Country Reports**

**FINLAND**

Players surveyed: 222

Players nationality: 75% Finnish

---

**Finnish clubs are well-organized even if the facilities can be basic for some of the smaller team, according to one player at Kemi Kings.**

Players in the first and second division have to use a standard contract that helps to reduce the amount of unfair treatment, according to the national player union. “Everyone does his job and when your form drops off you work with the coach to improve,” a player at HJK Helsinki said. “There is not the same level of pressure as in some countries.”

---

**LOCAL UNION CONTACT**

Phone: +358 22 306 888
Website: www.jpy.fi

---

**CONTRACT DATA**

17 MONTHS
Average contract length

- 3% No copy of contract
- 2% Self-employed (civil law contract)
- 2% Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

---

**EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE**

- 5% Forced to train alone during career
- 1% Pressured by club to renew current contract
- 30% Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.
### Pay Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Late payment (last 2 seasons)</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>Number of respondents (192)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0-$300</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$301-$600</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$601-$1,000</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,001-$2,000</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2,001-$4,000</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4,001-$8,000</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$8,001-$15,000</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,001-$30,000</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30,001-$60,000</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$60,001-$100,000</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above $100,000</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Health, Well-being and Outlook

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 10 days paid vacation</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsatisfied with medical support</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generally no day off per week</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecure about employment as footballer</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational training or university degree</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Violence and Harassment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Incident</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victim of violence by fans</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threatened by fans</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Match-Fixing Approaches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approached by match fixers</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Country Reports

FRANCE

Players nationality

88%

French

418 Players surveyed

Players in France have some of the best conditions with high wages, long contracts and the smallest incidence of late salaries in the survey.

Ninety percent of footballers surveyed said they felt at least moderately secure at their current club. The national players union, which was founded in 1961, said its experience is one of the reasons players are well-protected. The league’s financial regulator also helps ensure players rights are respected, the union said.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

UNFP

Phone: +33 14 039 9107
Website: www.unfp.org

CONTRACT DATA

32 MONTHS
Average contract length

2% No copy of contract
0% Self-employed (civil law contract)
2% Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

5% Forced to train alone during career
2% Pressured by club to renew current contract
12% Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.
**PAY DATA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>Late payment (last 2 seasons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INCOME**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of respondents (408)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0 $300 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5 $600 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 $1,000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.9 $2,000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.7 $3,000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.2 $4,000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.3 $5,000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.3 $6,000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.5 $7,000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 $8,000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 $9,000 $</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>Approached by match fixers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>Less than 10 days paid vacation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>Unsatisfied with medical support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>Insecure about employment as footballer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>Victim of violence by fans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>Threatened by fans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PAY DATA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.1 $1.000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5 $2.000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 $3.000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.9 $4.000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.7 $5.000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.2 $6.000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.3 $7.000 $</td>
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<td>20.3 $8.000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.5 $9.000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 $10.000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 $11.000 $</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PAY DATA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>14.7 $5.000 $</td>
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<td>14.2 $6.000 $</td>
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<tr>
<td>21.3 $7.000 $</td>
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<tr>
<td>20.3 $8.000 $</td>
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<tr>
<td>13.5 $9.000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 $10.000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 $11.000 $</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**PAY DATA**

<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>14.7 $5.000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.2 $6.000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.3 $7.000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.3 $8.000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.5 $9.000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 $10.000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 $11.000 $</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Players

nationality

80%
Macedonian

121
Players
surveyed

Typically earn slightly above the average wage, Pance Kumbev, president of the national players union, said.

More than 30% of the 121 players surveyed have a second contract, a way for clubs to reduce their tax costs. “Young players often agree with these kind of contract because they don’t think about the consequences,” Kumbev said. He said the agreements are often not legally binding and it can take three years to resolve a dispute through arbitration.
COUNTRY REPORTS

Net remuneration/month/US dollars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>0$</th>
<th>30$</th>
<th>60$</th>
<th>90$</th>
<th>120$</th>
<th>150$</th>
<th>180$</th>
<th>Above</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17,9</td>
<td>13,7</td>
<td>14,5</td>
<td>7,7</td>
<td>6,8</td>
<td>5,1</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

Match-fixing approaches

11% Approached by match fixers

VOCATIONAL TRAINING OR UNIVERSITY DEGREE

41%

Health, well-being and outlook

21% Less than 10 days paid vacation

19% Unsatisfied with medical support

13% Insecure about employment as footballer

7% Victim of violence by fans

3% Threatened by fans

14% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

Pay data

28% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

Average income

Number of respondents (117)
Players in Georgia reported the highest rate of match-fixing approaches in the world.

The Georgian football association has assembled a group of experts to target fixing and last year handed down sanctions to some players and clubs. Club officials sometimes have a poor grasp of budgeting so late salaries are common even though many teams are supported by regional governments, the national players union said. One in three players has been bullied, either by fans, club staff or their peers.
**PAY DATA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Late payment (last 2 seasons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AVERAGE INCOME**

Number of respondents (113)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-300$</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301$-600$</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>601$-1,000$</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,001$-2,000$</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,001$-4,000$</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,001$-8,000$</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,001$-15,000$</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,001$-30,000$</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,001$-60,000$</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60,001$-100,000$</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 100,000$</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Less than 10 days paid vacation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27%</td>
<td>Unsatisfied with medical support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Insecure about employment as footballer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13%</td>
<td>Vocational training or university degree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Victim of violence by fans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Threatened by fans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33%</td>
<td>Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34%</td>
<td>Approached by match fixers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The financial crisis that began in 2008 has hit the Greek league hard, reducing wages as much as 50 percent, according to one player, Theodore (not his real name).

However, 92 percent of footballers said they felt at least moderately secure in their career. Theodore said pressure from the national player union is making clubs more reliable in paying wages on time. The union has also introduced a medical insurance scheme for players and their families, he said.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +30 21 082 39179
E-mail: psap@otenet.gr
Website: www.psap.gr
PAY DATA

55% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

AVERAGE INCOME

Number of respondents (340)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bracket</th>
<th>% of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0 - $300</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>$601 - $1,000</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,001 - $2,000</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2,001 - $4,000</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4,001 - $8,000</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$8,001 - $15,000</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,001 - $30,000</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30,001 - $60,000</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$60,001 - $100,000</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above $100,000</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Net remuneration/month/US dollars

HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

25% Less than 10 days paid vacation

16% Unsatisfied with medical support

8% Insecure about employment as footballer

22% Vocational training or university degree

VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

4% Victim of violence by fans

13% Threatened by fans

12% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

4% Approached by match fixers
Country Reports

HUNGARY

Players nationality

88%
Hungarian

207 Players surveyed

Hungarian clubs are becoming more stable financially thanks to government tax breaks, according to Gabor Gyepes, who plays for Soroksar.

However, some 12% of footballers surveyed have been excluded from the first squad during their career as a way to force them into signing a new contract or leaving a club. The national players union negotiated a standard contract that was introduced in July 2016 prohibiting this treatment unless there are medical or sporting reasons.

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

12%
Forced to train alone during career

N/A
Pressured by club to renew current contract

10%
Restricted freedom of movement*
(in transfer with fee)

*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

HLSZ

Phone: +36 12 376 050
E-mail: profifoci@profifoci.hu
Website: www.hlsz.hu

CONTRACT DATA

22 MONTHS
Average contract length

11% No copy of contract

1% Self-employed (civil law contract)

7% Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)
**PAY DATA**

47% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**
Number of respondents (169)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yearly Income (US dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0–300 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301–600 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>601–1,000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,001–2,000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,001–4,000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,001–8,000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,001–15,000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,001–30,000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,001–60,000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60,001–100,000 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 100,000 $</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK**

20% Less than 10 days paid vacation

33% Unsatisfied with medical support

9% Insecure about employment as footballer

16% Vocational training or university degree

**VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT**

1% Victim of violence by fans

3% Threatened by fans

11% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**

2% Approached by match fixers

**HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK**

33% Unsatisfied with medical support

9% Insecure about employment as footballer

16% Vocational training or university degree

**VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT**

1% Victim of violence by fans

3% Threatened by fans

11% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**

2% Approached by match fixers
Country Reports

ICELAND

Players nationality
80%
Icelandic

147 Players surveyed

Most players in Iceland – a surprise quarterfinalist at the 2016 European Championship - earn a modest wage and supplement their earnings with a second job, sometimes arranged by the club they play for, according to the national players union.

Eighty-seven percent described themselves as secure at their current team even though one in three are self-employed. The union is pushing to change the standard contract for all footballers to have extensive medical insurance and social security cover.

CONTRACT DATA

28 MONTHS
Average contract length

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
<td>No copy of contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41%</td>
<td>Self-employed (civil law contract)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Forced to train alone during career</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Pressured by club to renew current contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22%</td>
<td>Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.
PAY DATA
36% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

AVERAGE INCOME
Number of respondents (141)

Net remuneration/month/US dollars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>% Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0$-$300$</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$301$-$600$</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$601$-$1000$</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1001$-$2000$</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2001$-$4000$</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4001$-$8000$</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$8001$-$15000$</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15001$-$30000$</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30001$-$60000$</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$60001$-$100000$</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above $100000$</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

15% Less than 10 days paid vacation
21% Unsatisfied with medical support
6% Insecure about employment as footballer
28% Vocational training or university degree

VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

3% Victim of violence by fans
3% Threatened by fans
14% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

4% Approached by match fixers
Country Reports
IRELAND

Players
nationality
95%
Irish

About 60 percent of players in Ireland have a second job because pay is low, according to the national players union.

Many work flexible jobs, such as driving a taxi, so they can fit in with club commitments. Clubs have become more efficient at paying salaries on time recently but have also shortened the typical length of a contract to 11 months, PFA Ireland said. Eighty-five percent of players had less than 10 days paid leave.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

PFA
IRELAND

Phone: +353 18 999 350
E-mail: info@pfai.ie
Website: www.pfai.ie

CONTRACT DATA

11 MONTHS
Average contract length

| 32% | No copy of contract |
| 2% | Self-employed (civil law contract) |
| 2% | Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons) |

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

| 3% | Forced to train alone during career |
| 1% | Pressured by club to renew current contract |
| 30% | Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee) |

*pressed by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.
**PAY DATA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>Late payment (last 2 seasons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AVERAGE INCOME**

Number of respondents (201)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0 - $50,000</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50,001 - $100,000</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100,001 - $200,000</td>
<td>21.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>$200,001 - $400,000</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$400,001 - $800,000</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$800,001 - $1,000,000</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK**

- **85%** Less than 10 days paid vacation
- **6%** Unsatisfied with medical support
- **22%** Insecure about employment as footballer
- **32%** Vocational training or university degree

**VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT**

- **4%** Victim of violence by fans
- **16%** Threatened by fans
- **13%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**

- **2%** Approached by match fixers
Eighty-nine percent of players in Israel said they feel secure at their current club even though the average contract is just 12 months long.

The national players union said it has secured extra measures from the league to help reduce delayed salary payments which affected 14 percent of players the last two years. From the 2017-18 season clubs that fall behind with wages will miss out on a $25,000 bonus.

**LOCAL UNION CONTACT**

The New Organization of Football Players in Israel

Phone: +972 36 921 373

**CONTRACT DATA**

- **12 MONTHS**
  - Average contract length
    - 4% No copy of contract
    - 1% Self-employed (civil law contract)
    - 3% Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

**EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE**

- 1% Forced to train alone during career
- 0% Pressured by club to renew current contract
- 23% Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

*pressed by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected
PAY DATA

14% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

INCOME
Number of respondents (318)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>1.6</th>
<th>0.6</th>
<th>1.9</th>
<th>19.8</th>
<th>23.6</th>
<th>28.9</th>
<th>17.3</th>
<th>3.5</th>
<th>2.5</th>
<th>0.3</th>
<th>0.0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0$-300$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>301$-600$</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.001$-2.000$</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.001$-4.000$</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8.001$-15.000$</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15.001$-30.000$</td>
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<tr>
<td>30.001$-60.000$</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>60.001$-100.000$</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

13% Less than 10 days paid vacation
5% Unsatisfied with medical support
5% Generally no day off per week
5% Insecure about employment as footballer

16% Vocational training or university degree

VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

7% Victim of violence by fans
23% Threatened by fans
8% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

1% Approached by match fixers
Country Reports

ITALY

Players
nationality

96%
Italian

270 Players
surveyed

Footballers in Italy are well-paid although salaries are sometimes late.

More than half a dozen clubs in the second and third-division were docked points last season for being behind with wages according to the national players union. In the third division, “there’s always the chance you could lose money,” said Adriano Russo, a player for Frosinone. Fifty-nine percent of players who moved to their current club for a fee said they did not go to their first choice team or were pressured into a move.

Local Union Contact

Phone: +39 44 423 3233
E-mail: assocalciatori@telemar.it
Website: www.assocalciatori.it

Contract Data

27 Months
Average contract length

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No contract copy</td>
<td>☒ ☒ ☒</td>
<td>☒ ☒ ☒</td>
<td>☒ ☒ ☒</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed (civil law contract)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Employment Pressure

6%
Forced to train alone during career

2%
Pressured by club to renew current contract

59%
Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

*Pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.
**PAY DATA**

45% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**

Number of respondents (216)

**NET REMUNERATION/MONTH/US DOLLARS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$0 - $300</th>
<th>$301 - $600</th>
<th>$601 - $1,000</th>
<th>$1,001 - $2,000</th>
<th>$2,001 - $4,000</th>
<th>$4,001 - $8,000</th>
<th>$8,001 - $15,000</th>
<th>$15,001 - $30,000</th>
<th>$30,001 - $60,000</th>
<th>$60,001 - $100,000</th>
<th>Above 100,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK**

21% Less than 10 days paid vacation

20% Unsatisfied with medical support

21% Insecure about employment as footballer

13% Vocational training or university degree

**VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT**

7% Victim of violence by fans

32% Threatened by fans

9% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**

3% Approached by match fixers
Players in Kazakhstan are among the best-paid in Eastern Europe, although they do not receive pension contributions and contracts are short.

“Being a professional footballer is one of the better jobs here,” one of 19 foreign players surveyed said. However, Kazakh player Maxim (not his real name) said second-division players have to travel as many as 40 hours for a match and most are paid late. “We have a lot of money in our game but we don’t know how to spend it,” Maxim said.
**PAY DATA**

- **59%** Late payment (last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**

Number of respondents (101)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>6,9</th>
<th>4,0</th>
<th>10,9</th>
<th>13,9</th>
<th>12,9</th>
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<td>$15,001-$30,000</td>
<td>$30,001-$60,000</td>
<td>$60,001-$1,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK**

- **26%** Less than 10 days paid vacation
- **11%** Unsatisfied with medical support
- **3%** Insecure about employment as footballer

- **75%** Vocational training or university degree

**VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT**

- **1%** Victim of violence by fans
- **1%** Threatened by fans
- **22%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**

- **25%** Approached by match fixers
Country Reports
MALTA

Players
nationality
70%
Maltese

112 Players
surveyed

Because salaries are low most players in Malta’s Premier League hold another job. John (not his real name) is a delivery driver.

“When I play on weekdays I take half a day off,” he said. Poor management means clubs are repeatedly late with wages and standard contracts allow clubs to jettison players if injured for three months, the Malta Football Players Association said. Another issue is clubs can still require transfer compensation for out-of-contract players, more than 20 years after the Bosman ruling.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +356 79 449 989
E-mail: info@maltafpa.com
Website: www.maltafpa.com

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

3%
Forced to train alone during career

N/A
Pressured by club to renew current contract

47%
Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected

CONTRACT DATA

21 MONTHS
Average contract length

13%
No copy of contract

3%
Self-employed (civil law contract)

7%
Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)
**PAY DATA**

- **79%** Late payment (last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**

Number of respondents (101)

- Net remuneration/month/US dollars:
  - 0.001$: 4.0
  - 600$: 12.9
  - 1.000$: 25.7
  - 2.000$: 40.6
  - 4.000$: 13.9
  - 8.000$: 2.0
  - 15.000$: 1.0
  - 30.000$: 0.0
  - 60.000$: 0.0
  - Above 100.000$: 0.0

**VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT**

- **1%** Victim of violence by fans
- **4%** Threatened by fans
- **12%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

**HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK**

- **29%** Less than 10 days paid vacation
- **49%** Unsatisfied with medical support
- **38%** Insecure about employment as footballer
- **35%** Vocational training or university degree

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**

- **16%** Approached by match fixers
Country Reports

MONTENEGRO

Players
nationality

88%
Montenegrins

186 Players
surveyed

Almost quarter of players in Montenegro said they do not have a copy of their own employment contract, and therefore risk mistreatment if they get injured or become involved in a dispute with club management.

According to Stefan (not his real name), who recently quit football, clubs typically do not take out insurance to cover players against injury and sometimes “abandon” them when they are sidelined for months.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

E-mail: sindikat@spfcg.org
Website: www.spfcg.org

CONTRACT DATA

15 MONTHS
Average contract length

- 23% No copy of contract
- 7% Self-employed (civil law contract)
- 8% Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

- 4% Forced to train alone during career
- N/A Pressured by club to renew current contract
- 25% Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.
PAY DATA

53% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

INCOME
Number of respondents (172)

VOCATIONAL TRAINING OR UNIVERSITY DEGREE

HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

44% Less than 10 days paid vacation

25% Unsatisfied with medical support

30% Insecure about employment as footballer

15% Vocational training or university degree

VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

2% Victim of violence by fans

3% Threatened by fans

5% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

4% Approached by match fixers
Players in Norway earn enough money to live comfortably, according to Otto (not his real name), who plays in the second division.

“Not in the same way as Cristiano Ronaldo but you can just focus on the game and nothing else. You don’t have to work on the side.” Ninety-nine percent of players surveyed said they felt at least moderately secure in their profession. Sixty-seven percent had between 26 and 30 days paid holiday last year.
**PAY DATA**

6% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**
Number of respondents (263)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>1.9</th>
<th>16.0</th>
<th>12.5</th>
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<th>5.7</th>
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<th>0.4</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US 0$</td>
<td>30$</td>
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<td>15.000$</td>
<td>30.000$</td>
<td>60.000$</td>
<td>Above 100.000$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK**

4% Less than 10 days paid vacation
13% Unsatisfied with medical support
1% Insecure about employment as footballer
30% Vocational training or university degree

**VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT**

2% Victim of violence by fans
4% Threatened by fans
12% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**

2% Approached by match fixers
In Poland, there is a licensing system in the first division but not in the second tier where there is a higher incidence of teams not paying wages on time.

Players this year campaigned on social media against clubs making squad members train alone to put them under pressure to lower their wages or break contracts following the case of Sebino Plaku, who according to a court ruling, received “appalling treatment” at Slask Wroclaw.

**LOCAL UNION CONTACT**

Phone: +48 42 673 0092  
E-mail: biuro@pzp.info.pl  
Website: www.pzp.info.pl
PAY DATA

45% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

INCOME
Number of respondents (268)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
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</tr>
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<td>1.001$-2.000$</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.001$-4.000$</td>
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<tr>
<td>30.001$-60.000$</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60.001$-100.000$</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 100.000$</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

8% Victim of violence by fans
21% Threatened by fans
15% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

25% Less than 10 days paid vacation
29% Unsatisfied with medical support
6% Generally no day off per week
8% Insecure about employment as footballer
17% Vocational training or university degree

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

2% Approached by match fixers
Country Reports

ROMANIA

Players
nationality

76%

Romanian

Players
surveyed

231

Romanian clubs are among the worst offenders for defaulting on salary payments.

“If you play in the first league there is a good chance that you will get paid but in the second league you don’t know,” Adrian (not his real name) said. In April 2016, following lobby from the national players union, the government absolved legislation that had allowed clubs in financial administration to retain players without paying them.

CONTACT
Phone: +40 21 310 3540
E-mail: office@afan.ro
Website: www.afan.ro

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

15%
Forced to train alone during career

15%
Pressured by club to renew current contract

44%
Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

*pressed by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

CONTRACT DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

N/A
Average contract length

8%
No copy of contract

60%
Self-employed (civil law contract)

2%
Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

Players

Nationality

76%
Romanian

Country Reports

Players

Surveyed

231

Romanian clubs are among the worst offenders for defaulting on salary payments.

“If you play in the first league there is a good chance that you will get paid but in the second league you don’t know,” Adrian (not his real name) said. In April 2016, following lobby from the national players union, the government absolved legislation that had allowed clubs in financial administration to retain players without paying them.

CONTACT
Phone: +40 21 310 3540
E-mail: office@afan.ro
Website: www.afan.ro

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

15%
Forced to train alone during career

15%
Pressured by club to renew current contract

44%
Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

*pressed by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.

CONTRACT DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

N/A
Average contract length

8%
No copy of contract

60%
Self-employed (civil law contract)

2%
Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)
PAY DATA

75% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

AVERAGE INCOME
Number of respondents (220)

Net remuneration/month/US dollars

- 0.9%
- 1.4%
- 0.0%
- 1.8%
- 34.1%
- 38.2%
- 2.7%
- 3.2%
- 3.6%
- 7.7%
- 6.4%
- 1.001$
- 2.000$
- 4.000$
- 8.000$
- 15.000$
- 30.000$
- 60.000$
- 100.000$

HEALTH, WELL-BEING, AND OUTLOOK

- 29% Less than 10 days paid vacation
- 21% Unsatisfied with medical support
- 18% Insecure about employment as footballer
- 38% Vocational training or university degree

VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

- 4% Victim of violence by fans
- 9% Threatened by fans
- 7% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

- 0% Approached by match fixers
Country Reports

RUSSIA

Players

nationality

84%

Russian

Players

surveyed

242

Russian football offers some of the highest wages in the region but many clubs have an irresponsible attitude to finances, prejudicing the career of footballers.

They “first sign contracts and then they look for the money,” according to Vladimir Leonchenko, president of the national players union. “We need a more-healthy model.” A weakening economy means that the budgets of clubs has tumbled in the last three years.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +7 92 580 17474
E-mail: data@psft.ru
Website: www.psft.ru

CONTRACT DATA

N/A

Average contract length

0%

No copy of contract

0%

Self-employed (civil law contract)

13%

Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

0%

Forced to train alone during career

0%

Pressured by club to renew current contract

N/A

Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.
PAY DATA

**25%** Late payment (last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**
Number of respondents (241)

- Net remuneration/month/US dollars
  - 0.0
  - 2.9
  - 9.5
  - 16.2
  - 23.7
  - 20.7
  - 8.7
  - 5.4
  - 2.9
  - 10.0

HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

- Less than 10 days paid vacation: 0%
- Unsatisfied with medical support: 1%
- Insecure about employment as footballer: 3%

VOCATIONAL TRAINING

- Vocational training or university degree: 39%

VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

- Victim of violence by fans: N/A
- Threatened by fans: N/A
- Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players): N/A

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

- Approached by match fixers: 2%
## 2016 Football Employment Report
### Scotland

**Country Reports**

### Scotland

**Players nationality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>84%</td>
<td>Scottish</td>
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**Players surveyed**: 168

### Employment Pressure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Issue Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Pressured by club to renew current contract</td>
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</table>

### Contract Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No copy of contract</th>
<th>Self-employed (civil law contract)</th>
<th>Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YEAR 1</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Average contract length

- **22 MONTHS**

---

**Scottish football has rigorous rules to make sure all players are paid on time.**

However, some clubs “pick and choose” which players they cover with private medical insurance, the national players union said. “They will pay for the star striker but not the player who has 6 months left on his contract,” the union said. Some footballers have had to wait 6 months for surgery in the public health sector. Thirty-three percent are not satisfied with the medical support at their clubs.

### Local Union Contact

**PFA Scotland**

Phone: +44 14 135 30199  
E-mail: info@pfascotland.co.uk  
Website: www.pfascotland.co.uk
**PAY DATA**

- **5%** Late payment (last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**

Number of respondents (58)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-3000$</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3001$-6000$</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>12.1%</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>300001$-600000$</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600001$-1000000$</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 1000000$</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK**

- **36%** Less than 10 days paid vacation
- **19%** Unsatisfied with medical support
- **14%** Insecure about employment as footballer
- **14%** Vocational training or university degree
- **1%** Generally no day off per week

**VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT**

- **3%** Victim of violence by fans
- **35%** Threatened by fans
- **28%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**

- **1%** Approached by match fixers
Country Reports

**SERBIA**

Players nationality

96% Serbian

265 Players surveyed

---

**SERBIA’s football league is among the least hospitable for footballers.**

The national players union has overseen 250 cases of players going to court in the last two years in a league with 500 players. “When you sign a contract you have a 50% chance of ending up in court,” Mirko Poledica, the union president, said. Footballers also face attacks from hooligans when their form dips. The Serbian federation plans to introduce licensing rules in 2017-18 with a view to improving conditions.

---

**EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE**

9% Forced to train alone during career

21% Pressured by club to renew current contract

96% Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

---

**CONTRACT DATA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR 1</th>
<th>YEAR 2</th>
<th>YEAR 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>🌟🌟🌟</td>
<td>🌟🌟🌟</td>
<td>🌟🌟🌟</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25 MONTHS

Average contract length

13% No copy of contract

0% Self-employed (civil law contract)

6% Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

---

**LOCAL UNION CONTACT**

Phone: +381 11
E-mail: sindikatfudbalera@gmail.com
Website: www.sindikatfudbalera.org
PAY DATA

68% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

INCOME
Number of respondents (235)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Range</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>$0 - $300</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>$301 - $600</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>$601 - $1,000</td>
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<td>$2,001 - $4,000</td>
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<td>$4,001 - $8,000</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$8,001 - $15,000</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>$15,001 - $30,000</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30,001 - $60,000</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$60,001 - $100,000</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Net remuneration/month/US dollars

HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

23% Less than 10 days paid vacation
14% Unsatisfied with medical support
18% Insecure about employment as footballer
13% Vocational training or university degree

VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

2% Victim of violence by fans
6% Threatened by fans
5% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

6% Approached by match fixers
Country Reports

SLOVENIA

Players nationality

72% Slovenian

95 Players surveyed

Less than one-third of the 95 players surveyed get their pay on time.

“One club director even told the players: you play better when you are not paid on time,” Dejan Stefanovic, president of the national players union, said. “They like to keep the pressure on.” While most players have self-employed contracts with a lower income tax rate, the government is gradually phasing out these in favour of employment contracts.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +386 14 341 280
E-mail: office@spins-sindikat.si
Website: www.spins.si

CONTRACT DATA

23 MONTHS
Average contract length

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR 1</th>
<th>YEAR 2</th>
<th>YEAR 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✗ ✗ ✗</td>
<td>✗ ✗ ✗</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12% No copy of contract
73% Self-employed (civil law contract)
4% Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

7% Forced to train alone during career
12% Pressured by club to renew current contract
47% Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.
PAY DATA

70% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

INCOME
Number of respondents (81)

Net remuneration/month/US dollars

Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)
Threatened by fans
Victim of violence by fans
Unsatisfied with medical support
Generally no day off per week
Insecure about employment as footballer

HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK
30% Less than 10 days paid vacation
33% Unsatisfied with medical support
24% Insecure about employment as footballer
26% Vocational training or university degree

VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT
4% Victim of violence by fans
7% Threatened by fans
12% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES
6% Approached by match fixers

PAY DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60,001$ - 100,000$</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 100,000$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VOCATIONAL TRAINING OR UNIVERSITY DEGREE

33%

INCOME

6%

HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

30%

VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

4%

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

6%
Players in Sweden earn a decent salary but for many it’s not enough to fall back on when they stop playing, Henrik (not his real name) said.

Conditions in the league are good -- 67 percent felt very secure at their club. However, Henrik said footballers get only 80 percent of their salary when they are injured. “It means players are pulling out of tackles in training,” he said. The national players union is lobbying to grant footballers an exemption from this state regulation.

**LOCAL UNION CONTACT**

Phone: +46 31 757 1500  
E-mail: info@spelarforeningen.com  
Website: www.spelarforeningen.com
### PAY DATA

- **12%** Late payment (last 2 seasons)

### INCOME

- **Number of respondents (346)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0-$300</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$301-$600</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$601-$1,000</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,001-$2,000</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2,001-$4,000</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4,001-$8,000</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$8,001-$15,000</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,001-$30,000</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30,001-$60,000</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$60,001-$100,000</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above $100,000</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK

- **7%** Less than 10 days paid vacation
- **17%** Unsatisfied with medical support
- **4%** Insecure about employment as footballer
- **14%** Vocational training or university degree

### VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT

- **2%** Victim of violence by fans
- **15%** Threatened by fans
- **23%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

### MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES

- **3%** Approached by match fixers
The Swiss football league is very well organized and the national federation is quick to punish teams if they fall behind with salaries, according to Joseph (not his real name).

In six years, he said, he had not had any problems with receiving pay. Seventy-seven percent of footballers said they felt either secure or very secure in their profession. Footballers are not under as much pressure as their counterparts in Mediterranean countries, Joseph said.

**Players surveyed**

211

**Players nationality**

68%

Swiss

**EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE**

5%

Forced to train alone during career

2%

Pressured by club to renew current contract

40%

Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected

**CONTRACT DATA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No copy of contract</th>
<th>1%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed (civil law contract)</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Average contract length**

30 MONTHS

**Country Reports**

**SWITZERLAND**

**LOCAL UNION CONTACT**

Phone: +41 44 829 2250
E-mail: info@safp.ch
Website: www.safp.ch
PAY DATA
11% Late payment (last 2 seasons)

INCOME
Number of respondents (143)

Net remuneration/month/US dollars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0$</th>
<th>300$</th>
<th>600$</th>
<th>900$</th>
<th>1.200$</th>
<th>1.500$</th>
<th>1.800$</th>
<th>2.100$</th>
<th>3.000$</th>
<th>4.000$</th>
<th>5.000$</th>
<th>6.000$</th>
<th>7.000$</th>
<th>8.000$</th>
<th>9.000$</th>
<th>10.000$</th>
<th>Above 10.000$</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>14.7</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK
16% Less than 10 days paid vacation
17% Unsatisfied with medical support
8% Insecure about employment as footballer

VOCATIONAL TRAINING
48% Vocational training or university degree

VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT
3% Victim of violence by fans
2% Threatened by fans
10% Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES
5% Approached by match fixers
Country Reports

TURKEY

Players nationality
93%
Turkish

185 Players surveyed

The finances of Turkish clubs are chaotic. Club presidents sign star players on time but don’t pay the rest of squad.

One trick clubs use is to fine players who they owe salary payments just before their contract expires. A few top teams are becoming more careful with their money because they risk breaking UEFA Financial Fair Play rules and exclusion from the Champions League and Europa League. Galatasaray is serving a UEFA ban.
### Pay Data

**77%** Late payment (last 2 seasons)

#### Income

Number of respondents (169)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net remuneration/month/US dollars</th>
<th>0$–300$</th>
<th>301$–600$</th>
<th>601$–1,000$</th>
<th>1,001$–2,000$</th>
<th>2,001$–4,000$</th>
<th>4,001$–8,000$</th>
<th>8,001$–15,000$</th>
<th>15,001$–30,000$</th>
<th>30,001$–60,000$</th>
<th>60,001$–1,000,000$</th>
<th>Above 1,000,000$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Health, Well-Being and Outlook

- **45%** Less than 10 days paid vacation
- **29%** Unsatisfied with medical support
- **21%** Insecure about employment as footballer
- **27%** Vocational training or university degree

### Violence and Harassment

- **5%** Victim of violence by fans
- **25%** Threatened by fans
- **33%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

### Match-Fixing Approaches

- **8%** Approached by match fixers
Country Reports

UKRAINE

Players
nationality

97%
Ukrainian

482 Players
surveyed

Conflict with Russia has severely affected the finances of the Ukraine league, forcing clubs in the north of the country to relocate and cut salaries in half.

Some clubs have gone out of business, leaving players without jobs. “The situation of the league is slowly going down,” Sergey (not his real name) said. Only a few of the biggest teams such as Dynamo Kiev are stable financially, he said.

LOCAL UNION CONTACT

Phone: +380 44 279 2941
E-mail: office@apfu.org.ua
Website: www.apfu.org.ua

20 MONTHS

Average contract length

22% No copy of contract
35% Self-employed (civil law contract)
11% Secondary contract (for image rights, tax, other reasons)

CONTRACT DATA

EMPLOYMENT PRESSURE

4% Forced to train alone during career
4% Pressured by club to renew current contract
37% Restricted freedom of movement* (in transfer with fee)

*pressured by previous club or agent; or had request to join different club rejected.
**PAY DATA**

- **43%** Late payment (last 2 seasons)

**INCOME**

Number of respondents (461)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Range (US$)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Below 3000</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3001-6000</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6001-10000</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10001-20000</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20001-40000</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40001-80000</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80001-15000</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15001-30000</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30001-60000</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60001-100000</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HEALTH, WELL-BEING AND OUTLOOK**

- **14%** Less than 10 days paid vacation
- **18%** Unsatisfied with medical support
- **8%** Insecure about employment as footballer
- **12%** Generally no day off per week

- **83%** Vocational training or university degree

**VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT**

- **N/A** Victim of violence by fans
- **N/A** Threatened by fans
- **4%** Bullied or harassed (by fans, club staff or players)

**MATCH-FIXING APPROACHES**

- **7%** Approached by match fixers
Working conditions in professional football

SURVEY

ASIA

Data coming soon...